股票回购的阴暗面

G. Guthrie
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引用次数: 3

摘要

股票回购可以减少税收,使管理者承诺支付自由现金流,并向投资者发出积极信号。本文表明,他们还将财富从股东转移到员工股票期权的所有者,并且这种转移增加了诱导股东将股票卖回公司所需的价格。这就产生了两种成本:在治理不善的公司,回购会损害股东利益;在治理良好的公司,一些价值提升的回购不会发生。当未偿期权数量很大,且期权处于价外时,这些成本最大。
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The Dark Side of Share Buybacks
Share buybacks reduce taxes, commit managers to pay out free cash-flow, and send positive signals to investors. This paper shows that they also transfer wealth from shareholders to the owners of employee stock options and that this transfer increases the price needed to induce shareholders to sell shares back to the firm. Two costs arise: at firms with poor governance, buybacks occur that harm shareholders; at firms with good governance, some value-enhancing buybacks do not occur. These costs are greatest when the number of outstanding options is large and when the options are out-of-the-money.
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