Policies targeted at high-crime neighbourhoods may have unintended consequences in the presence of organised crime. Whilst they reduce the incentive to commit crime at the margin, those who still choose to join the criminal organisation are hardened criminals. Large organisations take advantage of this, substituting away from membership size towards increased individual criminal activity. Aggregate crime may rise. However, as more would-be recruits move into the formal labour market, falling revenue causes a reversal of this effect. Thereafter, the policy reduces both size and individual activity simultaneously.
{"title":"The Storm Before the Calm? Adverse Effects of Tackling Organized Crime","authors":"I. Long","doi":"10.1111/manc.12155","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.12155","url":null,"abstract":"Policies targeted at high-crime neighbourhoods may have unintended consequences in the presence of organised crime. Whilst they reduce the incentive to commit crime at the margin, those who still choose to join the criminal organisation are hardened criminals. Large organisations take advantage of this, substituting away from membership size towards increased individual criminal activity. Aggregate crime may rise. However, as more would-be recruits move into the formal labour market, falling revenue causes a reversal of this effect. Thereafter, the policy reduces both size and individual activity simultaneously.","PeriodicalId":130467,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Manchester School","volume":"47 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130808852","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper studies monopolistic third-degree price discrimination, incorporating consumers' fairness concerns: discriminatory pricing antagonizes consumers and may reduce their demand. In contrast to the findings in previous studies, we show that consumers' concerns regarding price inequalities may deter discriminatory pricing by monopolists. Furthermore, a strong aversion to unfair pricing may improve social welfare compared with the situation in which consumers do not perceive price discrimination as unfair. Conversely, if the disutility from price inequality is not sufficiently large, social welfare decreases.
{"title":"Third‐Degree Price Discrimination with Fairness‐Concerned Consumers","authors":"Tomohisa Okada","doi":"10.1111/manc.12041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.12041","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies monopolistic third-degree price discrimination, incorporating consumers' fairness concerns: discriminatory pricing antagonizes consumers and may reduce their demand. In contrast to the findings in previous studies, we show that consumers' concerns regarding price inequalities may deter discriminatory pricing by monopolists. Furthermore, a strong aversion to unfair pricing may improve social welfare compared with the situation in which consumers do not perceive price discrimination as unfair. Conversely, if the disutility from price inequality is not sufficiently large, social welfare decreases.","PeriodicalId":130467,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Manchester School","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127272051","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper studies licensing of a cost-reducing innovation in an environment with horizontal product differentiation where the licensee is the most efficient firm in absence of the innovation. We derive the optimal two-part tariff and show that when we allow for negative royalty rates, the optimal contract may involve the patentee paying its rival a per-unit subsidy.
{"title":"Licensing to a More Efficient Rival","authors":"F. Anderson","doi":"10.1111/manc.12036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.12036","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies licensing of a cost-reducing innovation in an environment with horizontal product differentiation where the licensee is the most efficient firm in absence of the innovation. We derive the optimal two-part tariff and show that when we allow for negative royalty rates, the optimal contract may involve the patentee paying its rival a per-unit subsidy.","PeriodicalId":130467,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Manchester School","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128332174","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-08-24DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9957.2012.02328.x
Cruz A. Echevarría
This note extends the Barro (Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98 (1990), No. 5 part II, pp. S103–S125) model to a two‐period, OLG economy with aggregate uncertainty. We show that the government sizes maximizing average growth and individual welfare in a market economy coincide and are not affected by the introduction of uncertainty. The maximum average growth rate, however, does depend on the aggregate uncertainty, the individuals' risk aversion and how the intertemporal elasticity of substitution compares with one. Individual welfare is lower in the stochastic economy. Failing to include uncertainty overestimates the effect of changes in the government size.
本文将Barro (Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98 (1990)， No. 5 part II, pp. S103-S125)模型扩展到具有总不确定性的两期OLG经济。我们证明了在市场经济中，政府规模最大化平均增长和个人福利是一致的，并且不受引入不确定性的影响。然而，最大平均增长率确实取决于总体不确定性、个体的风险厌恶程度以及替代的跨期弹性如何与之比较。在随机经济中，个人福利较低。如果不考虑不确定性，就高估了政府规模变化的影响。
{"title":"A Note on Infrastructure Expenditure, Uncertainty and Growth","authors":"Cruz A. Echevarría","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-9957.2012.02328.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9957.2012.02328.x","url":null,"abstract":"This note extends the Barro (Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98 (1990), No. 5 part II, pp. S103–S125) model to a two‐period, OLG economy with aggregate uncertainty. We show that the government sizes maximizing average growth and individual welfare in a market economy coincide and are not affected by the introduction of uncertainty. The maximum average growth rate, however, does depend on the aggregate uncertainty, the individuals' risk aversion and how the intertemporal elasticity of substitution compares with one. Individual welfare is lower in the stochastic economy. Failing to include uncertainty overestimates the effect of changes in the government size.","PeriodicalId":130467,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Manchester School","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131942853","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-01-01DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9957.2011.02255.x
V. Gash, A. Mertens, Laura Romeu Gordo
This paper asks whether moving to part-time work makes women happy. Previous research on labour supply has assumed that as workers freely choose their optimal working hours on the basis of their innate preferences and the hourly wage rate, outcome reflects preference. This paper tests this assumption by measuring the impact of changes in working hours on life satisfaction in two countries (the UK and Germany using the German Socio-Economic Panel and the British Household Panel Survey). We find decreases in working hours bring about positive and significant improvement on well-being for women.
{"title":"The Influence of Changing Hours of Work on Women's Life Satisfaction","authors":"V. Gash, A. Mertens, Laura Romeu Gordo","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-9957.2011.02255.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9957.2011.02255.x","url":null,"abstract":"This paper asks whether moving to part-time work makes women happy. Previous research on labour supply has assumed that as workers freely choose their optimal working hours on the basis of their innate preferences and the hourly wage rate, outcome reflects preference. This paper tests this assumption by measuring the impact of changes in working hours on life satisfaction in two countries (the UK and Germany using the German Socio-Economic Panel and the British Household Panel Survey). We find decreases in working hours bring about positive and significant improvement on well-being for women.","PeriodicalId":130467,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Manchester School","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131380937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-01-01DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9957.2011.02231.x
S. Comi, M. Grasseni
The aim of this paper is to analyse the wage gap between temporary and permanent jobs in 12 European countries. We use the semi-parametric (quantile regression) approach and evaluate the wage gap across the entire wage distribution. We show that the fixed-term wage gap decreases as higher quantiles are considered, and that having a fixed-term contract penalizes low–skilled workers (at the bottom of the earnings distribution) more than high–skilled ones. Finally, we decompose the wage differential across the entire wage distribution in order to account for the relative importance of observed characteristics versus different returns to skills. We find that workers with the same characteristics as temporary workers would receive higher wages if they worked on permanent contracts in almost all the countries considered, and that this finding is stable across? the entire wage distribution.
{"title":"Are Temporary Workers Discriminated Against? Evidence from Europe","authors":"S. Comi, M. Grasseni","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-9957.2011.02231.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9957.2011.02231.x","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this paper is to analyse the wage gap between temporary and permanent jobs in 12 European countries. We use the semi-parametric (quantile regression) approach and evaluate the wage gap across the entire wage distribution. We show that the fixed-term wage gap decreases as higher quantiles are considered, and that having a fixed-term contract penalizes low–skilled workers (at the bottom of the earnings distribution) more than high–skilled ones. Finally, we decompose the wage differential across the entire wage distribution in order to account for the relative importance of observed characteristics versus different returns to skills. We find that workers with the same characteristics as temporary workers would receive higher wages if they worked on permanent contracts in almost all the countries considered, and that this finding is stable across? the entire wage distribution.","PeriodicalId":130467,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Manchester School","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128032789","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-01-01DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9957.2011.02248.x
Marloes de Graaf-Zijl
This paper analyses the compensation of fixed‐term and on‐call employment contracts, applying an analytical framework in which wage differentials result from two types of uncertainty. Quantity uncertainty originates from product demand volatility. Quality uncertainty, on the other hand, originates from the fact that employers are ex‐ante unable to observe fully a worker's ability. Using matching techniques, we analyse wage differentials using linked employer–employee data for the Netherlands. Findings indicate that on‐call workers receive compensation for providing quantity flexibility, or at least did so before the regulatory change in 1999. Compensation of fixed‐term contracts, however, is dominated by the negative wage effect of quality uncertainty.
{"title":"Compensation of On‐Call and Fixed‐Term Employment: The Role of Uncertainty","authors":"Marloes de Graaf-Zijl","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-9957.2011.02248.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9957.2011.02248.x","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyses the compensation of fixed‐term and on‐call employment contracts, applying an analytical framework in which wage differentials result from two types of uncertainty. Quantity uncertainty originates from product demand volatility. Quality uncertainty, on the other hand, originates from the fact that employers are ex‐ante unable to observe fully a worker's ability. Using matching techniques, we analyse wage differentials using linked employer–employee data for the Netherlands. Findings indicate that on‐call workers receive compensation for providing quantity flexibility, or at least did so before the regulatory change in 1999. Compensation of fixed‐term contracts, however, is dominated by the negative wage effect of quality uncertainty.","PeriodicalId":130467,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Manchester School","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126463513","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2010-08-10DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9957.2010.02205.x
L. Bonatti, Giulia Felice
We develop a two-country growth model distinguishing between a market sector producing services that can also be home produced and a market sector producing goods without home-produced substitutes. The former is a technologically ‘stagnant’ sector, while the latter is subject to learning-by-doing and technological spillovers. This distinction coincides in the model with the distinction between the sector producing non-tradables and the sector producing internationally tradable goods. We study how differentials in labor tax rates across countries influence the mix of tradable and non-tradable goods that characterizes the market output of each country, thus affecting their bilateral trade balance and growth rates.
{"title":"Trade and Growth in a Two-Country Model with Home Production and Uneven Technological Spillovers","authors":"L. Bonatti, Giulia Felice","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-9957.2010.02205.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9957.2010.02205.x","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a two-country growth model distinguishing between a market sector producing services that can also be home produced and a market sector producing goods without home-produced substitutes. The former is a technologically ‘stagnant’ sector, while the latter is subject to learning-by-doing and technological spillovers. This distinction coincides in the model with the distinction between the sector producing non-tradables and the sector producing internationally tradable goods. We study how differentials in labor tax rates across countries influence the mix of tradable and non-tradable goods that characterizes the market output of each country, thus affecting their bilateral trade balance and growth rates.","PeriodicalId":130467,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Manchester School","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127059360","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2010-08-10DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9957.2010.02203.x
Gianni Amisano, M. Tronzano
In this paper we extend Svenssons (CEPR Discussion Paper 940, April 1994) ‘simplest test’ of inflation target credibility inside a Bayesian econometric framework and obtain various estimates of the European Central Bank's monetary policy credibility. Overall, our empirical evidence suggests that the strategy followed by the European Central Bank was successful in building a satisfactory degree of reputation. However, we find some significant credibility reversals concerning both anti-inflationary and anti-deflationary credibility. These reversals, in turn, are closely related to the evolution of the cyclical macroeconomic conditions in the euro area.
{"title":"Assessing European Central Bank's Credibility During the First Years of the Eurosystem: A Bayesian Empirical Investigation","authors":"Gianni Amisano, M. Tronzano","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-9957.2010.02203.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9957.2010.02203.x","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we extend Svenssons (CEPR Discussion Paper 940, April 1994) ‘simplest test’ of inflation target credibility inside a Bayesian econometric framework and obtain various estimates of the European Central Bank's monetary policy credibility. Overall, our empirical evidence suggests that the strategy followed by the European Central Bank was successful in building a satisfactory degree of reputation. However, we find some significant credibility reversals concerning both anti-inflationary and anti-deflationary credibility. These reversals, in turn, are closely related to the evolution of the cyclical macroeconomic conditions in the euro area.","PeriodicalId":130467,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Manchester School","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131943453","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2010-08-10DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9957.2010.02206.x
Joseph Lanfranchi, J. Treble
Studies of sick-pay and absenteeism have traditionally treated absence as a worker-related phenomenon. There are good reasons to suppose, though, that firms' incentives to control absenteeism are not uniform. Using an employee/employer-matched data set, we investigate the relationship between the firm's production methods and the generosity of its sick-pay. The results suggest that firms that might be expected to value reliability highly, characterized as those that use just-in-time, are more likely to provide less generous sick-pay. Those findings survive when we control for the use of complementary policies that buffer production from absence shocks.
{"title":"Just-in-Time Production, Work Organization and Absence Control","authors":"Joseph Lanfranchi, J. Treble","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-9957.2010.02206.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9957.2010.02206.x","url":null,"abstract":"Studies of sick-pay and absenteeism have traditionally treated absence as a worker-related phenomenon. There are good reasons to suppose, though, that firms' incentives to control absenteeism are not uniform. Using an employee/employer-matched data set, we investigate the relationship between the firm's production methods and the generosity of its sick-pay. The results suggest that firms that might be expected to value reliability highly, characterized as those that use just-in-time, are more likely to provide less generous sick-pay. Those findings survive when we control for the use of complementary policies that buffer production from absence shocks.","PeriodicalId":130467,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Manchester School","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133015518","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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