理性冲突时的纠纷解决:混合经济中的成本与选择

R. Wagner
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在对解决法律争端进行经济分析时,通常假定争端各方受私有财产原则支配,因此也是其法律费用的剩余索取者。这种体制框架促进了一种实质性的理性,往往有利于不经审判解决争端。然而,在当代混合经济中,政治机构往往是争议的一方。这些机构在不同的实质理性下运作,因为它们运作的集体财产框架意味着它们对其法律费用没有剩余索取权。然而,他们可以将这些费用转化为对政治上受欢迎的活动的投资。结果是理性之间的冲突,这种冲突产生了社会结构,往往被误认为是市场失灵,而它们实际上是相互冲突的理性的系统特性。
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Dispute Resolution When Rationalities Conflict: Cost and Choice in a Mixed Economy
In bringing economic analysis to bear on the settlement of legal disputes, it is commonly presumed that the parties to the dispute are governed by the principles of private property and so are residual claimants to their legal expenses. This institutional framework promotes a substantive rationality that is often conducive to the settlement of disputes without trial. In contemporary mixed economies, however, a political agency is often party to a dispute. These agencies operate under a different substantive rationality because the framework of collective property under which they operate means they do not have residual claims on their legal expenses. They can, however, convert those expenses into investments in politically preferred activity. What results is a conflict between rationalities that generates societal tectonics that often are misidentified as market failures when they are really systemic properties of the conflicting rationalities.
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