The Individual’s Place in the Grounding of her Rights

Chapter 8 develops a taxonomy of the differing degrees and manner in which a right might be grounded on its holder’s good—and, in the author’s terms, exist ‘for its holder’s sake’. This is a taxonomy of the extent to which a right’s status as a right, and a duty’s status as a directed duty whose violation wrongs someone, are pre-institutional or ‘natural’. The chapter explores the important question of whether non-individualistic, communitarian moral views can accommodate this idea of ‘natural’ rights grounded by their holder’s good. It turns out that while many communitarian approaches are compatible with the idea, it is inconsistent with those communitarians who deny the very possibility of distinguishing one party’s good from the wider good. The chapter ends by sketching the appeal of taking human rights as grounded ultimately on ‘natural’ rights that exist for the right-holder’s sake.