Paolo Saona, Laura Muro, Ryan McWay, Mauricio Jara-Bertin
{"title":"盈余管理的激励对比:西班牙公司董事会活动与董事会薪酬","authors":"Paolo Saona, Laura Muro, Ryan McWay, Mauricio Jara-Bertin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3710966","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We analyze the effect board activity and board remuneration has on earnings management (EM). Our results show that more active boards are inefficient in preventing earnings manipulation. Regarding board compensation we find a U-shaped relation indicating that excessive remuneration will lead to more earnings management. Policy recommendations are derived from the findings.","PeriodicalId":170679,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Board Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Contrasting Incentives for Earnings Management: Board Activity and Board Remuneration in Spanish Firms\",\"authors\":\"Paolo Saona, Laura Muro, Ryan McWay, Mauricio Jara-Bertin\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3710966\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We analyze the effect board activity and board remuneration has on earnings management (EM). Our results show that more active boards are inefficient in preventing earnings manipulation. Regarding board compensation we find a U-shaped relation indicating that excessive remuneration will lead to more earnings management. Policy recommendations are derived from the findings.\",\"PeriodicalId\":170679,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ERN: Board Motivation & Incentives (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"23 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-12-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ERN: Board Motivation & Incentives (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3710966\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Board Motivation & Incentives (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3710966","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Contrasting Incentives for Earnings Management: Board Activity and Board Remuneration in Spanish Firms
We analyze the effect board activity and board remuneration has on earnings management (EM). Our results show that more active boards are inefficient in preventing earnings manipulation. Regarding board compensation we find a U-shaped relation indicating that excessive remuneration will lead to more earnings management. Policy recommendations are derived from the findings.
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