隐性契约的显性证据

A. Young, Daniel Levy
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引用次数: 40

摘要

我们提供了商品市场中隐含契约的第一个直接证据。我们提供的证据来自可口可乐市场。我们证明可口可乐公司留下了大量的书面证据,证明它与消费者的隐性契约——隐性契约的一种非常明确的形式。该合同代表了5美分(名义上的)价格的承诺和对“秘密配方”的遵守。一般来说,这种契约的隐式性质使观察变得困难。为了克服这个困难,我们采用了叙述的方法。通过对从可口可乐档案馆和其他来源获得的大量历史文件的分析,我们提供了可口可乐公司承认并履行这一隐性合同的证据。我们还通过探索质量作为可口可乐的调整余地做出了另一项独特贡献。隐性合同不仅承诺名义价格不变,而且承诺质量不变(即6.5盎司的秘密配方)。在70多年的时间里,我们发现只有一个案例证明了真正的质量变化。通过研究可口可乐公司因应市场条件变化而选择的调整幅度,我们发现违反隐性契约的感知成本很大。我们认为,1985年“新可乐”推出后的后果是这些成本巨大的一个直接证据。
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Explicit Evidence on an Implicit Contract
We offer the first direct evidence of an implicit contract in a goods market. The evidence we offer comes from the market for Coca-Cola. We demonstrate that the Coca-Cola Company left a substantial amount of written evidence of its implicit contract with its consumers—a very explicit form of an implicit contract. The contract represented the promise of a five cent (nominal) price and adherence to the “Secret Formula”. In general, the implicit nature of such contracts makes observation difficult. To overcome this difficulty, we adopt a narrative approach. Based on the analysis of a large number of historical documents obtained from the Coca-Cola Archives and other sources, we offer evidence of the Coca-Cola Company both acknowledging and acting on this implicit contract. We also make another unique contribution by exploring quality as a margin of adjustment available to Coca-Cola. The implicit contract included a promise not only of a constant nominal price but also a constant quality (i.e., 6.5 oz. of the Secret Formula). During a period of over 70 years, we find evidence of only a single case of true quality change. By studying the margin of adjustment the Coca-Cola Company chose in response to changes in market conditions, we demonstrate that the perceived costs of breaking the implicit contract were large. We argue that one piece of direct evidence on the magnitude of these costs is the aftermath “New Coke’s” introduction in 1985.
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