电力和市场力量:重组市场的当前问题(一项调查)

Diana L. Moss
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引用次数: 6

摘要

本文综述了近15年来有关电力市场力量的法律经济学文献。电力行业的许多市场力量问题,都属于人们长期熟悉的更广泛的反垄断分析范畴。但电力也显示出特殊的特点和复杂性,可能需要更有针对性的方法——甚至是竞争分析的特殊指导方针。目前大多数关于电力市场力量的研究集中在五个主要领域:(1)扣留;(2)衡量市场支配力;(3)市场界定;(4)纵向问题;(5)补救措施。许多形式的扣留构成了新的和严重的政策问题,这些问题与反垄断几乎不存在的作用和有效监管执法的各种障碍相混淆。许多研究也致力于衡量市场力量,特别是在加州能源危机之后。虽然诊断和量化市场力量的实证研究是有用的,但它们也可能转移人们对更广泛的结构性改革问题的注意力,结构性改革比行为修复更能解决市场力量问题。市场定义一直是合并和基于市场的利率政策中的一个关键问题[14],揭示了在定义相关市场时传输约束和需求条件的重要性。然而,当前的建模方法在其有用性方面是有限的,因此引入了关于模拟模型有用性的争论。在过去15年里,新的垂直问题也出现了。新形式的排除竞争对手的能力(例如,传输权和可靠性)和激励(例如,集中度和并购活动的增加)在对垂直重新捆绑的好处重新产生兴趣的情况下,构成了政策挑战。最后,对补救措施的研究揭示了结构和行为之间的紧张关系,这种紧张关系导致了反垄断和监管方法在处理市场力量方面的两极分化。但在并购审查领域之外,反垄断可能会继续在电力行业发挥非常有限的作用,这一负担将主要落在监管机构的肩上。
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Electricity and Market Power: Current Issues for Restructuring Markets (A Survey)
This paper surveys the legal economic literature on market power in electricity over the last 15 years. Many of the market power issues in electricity fit within the broader, long-familiar rubric of antitrust analysis. But electricity also displays special characteristics and complexities that may require a more tailored approach--or even special guidelinesâ014for competition analysis. Most of the current research regarding market power in electricity focuses on five major areas: (1) withholding; (2) measuring market power; (3) market definition; (4) vertical issues; and (5) remedies. Numerous forms of withholding pose novel and serious policy issues, which are confounded by a virtually nonexistent role for antitrust and various impediments to effective regulatory enforcement. Much research has also been devoted to measuring market power, particularly in the aftermath of the California energy crisis. While empirical studies that diagnose and quantify market power are useful, they may also deflect attention from the broader issue of structural reforms that would address market power better than behavioral fixes. Market definition has been a key issue in merger and market-based rate policyâ014revealing the importance of transmission constraints and demand conditions in defining relevant markets. Current modeling approaches are limited in their usefulness, however, thus introducing the debate about the usefulness of simulation models. New vertical issues have also emerged over the last 15 years. New forms of ability to foreclose rivals (e.g., transmission rights and reliability) and incentive (e.g., increased concentration and M&A activity) pose policy challenges in light of renewed interest in the benefits of vertical rebundling. Finally, the research on remedies exposes the tension between structural and behavioral that has polarized antitrust and regulatory approaches to dealing with market power. But outside the realm of merger review, antitrust will likely continue to play a very limited role in electricity, leaving the burden largely on the shoulders of regulators.
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