{"title":"论终身聘用合同政策的有效性","authors":"K. Ohnishi","doi":"10.1111/1467-9957.00326","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines a subgame perfect equilibrium when one of two duopolists executes a lifetime-employment-contract policy, which is a strategic commitment that generates kinks in the reaction curve, by using a two-stage quantity-setting model. The purpose of the paper is to show concretely in what kinds of cases the policy is effective. Copyright 2002 by Blackwell Publishers Ltd and The Victoria University of Manchester","PeriodicalId":130467,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Manchester School","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2002-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"13","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"On the Effectiveness of the Lifetime-Employment-Contract Policy\",\"authors\":\"K. Ohnishi\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/1467-9957.00326\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper examines a subgame perfect equilibrium when one of two duopolists executes a lifetime-employment-contract policy, which is a strategic commitment that generates kinks in the reaction curve, by using a two-stage quantity-setting model. The purpose of the paper is to show concretely in what kinds of cases the policy is effective. Copyright 2002 by Blackwell Publishers Ltd and The Victoria University of Manchester\",\"PeriodicalId\":130467,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Wiley-Blackwell: Manchester School\",\"volume\":\"15 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2002-12-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"13\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Wiley-Blackwell: Manchester School\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9957.00326\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Wiley-Blackwell: Manchester School","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9957.00326","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
On the Effectiveness of the Lifetime-Employment-Contract Policy
This paper examines a subgame perfect equilibrium when one of two duopolists executes a lifetime-employment-contract policy, which is a strategic commitment that generates kinks in the reaction curve, by using a two-stage quantity-setting model. The purpose of the paper is to show concretely in what kinds of cases the policy is effective. Copyright 2002 by Blackwell Publishers Ltd and The Victoria University of Manchester
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