{"title":"具有粘性价格的生产产出调整的平均场博弈","authors":"Bingchang Wang, Minyi Huang","doi":"10.1109/CCDC.2018.8407672","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates mean field games for dynamic production competition. We first introduce a market of many firms with the sticky price and adjustment costs, where the price is disturbed by a Wiener process. By solving forward-backward stochastic differential equations subject to consistent mean field approximations, a set of decentralized strategies is obtained and further shown to be an e-Nash equilibrium.","PeriodicalId":409960,"journal":{"name":"2018 Chinese Control And Decision Conference (CCDC)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Mean field games for production output adjustment with noisy sticky prices\",\"authors\":\"Bingchang Wang, Minyi Huang\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/CCDC.2018.8407672\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper investigates mean field games for dynamic production competition. We first introduce a market of many firms with the sticky price and adjustment costs, where the price is disturbed by a Wiener process. By solving forward-backward stochastic differential equations subject to consistent mean field approximations, a set of decentralized strategies is obtained and further shown to be an e-Nash equilibrium.\",\"PeriodicalId\":409960,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2018 Chinese Control And Decision Conference (CCDC)\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-06-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2018 Chinese Control And Decision Conference (CCDC)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/CCDC.2018.8407672\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2018 Chinese Control And Decision Conference (CCDC)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CCDC.2018.8407672","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Mean field games for production output adjustment with noisy sticky prices
This paper investigates mean field games for dynamic production competition. We first introduce a market of many firms with the sticky price and adjustment costs, where the price is disturbed by a Wiener process. By solving forward-backward stochastic differential equations subject to consistent mean field approximations, a set of decentralized strategies is obtained and further shown to be an e-Nash equilibrium.
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