Loan restructuring programs in the conditions of the coronavirus pandemic: a comparative analysis of domestic and international practice

Introduction. Loan restructuring is one of the toolkit for the resolution of problem loans. It directly affects the quality of assets, profitability and capitalization. This credit risk management tool always requires fine-tuning with the involvement of the regulator, as problem loans may be misclassified, namely restructured rather than classified as non-performing, and provisions may be inadequate to the risk, i.e. understated. Problem Statement. In the conditions of a systemic crisis, the probability of defaults on loans increases, and it is extremely important that lenders go to exactly those borrowers who maintain their viability and are ready to resume debt service immediately after the normalization of working conditions. It depends on the position of the regulator to what extent this practice is uniform among banks to prevent distortion of reporting. Along with this, reaching an agreement between the parties is always a difficult process of finding compromises and balancing interests. Purpose. To study the domestic and international experience of commercial banks and banking supervisory bodies in restructuring problem loans for borrowers who have experienced financial difficulties due to the coronavirus pandemic. Methods. The study was conducted by comparing domestic and international practice in the field of credit restructuring regulation and analyzing the disclosure of relevant information in financial statements by banks using the methods of statistical analysis of series dynamics and factor analysis of data. Content analysis was used in the review of scientific publications and reports. Results. The actions of the National Bank of Ukraine on the regulation of credit restructuring can be assessed as palliative, since they do not establish clear rules and do not guarantee the prevention of manipulations by banks, and also do not encourage creditors to grant concessions to borrowers. Banks with foreign capital (of Western countries) were guided by the instructions of the European supervisory authority EBA and the instructions of the parent bank regarding the recognition of the quality of restructured loans. Independent auditors of Ukrainian banks used different approaches to disclosure of information about restructuring in annual reports. In Ukraine, as in most countries of the world, the regulatory body gave temporary consent to the exclusion of restructured loans from the amount of problem loans. The benefit for banks is the ability not to accrue reserves for such exposures. However, the suspension of principal payments did not exempt him from paying interest, and in fact the borrower overpaid for the loan. It seems correct if the regulator would require recognition of the loan as problematic in case of repeated restructuring. Conclusions. The NBU is called upon to summarize the results of the work carried out by banks on credit restructuring and to provide banks with specific recommendations so that the banking sector would be ready for possible new upheavals It is expedient to determine 9 months as the maximum period of moratorium (credit holidays) that can be applied by banks.