正当的信念、理由和证据

A. Millar
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引用次数: 0

摘要

信仰的规范性理由——相信某事的理由——是由真理或事实构成的。这些理由不同于信念的动机理由,即主体相信某事的理由。这些都是由被主体视为相信理由的考虑因素构成的。一个人有一个正当的信念,在一个有充分根据的信念的意义上,只有当考虑构成一个动机的原因是他所知道的真理。基于证据的知识,即P是用真理或事实来解释的,这些真理或事实提供了充分的理由来相信P。有人认为,并非所有的知识都是基于证据的,并建议我们需要理解“足以证明知识的证据是确凿的证据”这一概念。讨论解决了Jennifer Hornsby提出的关于规范原因和激励原因之间区别的问题。
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Justified Belief, Reasons, and Evidence
Normative reasons for belief—reasons to believe something—are constituted by truths or facts. Such reasons are distinguished from motivating reasons for belief, that is, reasons for which a subject believes something. These are constituted by considerations that the subject treats as reasons to believe. One has a justified belief, in the sense of a well-founded belief, only if the considerations that constitute one’s motivating reason are truths that one knows. Evidence-based knowledge that P is explicated in terms truths or facts that provide an adequate reason to believe that P. It is argued that not all knowledge is evidence-based, and suggested that we need to make sense of the idea that evidence adequate for knowledge is clinching evidence. The discussion addresses a problem raised by Jennifer Hornsby about the distinction between normative and motivating reasons.
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