Pub Date : 2019-01-31DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198755692.003.0003
A. Millar
Direct Realism is the thesis that our perception of mind-independent things is routinely direct. It is true if and only if, routinely, our perception of mind-independent things is not by means of perceiving something that is distinct and separate from those things. This chapter defends Direct Realism. It begins with an examination of reasons that have been given in the past for rejecting it, focusing on Hume and G. E. Moore. There follows a discussion of relationalist versus non-relationalist conceptions of perceptual experience. Particular attention is given to reconciling a non-relationalist conception with Direct Realism. To this end discussion is focused on how perception facilitates perceptual–demonstrative thought. An important role is played by a view of how to understand non-committal descriptions of experiences. This view figures in a response to problems raised by Michael Martin for non-relationist conceptions of experience.
{"title":"Perception, Experience, and Direct Realism","authors":"A. Millar","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198755692.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198755692.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"Direct Realism is the thesis that our perception of mind-independent things is routinely direct. It is true if and only if, routinely, our perception of mind-independent things is not by means of perceiving something that is distinct and separate from those things. This chapter defends Direct Realism. It begins with an examination of reasons that have been given in the past for rejecting it, focusing on Hume and G. E. Moore. There follows a discussion of relationalist versus non-relationalist conceptions of perceptual experience. Particular attention is given to reconciling a non-relationalist conception with Direct Realism. To this end discussion is focused on how perception facilitates perceptual–demonstrative thought. An important role is played by a view of how to understand non-committal descriptions of experiences. This view figures in a response to problems raised by Michael Martin for non-relationist conceptions of experience.","PeriodicalId":402307,"journal":{"name":"Knowing by Perceiving","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126573539","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-31DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198755692.003.0005
A. Millar
The discussion in this chapter is critical of theories that treat experiences, conceived in a non-relationalistic fashion, as evidence for beliefs, as in the work of Earl Conee and Richard Feldman. It is also critical of James Pryor’s theory of immediate justification. Judgements implicated in recognition, being exercises of general recognitional abilities, are regarded as rationally responsive to ways the world is. Justification for beliefs acquired in acts of recognition is provided by truths as to what one perceives to be so. An account is given of our access to such truths, and objections to the view of justification are addressed. Affinities with, and differences from, views advanced by John McDowell are explored, with particular attention given to his conceptions of experience. Implications for empiricism are drawn out.
{"title":"Perception and the Justification of Belief","authors":"A. Millar","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198755692.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198755692.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"The discussion in this chapter is critical of theories that treat experiences, conceived in a non-relationalistic fashion, as evidence for beliefs, as in the work of Earl Conee and Richard Feldman. It is also critical of James Pryor’s theory of immediate justification. Judgements implicated in recognition, being exercises of general recognitional abilities, are regarded as rationally responsive to ways the world is. Justification for beliefs acquired in acts of recognition is provided by truths as to what one perceives to be so. An account is given of our access to such truths, and objections to the view of justification are addressed. Affinities with, and differences from, views advanced by John McDowell are explored, with particular attention given to his conceptions of experience. Implications for empiricism are drawn out.","PeriodicalId":402307,"journal":{"name":"Knowing by Perceiving","volume":"89 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123067432","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-31DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198755692.003.0007
A. Millar
Perceptual knowledge is viewed as a paradigm of knowledge in virtue of so clearly exemplifying cognitive contact with a fact in an act—recognition—in which reason reaches out to the fact itself. This outlook is contrasted with that on which the work of reason is confined to forming a belief that might or might not be true in a manner that reliably but not infallibly yields true beliefs. The latter outlook is implicit in strands of virtue epistemology, notably in work of Greco and Sosa. It is argued that we should not attempt to explicate recognitional abilities in terms of more basic abilities that bear directly on the justification of belief or in terms of more basic belief-forming dispositions. Some complexities concerning the individuation of recognitional abilities are explored.
{"title":"Abilities","authors":"A. Millar","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198755692.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198755692.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"Perceptual knowledge is viewed as a paradigm of knowledge in virtue of so clearly exemplifying cognitive contact with a fact in an act—recognition—in which reason reaches out to the fact itself. This outlook is contrasted with that on which the work of reason is confined to forming a belief that might or might not be true in a manner that reliably but not infallibly yields true beliefs. The latter outlook is implicit in strands of virtue epistemology, notably in work of Greco and Sosa. It is argued that we should not attempt to explicate recognitional abilities in terms of more basic abilities that bear directly on the justification of belief or in terms of more basic belief-forming dispositions. Some complexities concerning the individuation of recognitional abilities are explored.","PeriodicalId":402307,"journal":{"name":"Knowing by Perceiving","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123593050","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-31DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198755692.003.0008
A. Millar
The focus is on knowing that something is so by perceiving something that indicates that it is so. It is argued that some of our knowledge of this sort is more akin to perceptual knowledge than might at first appear. This is because recognition figures in two ways. We recognize the indicating phenomenon as being of a certain sort and we recognize the indicative significance of the indicator. The view is shown to be compatible with taking the knowledge in question to be evidence-based. An alternative model—the covering generalization model—is critically discussed. Since generalizations do figure in our thinking about indicators, their status is discussed. This leads into a more general discussion of standing factual knowledge that touches on public knowledge and picks up themes from Moore and Wittgenstein.
{"title":"Knowledge from Perceived Indicators and Background Knowledge","authors":"A. Millar","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198755692.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198755692.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"The focus is on knowing that something is so by perceiving something that indicates that it is so. It is argued that some of our knowledge of this sort is more akin to perceptual knowledge than might at first appear. This is because recognition figures in two ways. We recognize the indicating phenomenon as being of a certain sort and we recognize the indicative significance of the indicator. The view is shown to be compatible with taking the knowledge in question to be evidence-based. An alternative model—the covering generalization model—is critically discussed. Since generalizations do figure in our thinking about indicators, their status is discussed. This leads into a more general discussion of standing factual knowledge that touches on public knowledge and picks up themes from Moore and Wittgenstein.","PeriodicalId":402307,"journal":{"name":"Knowing by Perceiving","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128613010","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-31DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198755692.003.0009
A. Millar
We have knowledge and often know that we have it. It is argued that epistemology should be guided by what we know about knowledge and not simply by so-called intuitions. This theme is worked out within a broader discussion of method in epistemology. Considerations motivating resistance to such a view are discussed, including the Russellian Retreat mentioned by Crispin Wright and the quest to understand human knowledge in general discussed by Barry Stroud. Sources of puzzlement about how we can have knowledge of our environment are identified. A positive lesson—the limits to self-understanding—is drawn from Stroud. Arguments from Ignorance (by Sceptical Hypotheses) in support of scepticism are critically discussed. It is suggested that the right response to scepticism is to show what is mistaken about the theories that underpin it.
{"title":"Going By What We Know","authors":"A. Millar","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198755692.003.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198755692.003.0009","url":null,"abstract":"We have knowledge and often know that we have it. It is argued that epistemology should be guided by what we know about knowledge and not simply by so-called intuitions. This theme is worked out within a broader discussion of method in epistemology. Considerations motivating resistance to such a view are discussed, including the Russellian Retreat mentioned by Crispin Wright and the quest to understand human knowledge in general discussed by Barry Stroud. Sources of puzzlement about how we can have knowledge of our environment are identified. A positive lesson—the limits to self-understanding—is drawn from Stroud. Arguments from Ignorance (by Sceptical Hypotheses) in support of scepticism are critically discussed. It is suggested that the right response to scepticism is to show what is mistaken about the theories that underpin it.","PeriodicalId":402307,"journal":{"name":"Knowing by Perceiving","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128818283","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-31DOI: 10.1093/OSO/9780198755692.003.0002
A. Millar
Normative reasons for belief—reasons to believe something—are constituted by truths or facts. Such reasons are distinguished from motivating reasons for belief, that is, reasons for which a subject believes something. These are constituted by considerations that the subject treats as reasons to believe. One has a justified belief, in the sense of a well-founded belief, only if the considerations that constitute one’s motivating reason are truths that one knows. Evidence-based knowledge that P is explicated in terms truths or facts that provide an adequate reason to believe that P. It is argued that not all knowledge is evidence-based, and suggested that we need to make sense of the idea that evidence adequate for knowledge is clinching evidence. The discussion addresses a problem raised by Jennifer Hornsby about the distinction between normative and motivating reasons.
{"title":"Justified Belief, Reasons, and Evidence","authors":"A. Millar","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780198755692.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780198755692.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"Normative reasons for belief—reasons to believe something—are constituted by truths or facts. Such reasons are distinguished from motivating reasons for belief, that is, reasons for which a subject believes something. These are constituted by considerations that the subject treats as reasons to believe. One has a justified belief, in the sense of a well-founded belief, only if the considerations that constitute one’s motivating reason are truths that one knows. Evidence-based knowledge that P is explicated in terms truths or facts that provide an adequate reason to believe that P. It is argued that not all knowledge is evidence-based, and suggested that we need to make sense of the idea that evidence adequate for knowledge is clinching evidence. The discussion addresses a problem raised by Jennifer Hornsby about the distinction between normative and motivating reasons.","PeriodicalId":402307,"journal":{"name":"Knowing by Perceiving","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121206851","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-31DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198755692.003.0001
A. Millar
Mainstream epistemology has aimed to provide reductive analyses of knowledge in terms of conditions on belief. Kinds of knowledge, for instance, perceptual knowledge and knowledge from testimony, are supposed to be explicated by drawing on the general analysis. This chapter outlines an alternative approach to epistemological method that aims to provide substantive accounts of knowledge of particular kinds and to illuminate knowledge in general in terms of those accounts. A case is made for the claim that those enquiring into the truth of some matter should aim at knowledge, and indeed reflective knowledge. It is argued that although epistemology is concerned with the nature of knowledge it should be sensitive to how the concept of knowledge figures in our thinking. Fruitful conceptual enquiry need not aim to provide analyses of concepts.
{"title":"Epistemology and Philosophical Method","authors":"A. Millar","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198755692.003.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198755692.003.0001","url":null,"abstract":"Mainstream epistemology has aimed to provide reductive analyses of knowledge in terms of conditions on belief. Kinds of knowledge, for instance, perceptual knowledge and knowledge from testimony, are supposed to be explicated by drawing on the general analysis. This chapter outlines an alternative approach to epistemological method that aims to provide substantive accounts of knowledge of particular kinds and to illuminate knowledge in general in terms of those accounts. A case is made for the claim that those enquiring into the truth of some matter should aim at knowledge, and indeed reflective knowledge. It is argued that although epistemology is concerned with the nature of knowledge it should be sensitive to how the concept of knowledge figures in our thinking. Fruitful conceptual enquiry need not aim to provide analyses of concepts.","PeriodicalId":402307,"journal":{"name":"Knowing by Perceiving","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134647639","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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