下议院的指挥权向何处去?选择安全胜于控制

Sameer P. Lalwani, Joshua R. Shifrinson
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引用次数: 5

摘要

美国指挥全球公域的能力——货物、人员和信息流动的海洋、空中和太空领域——在过去30年里一直是美国国家安全的支柱。美国通过追求我们所说的对公地的控制来确保它的指挥:防止国家和非国家行为体对美国军事主导地位的可能威胁的出现,远远早于它们的实际表现。在预算被削减、新兴大国在国际事务中发挥越来越大的影响力之际,对公地的控制越来越难以为继。取而代之的是,本文提倡一种新的方法来保持对公地的控制,我们称之为“公地的安全”。关注海洋领域,我们首先认为全球海洋公域远比许多人认识到的更有弹性:公域的潜在威胁被夸大了,因为其他行为者缺乏足够的手段或动机来严重扰乱美国的指挥。因此,美国有很大的空间在保留指挥权的同时减少其军事足迹。因此,我们提倡的基于安全的方法要求美国减少其在世界各地的军事存在,作为向超视距战略存在迈进的一部分。这一变化将减少搭便车的问题,减少与其他强国的不安全螺旋上升的风险,同时使美国拥有一种强大的能力——无论是单独行动还是与其他国家合作——在威胁显现时击败对共同利益的威胁。这种方法还将使美国能够重新投资于美国实力的来源,以维持其在全球秩序中的地位。
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Whither Command of the Commons? Choosing Security over Control
The United States’ ability to command the global commons – the sea, air, and space domains through which goods, people, and information flow – has been a pillar of United States national security for the last thirty years. The United States has ensured its command by pursuing what we term control of the commons: preventing the emergence of plausible threats to U.S. military dominance by state and non-state actors alike, well ahead of their actual manifestation. At a time when budgets are being cut and new great powers exert increasing influence in international affairs, control of the commons is increasingly unsustainable.In its stead, this paper advocates for a new approach to retaining command of the commons, what we term “security of the commons.” Focusing on the maritime domain, we first argue that the global maritime commons is far more resilient than many recognize: potential threats to the commons are overstated as other actors lack sufficient means or incentives to severely disrupt U.S. command. As a result, there is significant room for the United States to reduce its military footprint while retaining command. Thus, the security-based approach we advocate calls for the United States to reduce its military presence around the world as part of a move towards an over-the-horizon strategic presence. This change would reduce the problem of free-riding and the risk of spirals of insecurity with other powerful actors while leaving the United States a significant capacity – on its own and in partnership with other nations – to defeat threats to the commons if and when they manifest. This approach will also allow the United States to reinvest in the sources of American power that will sustain its position in the global order.
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