In previous work we have distinguished between rule-governed decision-making and unconstrained practical, moral, and empirical decision-making. A rule is a general, determinate directive that dictates the outcome of all cases that fall within its terms. Rules achieve settlement and facilitate coordination, at the cost of some outcomes that may not serve the principles underlying the rule. Here we consider the nature and function of standards of decision. Standards describe the scope of their own application in determinate terms and outline objectives or values a later decision-maker should pursue. The effect is a guided delegation of decision-making power to future decision-makers. We provide a variety of examples.
{"title":"How to Govern Conduct","authors":"Emily L. Sherwin, L. Alexander","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3763025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3763025","url":null,"abstract":"In previous work we have distinguished between rule-governed decision-making and unconstrained practical, moral, and empirical decision-making. A rule is a general, determinate directive that dictates the outcome of all cases that fall within its terms. Rules achieve settlement and facilitate coordination, at the cost of some outcomes that may not serve the principles underlying the rule. Here we consider the nature and function of standards of decision. Standards describe the scope of their own application in determinate terms and outline objectives or values a later decision-maker should pursue. The effect is a guided delegation of decision-making power to future decision-makers. We provide a variety of examples.","PeriodicalId":251521,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Legislative & Political Process (Topic)","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125305761","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper we introduce RegData Australia (RDAU1.0) and present some preliminary and comparative findings using this new panel. RDAU1.0 applies the RegData method to create a unique Australian database that extends from 1997 to 2012. RegData uses text analysis to quantify restrictive clauses in legislation, significantly improving the accuracy of measurements of regulatory incidence. RDAU1.0 extends and adapts the RegData methodology to Australian regulations and legislation. We use RDAU1.0 to capture broad patterns in Australian regulation, and we compare these data to RegData findings from other regulatory jurisdictions, including the federal government in the United States and several US state governments. A preliminary analysis yields relational evidence consistent with previous researchers’ hypothesis that the extent of regulation will be determined by the size of the market because of the fixed costs of regulatory production. This hypothesis suggests that regulatory volume in a specific jurisdiction will scale as a function of the jurisdiction’s population. We examine RegData metrics of regulation for 23 different jurisdictions, including the federal governments of Australia and the United States and the state governments of 21 American states, and find a positive and significant correlation between regulatory volume and population.
在本文中，我们介绍了RegData Australia (RDAU1.0)，并介绍了使用这个新面板的一些初步和比较结果。RDAU1.0应用RegData方法创建了一个从1997年到2012年的唯一的澳大利亚数据库。RegData使用文本分析来量化立法中的限制性条款，显著提高了监管发生率测量的准确性。RDAU1.0扩展并调整了RegData方法以适应澳大利亚的法规和立法。我们使用RDAU1.0来捕获澳大利亚监管中的广泛模式，并将这些数据与来自其他监管管辖区(包括美国联邦政府和几个美国州政府)的RegData发现进行比较。初步分析得出的相关证据与先前研究人员的假设一致，即监管的程度将由市场规模决定，因为监管生产的固定成本。这一假设表明，特定司法管辖区的监管量将作为该司法管辖区人口的函数而扩大。我们研究了23个不同司法管辖区(包括澳大利亚和美国联邦政府以及美国21个州的州政府)的RegData监管指标，发现监管量与人口之间存在显著的正相关关系。
{"title":"RegData: Australia","authors":"P. McLaughlin, Oliver Sherouse, J. Potts","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3420352","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3420352","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we introduce RegData Australia (RDAU1.0) and present some preliminary and comparative findings using this new panel. RDAU1.0 applies the RegData method to create a unique Australian database that extends from 1997 to 2012. RegData uses text analysis to quantify restrictive clauses in legislation, significantly improving the accuracy of measurements of regulatory incidence. RDAU1.0 extends and adapts the RegData methodology to Australian regulations and legislation. We use RDAU1.0 to capture broad patterns in Australian regulation, and we compare these data to RegData findings from other regulatory jurisdictions, including the federal government in the United States and several US state governments. A preliminary analysis yields relational evidence consistent with previous researchers’ hypothesis that the extent of regulation will be determined by the size of the market because of the fixed costs of regulatory production. This hypothesis suggests that regulatory volume in a specific jurisdiction will scale as a function of the jurisdiction’s population. We examine RegData metrics of regulation for 23 different jurisdictions, including the federal governments of Australia and the United States and the state governments of 21 American states, and find a positive and significant correlation between regulatory volume and population.","PeriodicalId":251521,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Legislative & Political Process (Topic)","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127353471","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Budget deliberations represent a dynamic interaction between many actors, including agency officials and legislators. There may be opposing perceptions about the relative importance of various types of information and there are likely many priority items that legislators base their decisions on, which budget officials may, or may not, have the ability to impact or control. Through a survey of state legislators, we first determined the relative importance of 27 items in approving budget proposals. Agency officials were surveyed and asked to rate the degree that they can impact each of the 27 items. We considered how the difference in party affiliation of legislators relates to the type of information they view as important in budget decisions. We then compared the importance ratings of legislators with the impact ratings of budget officials, which led to some recommendations aimed at agency officials.
{"title":"An Assessment of Factors Important to Legislators in Budget Decisions; How Much Impact Can Agencies Have?","authors":"A. Smith, J. Jensen","doi":"10.1111/pbaf.12159","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pbaf.12159","url":null,"abstract":"Budget deliberations represent a dynamic interaction between many actors, including agency officials and legislators. There may be opposing perceptions about the relative importance of various types of information and there are likely many priority items that legislators base their decisions on, which budget officials may, or may not, have the ability to impact or control. Through a survey of state legislators, we first determined the relative importance of 27 items in approving budget proposals. Agency officials were surveyed and asked to rate the degree that they can impact each of the 27 items. We considered how the difference in party affiliation of legislators relates to the type of information they view as important in budget decisions. We then compared the importance ratings of legislators with the impact ratings of budget officials, which led to some recommendations aimed at agency officials.","PeriodicalId":251521,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Legislative & Political Process (Topic)","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125916495","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Statutes dominate our legal system, but we have no theory about the best way to design them. The process that the U.S. Congress follows is haphazard and obscure. Any Member can introduce a bill. There are no requirements about who can draft the bill or how the basic decisions that it embodies should be made. The one requirement is that the bill must be written in statutory language, in a form that appears ready for enactment. This means that all the basic decisions about the bill’s design have been reached by the time the bill is introduced, and before it is subjected to any scrutiny by elected representatives or the general public. Any changes that the Members of Congress want to make, if the bill goes forward, must be done through the revision process and on an incremental basis. This Article suggests a more systematic way to design legislation. Based on modern policy analysis, it proposes that the legislative process begin with a statement of a problem to be solved. Congressional committees would begin by analyzing the problem and generating a range of potential solutions. Drafts of proposed statutory language would only be considered at that point. A process of this sort is more likely to generate legislation that serves its basic purpose, which is to produce the results that the Members who vote on it desire. Either Chamber of Congress, or any individual chamber of a state legislature, could implement this approach without the approval of any other body, and without any significant change in its other practices or basic structure. The proposal, moreover, is non-partisan, since members of either Party will want to achieve their own purposes more effectively and reliably.
{"title":"Statutory Design as Policy Analysis","authors":"E. Rubin","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2947258","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2947258","url":null,"abstract":"Statutes dominate our legal system, but we have no theory about the best way to design them. The process that the U.S. Congress follows is haphazard and obscure. Any Member can introduce a bill. There are no requirements about who can draft the bill or how the basic decisions that it embodies should be made. The one requirement is that the bill must be written in statutory language, in a form that appears ready for enactment. This means that all the basic decisions about the bill’s design have been reached by the time the bill is introduced, and before it is subjected to any scrutiny by elected representatives or the general public. Any changes that the Members of Congress want to make, if the bill goes forward, must be done through the revision process and on an incremental basis. \u0000This Article suggests a more systematic way to design legislation. Based on modern policy analysis, it proposes that the legislative process begin with a statement of a problem to be solved. Congressional committees would begin by analyzing the problem and generating a range of potential solutions. Drafts of proposed statutory language would only be considered at that point. A process of this sort is more likely to generate legislation that serves its basic purpose, which is to produce the results that the Members who vote on it desire. Either Chamber of Congress, or any individual chamber of a state legislature, could implement this approach without the approval of any other body, and without any significant change in its other practices or basic structure. The proposal, moreover, is non-partisan, since members of either Party will want to achieve their own purposes more effectively and reliably.","PeriodicalId":251521,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Legislative & Political Process (Topic)","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123889318","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper we use a dynamic model to investigate the macroeconomic impact of legislative complexity on growth and welfare, in comparison with political corruption. After a careful review of the economic literature on corruption and legislative complexity, we set up the model. The main theoretical findings of the analysis are that legislative complexity, like corruption, constitutes a constraint to growth and determines a redistribution of income in favor of politicians. To check if the previsions of the model are verified we introduce a simple indicator of legislative complexity, built in a way that makes it internationally comparable, and consider the data for sixty-seven countries; using OLS and 2SLS econometric models we estimate the effects of legislative complexity and corruption on the growth rate of per capita income. The results of the econometric analysis support the hypothesis that legislative complexity is a constraint to growth, and that in countries with a long history of liberal democracy, legislative complexity determines a redistribution to the detriment of the more poor social classes.
{"title":"Political Corruption and Legislative Complexity: A Macroeconomic Analysis","authors":"G. Divita","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2965035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2965035","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we use a dynamic model to investigate the macroeconomic impact of legislative complexity on growth and welfare, in comparison with political corruption. After a careful review of the economic literature on corruption and legislative complexity, we set up the model. The main theoretical findings of the analysis are that legislative complexity, like corruption, constitutes a constraint to growth and determines a redistribution of income in favor of politicians. To check if the previsions of the model are verified we introduce a simple indicator of legislative complexity, built in a way that makes it internationally comparable, and consider the data for sixty-seven countries; using OLS and 2SLS econometric models we estimate the effects of legislative complexity and corruption on the growth rate of per capita income. The results of the econometric analysis support the hypothesis that legislative complexity is a constraint to growth, and that in countries with a long history of liberal democracy, legislative complexity determines a redistribution to the detriment of the more poor social classes.","PeriodicalId":251521,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Legislative & Political Process (Topic)","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134366265","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Corporate law shapes the fundamental business environment and affects various stakeholders such as shareholders, managers, employees, and creditors. Each stakeholder has an incentive to influence the reform process of corporate law. The many corporate law reforms in Japan reflect its rapidly changing business environment. It is possible to determine the behaviour of various stakeholders by examining the politics of the reform process of corporate law.In order to understand the corporate law reform process, this paper uses the notice-and-comment procedure (`public comment procedure'), which was introduced by the Administrative Procedure Act in 1993. The Administrative Procedure Act requires every law reform or order proposed by a government agency to undergo a public comment procedure. Under this procedure, people submit comments to the Ministry of Justice; some of these comments are reflected in the final bill, whereas others are not. The paper performs a quantitative analysis of a hand-collected dataset from two recent public comment procedures on corporate law reform. By analysing the comments with respect to the issues, we can understand the mechanism of the corporate law reform process, particularly the relative political power of various interest groups.The results showed that the bureaucrats are rigid and not willing to take public comments seriously. However, on some technical issues, legal academics and legal professionals, such as courts and law firms, influence the behaviour of the bureaucrats. The results showed that the bureaucrats employed these comments to honour the technical views of professionals. In other cases, corporate managers significantly influence the reform process. The results did not support Croley's (2007) independence hypothesis about government agencies.
{"title":"Corporate Law Reform and Political Environment: An Empirical Analysis Employing Public Comment Procedure Data in Japan","authors":"Hatsuru Morita","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2394451","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2394451","url":null,"abstract":"Corporate law shapes the fundamental business environment and affects various stakeholders such as shareholders, managers, employees, and creditors. Each stakeholder has an incentive to influence the reform process of corporate law. The many corporate law reforms in Japan reflect its rapidly changing business environment. It is possible to determine the behaviour of various stakeholders by examining the politics of the reform process of corporate law.In order to understand the corporate law reform process, this paper uses the notice-and-comment procedure (`public comment procedure'), which was introduced by the Administrative Procedure Act in 1993. The Administrative Procedure Act requires every law reform or order proposed by a government agency to undergo a public comment procedure. Under this procedure, people submit comments to the Ministry of Justice; some of these comments are reflected in the final bill, whereas others are not. The paper performs a quantitative analysis of a hand-collected dataset from two recent public comment procedures on corporate law reform. By analysing the comments with respect to the issues, we can understand the mechanism of the corporate law reform process, particularly the relative political power of various interest groups.The results showed that the bureaucrats are rigid and not willing to take public comments seriously. However, on some technical issues, legal academics and legal professionals, such as courts and law firms, influence the behaviour of the bureaucrats. The results showed that the bureaucrats employed these comments to honour the technical views of professionals. In other cases, corporate managers significantly influence the reform process. The results did not support Croley's (2007) independence hypothesis about government agencies.","PeriodicalId":251521,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Legislative & Political Process (Topic)","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126754496","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Since its inception, the U.S. Federal Reserve's monetary policies have led, directly and indirectly, to a decline of over 95% in the purchasing power of the U.S. dollar. As a result, there have been several attempts to curtail or eliminate the Federal Reserve's monopolistic powers; however, none have proven successful to date, due mainly to the constraints of strong political opposition at the national level.In contrast to these attempts at the national level, this paper examines the levels of success and possible correlating factors of an alternative approach to ending the Federal Reserve's monopoly on money: "sound money" bills, introduced at the state legislative level, the purpose of which are to move each state that passes them in the direction of adherence to the U.S. Constitution's "legal tender" provisions of Article I, Section 10.Since the financial crisis of 2008-2009, there appears to be a renewed interest in "sound money" bills across the United States, including "Constitutional Tender," "State Legal Tender," "Gold/Silver Sales Tax Elimination," and "State Bullion Depository" bills. Using multivariate analysis of state legislatures, this paper attempts to determine what factors are associated with the successful, and failed, passage of these type of bills.
{"title":"Digging for Gold: A Multivariate Analysis of the Passage of State 'Sound Money' Laws","authors":"William Greene, Nathan Hosey","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2713187","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2713187","url":null,"abstract":"Since its inception, the U.S. Federal Reserve's monetary policies have led, directly and indirectly, to a decline of over 95% in the purchasing power of the U.S. dollar. As a result, there have been several attempts to curtail or eliminate the Federal Reserve's monopolistic powers; however, none have proven successful to date, due mainly to the constraints of strong political opposition at the national level.In contrast to these attempts at the national level, this paper examines the levels of success and possible correlating factors of an alternative approach to ending the Federal Reserve's monopoly on money: \"sound money\" bills, introduced at the state legislative level, the purpose of which are to move each state that passes them in the direction of adherence to the U.S. Constitution's \"legal tender\" provisions of Article I, Section 10.Since the financial crisis of 2008-2009, there appears to be a renewed interest in \"sound money\" bills across the United States, including \"Constitutional Tender,\" \"State Legal Tender,\" \"Gold/Silver Sales Tax Elimination,\" and \"State Bullion Depository\" bills. Using multivariate analysis of state legislatures, this paper attempts to determine what factors are associated with the successful, and failed, passage of these type of bills.","PeriodicalId":251521,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Legislative & Political Process (Topic)","volume":"73 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133193605","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Many politicians and commentators agree that credit default swaps (CDS) played a significant role in the worldwide financial crisis of 2008. Yet, few who observe this role are aware that CDS were set loose on the economy by the pre-emption of thousands of years of public policy. Since the time of Aristotle law, philosophy, and public policy have been united in their opposition to gambling, and in particular, financial gambling. Viewed as a socially unproductive zero sum wealth transfer, the law has generally refused to permit parties to use the courts to enforce wagers. For centuries, courts and legislatures worked in harmony to control, and in some cases punish, financial wagers particularly on the heels of financial panics precipitated by speculative wagering. When the financial industry developed complex derivatives that permitted banks and other institutions to bet on the financial health of companies and portfolios of mortgages and other financial assets, legal experts recognized these contracts would be unenforceable as against public policy under state law. The industry turned to the federal pre-emption power which was wielded not only to exempt CDSs from all state law but to exempt CDSs from all federal regulation. This strategy within the United States was repeated in other countries such as the United Kingdom. Ironically, claiming to reduce systemic risk, governments issued a “Get out of Law Free” card to these financial gamblers. The result was an exponential increase in the size and frequent spinning of this newly engineered roulette wheel. When the wheel stopped it was not the gamblers but the U.S. economy which lost the bet. After describing the nature of CDS contracts and the market for them, this article traces the ancient philosophical (beginning with Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics) and legal antipathy to gambling, examing the nuanced distinctions made between gambling and socially useful transactions such as insurance. Next the article traces the rejection of that wisdom by federal preemption and concludes that CDSs and other financial wagers should again be subjected to state law and public policy against financial wagers. CDS contracts that serve an economic purpose other than gambling, such as insurance or risk hedging, should be legally enforced (subject to appropriate regulation) but pure financial gambling should be constrained by the highly developed and ancient state common and statutory law still on the books of the various states. We cannot afford to continue to gamble with the world’s financial future by allowing legally enforceable financial wagers to drive the economy. The U.S. federal government needs to stop fiddling with regulatory turf wars between the SEC and CFTC and place a safer bet on state courts and legislatures enforcing ancient public policy.
{"title":"Gambling on Our Financial Future: How the Federal Government Fiddles While State Common Law Is a Safer Bet to Prevent Another Financial Collapse","authors":"Brian M. McCall","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2384965","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2384965","url":null,"abstract":"Many politicians and commentators agree that credit default swaps (CDS) played a significant role in the worldwide financial crisis of 2008. Yet, few who observe this role are aware that CDS were set loose on the economy by the pre-emption of thousands of years of public policy. Since the time of Aristotle law, philosophy, and public policy have been united in their opposition to gambling, and in particular, financial gambling. Viewed as a socially unproductive zero sum wealth transfer, the law has generally refused to permit parties to use the courts to enforce wagers. For centuries, courts and legislatures worked in harmony to control, and in some cases punish, financial wagers particularly on the heels of financial panics precipitated by speculative wagering. When the financial industry developed complex derivatives that permitted banks and other institutions to bet on the financial health of companies and portfolios of mortgages and other financial assets, legal experts recognized these contracts would be unenforceable as against public policy under state law. The industry turned to the federal pre-emption power which was wielded not only to exempt CDSs from all state law but to exempt CDSs from all federal regulation. This strategy within the United States was repeated in other countries such as the United Kingdom. Ironically, claiming to reduce systemic risk, governments issued a “Get out of Law Free” card to these financial gamblers. The result was an exponential increase in the size and frequent spinning of this newly engineered roulette wheel. When the wheel stopped it was not the gamblers but the U.S. economy which lost the bet. After describing the nature of CDS contracts and the market for them, this article traces the ancient philosophical (beginning with Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics) and legal antipathy to gambling, examing the nuanced distinctions made between gambling and socially useful transactions such as insurance. Next the article traces the rejection of that wisdom by federal preemption and concludes that CDSs and other financial wagers should again be subjected to state law and public policy against financial wagers. CDS contracts that serve an economic purpose other than gambling, such as insurance or risk hedging, should be legally enforced (subject to appropriate regulation) but pure financial gambling should be constrained by the highly developed and ancient state common and statutory law still on the books of the various states. We cannot afford to continue to gamble with the world’s financial future by allowing legally enforceable financial wagers to drive the economy. The U.S. federal government needs to stop fiddling with regulatory turf wars between the SEC and CFTC and place a safer bet on state courts and legislatures enforcing ancient public policy.","PeriodicalId":251521,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Legislative & Political Process (Topic)","volume":"49 2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124977224","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In October, at the meetings of the Government of the Russian Federation the following issues were discussed among other things: a draft law introducing the requirements for gradual transformation of participants in the market of nongovernment pension funds into joint-stock companies; a draft law seting a limitation on the amount of a severance benefit of managers (chief accountants) of public sector entities.
{"title":"The Review of the Meetings of the Government of the RF in October 2013","authors":"M. Goldin","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2359396","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2359396","url":null,"abstract":"In October, at the meetings of the Government of the Russian Federation the following issues were discussed among other things: a draft law introducing the requirements for gradual transformation of participants in the market of nongovernment pension funds into joint-stock companies; a draft law seting a limitation on the amount of a severance benefit of managers (chief accountants) of public sector entities.","PeriodicalId":251521,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Legislative & Political Process (Topic)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-11-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133902202","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In democratic systems across the world, there are constitutional provisions and legislations, putting a certain bar on elected representatives from holding ‘Office of Profit’. The inherent idea is to ensure that personal and pecuniary interests will not come in the way of the objective and effective discharge by the legislators of their onerous responsibilities. At the same time, it has to be borne in mind that in democratic politics, parliamentarians and legislators, besides their varied role as elected representatives, are also expected to aid and advise public institutions and trusts so as to help these institutions function efficiently for the welfare and well-being of the people and the country at large. The rationale and the raison d’etre behind the concept of ‘Office of Profit’ is that the holder of a public office should not get influenced by any consideration whatsoever while discharging his various responsibilities. An elected representative is the repository of the confidence and trust of his constituents. That being so it is imperative that they do not corrode public confidence by any act of omission or commission while performing their varied roles. It is but natural, therefore, that members are expected to act according to the highest standards of probity, accountability, honesty and integrity in the exercise of their public duties.
{"title":"The Concept of 'Office of Profit' in India","authors":"S. Swain","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2181796","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2181796","url":null,"abstract":"In democratic systems across the world, there are constitutional provisions and legislations, putting a certain bar on elected representatives from holding ‘Office of Profit’. The inherent idea is to ensure that personal and pecuniary interests will not come in the way of the objective and effective discharge by the legislators of their onerous responsibilities. At the same time, it has to be borne in mind that in democratic politics, parliamentarians and legislators, besides their varied role as elected representatives, are also expected to aid and advise public institutions and trusts so as to help these institutions function efficiently for the welfare and well-being of the people and the country at large. The rationale and the raison d’etre behind the concept of ‘Office of Profit’ is that the holder of a public office should not get influenced by any consideration whatsoever while discharging his various responsibilities. An elected representative is the repository of the confidence and trust of his constituents. That being so it is imperative that they do not corrode public confidence by any act of omission or commission while performing their varied roles. It is but natural, therefore, that members are expected to act according to the highest standards of probity, accountability, honesty and integrity in the exercise of their public duties.","PeriodicalId":251521,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Legislative & Political Process (Topic)","volume":"77 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124187120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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