{"title":"风险规避下,成本相关信息共享可以增加消费者福利","authors":"Murat C. Mungan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2644962","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\nExisting literature suggests that the sharing of firm-specific information related to costs of production among Cournot competitors unambiguously reduces consumer welfare. This article shows that this result does not hold when at least one firm is risk-averse. Perhaps more importantly, if consumers are sufficiently risk-averse allowing information sharing leads to a Pareto improvement.","PeriodicalId":133015,"journal":{"name":"Florida State University Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2015-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Sharing of Cost Related Information Can Increase Consumer Welfare Under Risk-Aversion\",\"authors\":\"Murat C. Mungan\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2644962\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\nExisting literature suggests that the sharing of firm-specific information related to costs of production among Cournot competitors unambiguously reduces consumer welfare. This article shows that this result does not hold when at least one firm is risk-averse. Perhaps more importantly, if consumers are sufficiently risk-averse allowing information sharing leads to a Pareto improvement.\",\"PeriodicalId\":133015,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Florida State University Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series\",\"volume\":\"10 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2015-08-15\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Florida State University Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2644962\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Florida State University Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2644962","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Sharing of Cost Related Information Can Increase Consumer Welfare Under Risk-Aversion
Existing literature suggests that the sharing of firm-specific information related to costs of production among Cournot competitors unambiguously reduces consumer welfare. This article shows that this result does not hold when at least one firm is risk-averse. Perhaps more importantly, if consumers are sufficiently risk-averse allowing information sharing leads to a Pareto improvement.