有类型意识的代理人在拍卖前的投资

Yingying Li, W. Lovejoy, Sudheer Gupta
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引用次数: 7

摘要

本文研究了不对称代理在拍卖前的投资,这些代理竞争垄断性委托人的供应合同。代理人私下知道他们的管理效率,这决定了他们如何很好地利用固定投资来减少他们履行合同的可变成本,并且他们在委托人宣布采购机制之前私下选择投资水平。因此,在委托代理文献中标准的类型分布,在这里是由代理人的私人行为内生地决定的。在代理人做出私人投资决定后,委托人宣布一个对她最优的机制。结果表明,在均衡状态下,竞争企业的所有最优投资策略在达到管理型的临界水平之前,都是不存在保留价格的投资形式,并在此之后进行最小投资。然而,这一特征意味着,当委托人有任何合理的竞争性替代方案来履行合同时,只有微不足道的纯策略均衡才能存在。这是因为在这些情况下,最优机制诱导代理人采用不连续的投资策略,这为委托人提供了偏离所宣布机制的激励。根据现有文献对我们的背景(代理人采用具有固定可变成本权衡的技术)的直观推断,我们将看到“投资不足”,表现为行业中固定成本较低和可变成本较高的技术。然而,当委托人有任何合理的外部供应选择时,这种直觉要么微不足道地持续下去,要么不能在纯策略中持续下去。在这些情况下,我们将看到的平衡成本结构的问题将需要未来的努力,并考虑混合策略。
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Pre-Auction Investments by Type-Conscious Agents
This paper examines pre-auction investments made by asymmetric agents that compete for a supply contract from a monopolist principal. Agents are privately aware of their managerial efficiencies which determine how well they can leverage fixed investments to reduce their variable costs for servicing the contract, and they privately choose investment levels prior to the procurement mechanism being declared by the principal. Hence, the distribution of types that is standard in the principal-agent literature is, here, endogenously determined by the private actions of the agents. The principal declares a mechanism that is optimal for her, after agents have made their private investment decisions. We show that in equilibrium all optimal investment strategies by competing firms will have the form of investing as if there is no reservation price up to a critical level of managerial type, and investing minimally thereafter. This feature, however, implies that only trivial pure strategy equilibria can exist when the principal has any reasonably competitive alternative for servicing the contract. This is because in these cases an optimal mechanism induces agents to adopt a discontinuous investment strategy which provides the principal an incentive to deviate from the declared mechanism. An intuitive extrapolation of the extant literature to our context (in which agents adopt technologies featuring a fixed-variable cost trade-off) would suggest that we would see 'underinvestment', manifesting itself as lower fixed and higher variable cost technologies in the industry. However, this intuition is either sustained trivially or cannot be sustained in pure strategies when the principal has any reasonable outside options for supply. The question of what cost structure we will see in equilibrium in these contexts will require future effort, and a consideration of mixed strategies.
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Pre-Auction Investments by Type-Conscious Agents
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