{"title":"维特根斯坦论罗素的判断论","authors":"Guy Stock","doi":"10.1017/S0080443600000273","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In the early years of this century the debate as to the nature of judgment was a central issue dividing British philosophers. What a philosopher said about judgment was not independent of what he said about perception, the distinction between the a priori and empirical, the distinction between external and internal relations, the nature of inference, truth, universals, language, the reality of the self and so on.","PeriodicalId":322312,"journal":{"name":"Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1973-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Wittgenstein on Russell's Theory of Judgment\",\"authors\":\"Guy Stock\",\"doi\":\"10.1017/S0080443600000273\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In the early years of this century the debate as to the nature of judgment was a central issue dividing British philosophers. What a philosopher said about judgment was not independent of what he said about perception, the distinction between the a priori and empirical, the distinction between external and internal relations, the nature of inference, truth, universals, language, the reality of the self and so on.\",\"PeriodicalId\":322312,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures\",\"volume\":\"25 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1973-03-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0080443600000273\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0080443600000273","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
In the early years of this century the debate as to the nature of judgment was a central issue dividing British philosophers. What a philosopher said about judgment was not independent of what he said about perception, the distinction between the a priori and empirical, the distinction between external and internal relations, the nature of inference, truth, universals, language, the reality of the self and so on.