基于HDL的DPA安全嵌入式系统仿真框架

Danial Kamran, A. Marjovi, A. Fanian, M. Safayani
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摘要

侧信道分析(SCA)仍然是嵌入式系统安全的一大威胁。由于每一种SCA攻击或针对它的对策都需要在评估之前实现,因此在提供高分辨率测量工具,校准它们以及在ASIC或目标平台上实现所提出的设计需要付出大量的时间和成本。在本文中,我们介绍了一个新的仿真平台,用于评估基于功率的SCA攻击和对策。我们使用Synopsys功耗分析工具来模拟处理器并对其实施成功的差分功耗分析(DPA)攻击。然后,我们重点模拟了一种针对DPA攻击的常见对策,称为随机延迟插入(RDI)。我们模拟了一个使用此策略的抗性处理器。在接下来的步骤中,我们展示了所提出的框架如何帮助提取模拟处理器的功率特性,并在其上实现基于反向工程的功率分析。我们使用这种方法是为了检测在处理器上执行的与DPA相关的汇编指令,并对RDI安全处理器执行DPA攻击。在Pico-blaze模拟处理器上进行了实验。
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HDL based simulation framework for a DPA secured embedded system
Side Channel Analysis (SCA) are still harmful threats against security of embedded systems. Due to the fact that every kind of SCA attack or countermeasure against it needs to be implemented before evaluation, a huge amount of time and cost of this process is paid for providing high resolution measurement tools, calibrating them and also implementation of proposed design on ASIC or target platform. In this paper, we have introduced a novel simulation platform for evaluation of power based SCA attacks and countermeasures. We have used Synopsys power analysis tools in order to simulate a processor and implement a successful Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attack on it. Then we focused on the simulation of a common countermeasure against DPA attacks called Random Delay Insertion (RDI). We simulated a resistant processor that uses this policy. In the next step we showed how the proposed framework can help to extract power characteristics of the simulated processor and implement power analysis based reverse engineering on it. We used this approach in order to detect DPA related assembly instructions being executed on the processor and performed a DPA attack on the RDI secured processor. Experiments were carried out on a Pico-blaze simulated processor.
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