晋升的劳动力市场信号价值

Bobak Moallemi, Ramana Ramakrishnan, Ryan Shyu
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引用次数: 5

摘要

企业是否从其他企业的人力资源配置决策中学习?本文在员工晋升的背景下研究这一问题,根据理论,在员工能力不对称学习的情况下,员工晋升是向外部雇主提供信息的信号。利用LinkedIn简历上发布晋升报告时间的变化,我们实施了一种差异中的差异策略,以证明在线晋升报告增加了招聘人员发起的员工联系(“电子邮件”)。晋升的信号影响主要集中在那些最近吸引了以前招聘人员兴趣的人身上,这与这些员工对公司信息获取的更高期望值是一致的。
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The Labor Market Signaling Value of Promotions
Do firms learn from other firms' human resource allocation decisions? This paper studies this question in the context of worker promotions, which according to theory serve as informative signals to external employers under asymmetric learning about employee ability. Using variation in the timing of promotion reports on LinkedIn CVs, we implement a differences-in-differences strategy to demonstrate that online promotion reports increase recruiter-initiated worker contacts ("InMails''). The signaling impact of promotions is concentrated among those who have recently attracted previous recruiter interest, consistent with a higher expected value of firm information acquisition among such workers.
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Effect of Recruitment, Training, and Placement on Performance of Employee The Labor Market Signaling Value of Promotions К Вопросу Об Эффективности Подбора и Оценки Персонала в Сфере Недвижимости (To a Question of the Effectiveness of Personnel Selection and Assessment in the Real Estate Sphere)
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