A Priori, Introspective, and Inferential Skepticism

This chapter completes the presentation and examination of the piecemeal underdetermination-based case for global skepticism (initiated earlier in the book) by focusing on underdetermination worries about a priori intuition, introspection, and reasoning. For each of these three belief sources, the chapter argues for two conclusions that were defended previously in the book with respect to two other belief sources: namely, perception and memory. The first conclusion is that there is an important gap between the evidence for the beliefs in question and the truth of the beliefs based on that evidence. The second conclusion is that we are unable to identify good arguments that can adequately bridge that gap. What these conclusions show, when applied to all five of these belief sources, is that trying to resist the piecemeal underdetermination-based case for global skepticism by relying on anti-skeptical arguments will not work.