潘朵拉的盒子

Curtis Bechtel, S. Dughmi, Neel Patel
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引用次数: 13

摘要

在委托问题中,委托人没有完成特定任务所需的资源,因此他们将任务委托给不受信任的代理,代理的利益可能与自己不同。给定这类问题的任意族和委托人可以选择的机制空间,委托缺口是委托人委托时的最优效用与自己解决问题时的最优效用的最坏情况之比。在本文中,我们考虑广义潘多拉盒子问题的委托缺口,这是一个搜索问题,其中搜索解决方案会产生已知的成本,并且解决方案受到某些向下封闭约束的限制。首先,我们证明了一种特殊情况,当所有随机变量都有二进制支持时,对于矩阵约束存在常因子委托间隙。然而,即使对于简单的非二进制问题实例,也不存在常量因子委托差距。为了避免这种不可能性,我们考虑了两种变体:自由代理模型,在这种模型中,代理不支付探测元素的成本;贴现成本近似,在这种模型中,我们贴现所有成本,并以贴现因子和委托差距的双标准近似为目标。我们证明了在具有一定向下封闭约束和恒定折扣因子的贴现成本近似的自由代理模型中存在恒定因素的委托缺口。然而,在任何一种变体下都不能实现恒定的委托间隙。最后,我们考虑了另一种称为共享成本模型的变体,在该模型中,委托人可以在委托搜索问题之前选择如何在他们和代理之间共享成本。我们证明,对于某些向下封闭的约束,共享成本模型表现出恒定因子的委托缺口。
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Delegated Pandora's Box
In delegation problems, a principal does not have the resources necessary to complete a particular task, so they delegate the task to an untrusted agent whose interests may differ from their own. Given any family of such problems and space of mechanisms for the principal to choose from, the delegation gap is the worst-case ratio of the principal's optimal utility when they delegate versus their optimal utility when solving the problem on their own. In this work, we consider the delegation gap of the generalized Pandora's box problem, a search problem in which searching for solutions incurs known costs and solutions are restricted by some downward-closed constraint. First, we show that there is a special case when all random variables have binary support for which there exist constant-factor delegation gaps for matroid constraints. However, there is no constant-factor delegation gap for even simple non-binary instances of the problem. Getting around this impossibility, we consider two variants: the free-agent model, in which the agent doesn't pay the cost of probing elements, and discounted-cost approximations, in which we discount all costs and aim for a bicriteria approximation of the discount factor and delegation gap. We show that there are constant-factor delegation gaps in the free-agent model with discounted-cost approximations for certain downward closed constraints and constant discount factors. However, constant delegation gaps can not be achieved under either variant alone. Finally, we consider another variant called the shared-cost model, in which the principal can choose how costs will be shared between them and the agent before delegating the search problem. We show that the shared-cost model exhibits a constant-factor delegation gap for certain downward closed constraints.
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