赌我们的金融未来:联邦政府如何摆弄,而州普通法是防止另一次金融崩溃的更安全的赌注

Brian M. McCall
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引用次数: 0

摘要

许多政治家和评论员都认为,信用违约掉期(CDS)在2008年全球金融危机中发挥了重要作用。然而,很少有观察到这一角色的人意识到,CDS之所以会对经济造成影响,是因为数千年来的公共政策先发制人。自亚里士多德时代以来,法律、哲学和公共政策一直团结一致,反对赌博,特别是金融赌博。该法律被视为一种对社会无益的零和财富转移,通常不允许当事人利用法院强制执行赌注。几个世纪以来,法院和立法机构和谐合作,控制并在某些情况下惩罚金融赌博,尤其是在投机性赌博引发金融恐慌之后。当金融业开发出复杂的衍生品,允许银行和其他机构押注于公司的财务健康状况以及抵押贷款和其他金融资产的投资组合时,法律专家认识到,根据州法律,这些合同将违反公共政策,无法执行。该行业求助于联邦政府的优先购买权,该权力不仅使cds免于所有州法律的约束,而且使cds免于所有联邦法规的约束。这一策略在美国被其他国家如英国所重复。具有讽刺意味的是,政府声称要降低系统性风险,却向这些金融赌徒发放了一张“不受法律约束”的卡片。结果是这个新设计的轮盘的大小和频繁旋转呈指数增长。当轮盘停止时,输掉赌注的不是赌徒,而是美国经济。在描述了CDS合约的本质和它们的市场之后,本文追溯了古代哲学(从亚里士多德的《尼各马可伦理学》开始)和法律对赌博的反感,研究了赌博和对社会有用的交易(如保险)之间的细微差别。接下来,文章追溯了联邦政府对这种智慧的拒绝,并得出结论,cds和其他金融赌注应该再次受到州法律和反对金融赌注的公共政策的约束。服务于赌博以外的经济目的的CDS合约,如保险或风险对冲,应该在法律上强制执行(受到适当的监管),但纯粹的金融赌博应该受到高度发达和古老的国家习惯法和成文法的限制,这些法律仍然存在于各州的账簿上。我们不能继续拿世界金融的未来来赌博,允许法律强制执行的金融赌注来推动经济。美国联邦政府需要停止在SEC和CFTC之间的监管地盘之争中瞎折腾,而把更安全的赌注押在执行古老公共政策的州法院和立法机构身上。
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Gambling on Our Financial Future: How the Federal Government Fiddles While State Common Law Is a Safer Bet to Prevent Another Financial Collapse
Many politicians and commentators agree that credit default swaps (CDS) played a significant role in the worldwide financial crisis of 2008. Yet, few who observe this role are aware that CDS were set loose on the economy by the pre-emption of thousands of years of public policy. Since the time of Aristotle law, philosophy, and public policy have been united in their opposition to gambling, and in particular, financial gambling. Viewed as a socially unproductive zero sum wealth transfer, the law has generally refused to permit parties to use the courts to enforce wagers. For centuries, courts and legislatures worked in harmony to control, and in some cases punish, financial wagers particularly on the heels of financial panics precipitated by speculative wagering. When the financial industry developed complex derivatives that permitted banks and other institutions to bet on the financial health of companies and portfolios of mortgages and other financial assets, legal experts recognized these contracts would be unenforceable as against public policy under state law. The industry turned to the federal pre-emption power which was wielded not only to exempt CDSs from all state law but to exempt CDSs from all federal regulation. This strategy within the United States was repeated in other countries such as the United Kingdom. Ironically, claiming to reduce systemic risk, governments issued a “Get out of Law Free” card to these financial gamblers. The result was an exponential increase in the size and frequent spinning of this newly engineered roulette wheel. When the wheel stopped it was not the gamblers but the U.S. economy which lost the bet. After describing the nature of CDS contracts and the market for them, this article traces the ancient philosophical (beginning with Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics) and legal antipathy to gambling, examing the nuanced distinctions made between gambling and socially useful transactions such as insurance. Next the article traces the rejection of that wisdom by federal preemption and concludes that CDSs and other financial wagers should again be subjected to state law and public policy against financial wagers. CDS contracts that serve an economic purpose other than gambling, such as insurance or risk hedging, should be legally enforced (subject to appropriate regulation) but pure financial gambling should be constrained by the highly developed and ancient state common and statutory law still on the books of the various states. We cannot afford to continue to gamble with the world’s financial future by allowing legally enforceable financial wagers to drive the economy. The U.S. federal government needs to stop fiddling with regulatory turf wars between the SEC and CFTC and place a safer bet on state courts and legislatures enforcing ancient public policy.
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