{"title":"“鞋匠倒退”的两个问题及应对方法","authors":"Maik Niemeck","doi":"10.17454/pam-2209","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"With his now famous regress argument, Sydney Shoemaker (1968) aimed to provide justification for the assumption that at least some cases of self-awareness cannot be based on identification. The overall goal of this paper is to discuss two possible worries one may have about Shoemaker’s argument. I will show that these problems have far-reaching consequences that may diminish the argument’s importance for an adequate theory of self-awareness and that another conclusion Shoemaker and other philosophers draw may be unwarranted.","PeriodicalId":404019,"journal":{"name":"Phenomenology & Mind","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Two Problems with Shoemaker’s Regress and How to Deal with Them\",\"authors\":\"Maik Niemeck\",\"doi\":\"10.17454/pam-2209\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"With his now famous regress argument, Sydney Shoemaker (1968) aimed to provide justification for the assumption that at least some cases of self-awareness cannot be based on identification. The overall goal of this paper is to discuss two possible worries one may have about Shoemaker’s argument. I will show that these problems have far-reaching consequences that may diminish the argument’s importance for an adequate theory of self-awareness and that another conclusion Shoemaker and other philosophers draw may be unwarranted.\",\"PeriodicalId\":404019,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Phenomenology & Mind\",\"volume\":\"32 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1900-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Phenomenology & Mind\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.17454/pam-2209\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Phenomenology & Mind","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.17454/pam-2209","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
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摘要
Sydney Shoemaker(1968)提出了著名的回归论证，旨在为以下假设提供理由:至少在某些情况下，自我意识不能基于认同。本文的总体目标是讨论人们对舒梅克的论点可能产生的两种担忧。我将证明，这些问题具有深远的影响，可能会削弱这一论点对于一个充分的自我意识理论的重要性，而且休梅克和其他哲学家得出的另一个结论可能是没有根据的。
Two Problems with Shoemaker’s Regress and How to Deal with Them
With his now famous regress argument, Sydney Shoemaker (1968) aimed to provide justification for the assumption that at least some cases of self-awareness cannot be based on identification. The overall goal of this paper is to discuss two possible worries one may have about Shoemaker’s argument. I will show that these problems have far-reaching consequences that may diminish the argument’s importance for an adequate theory of self-awareness and that another conclusion Shoemaker and other philosophers draw may be unwarranted.
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