政府承诺、公共资本与贸易研究

Yang-Seung Lee
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摘要

目的——政治民粹主义会对社会福利产生负面影响,削弱承诺可信度。众所周知,公共政策在决定贸易收益方面发挥着作用。本文的目的是研究政治民粹主义如何影响开放经济的社会福利。设计/方法/方法-本文扩展了Brander-Spencer模型,其中国内外公司在第三国进行寡头垄断竞争。在这个模型中,社会福利被定义为本土企业利润的总和。从战略上讲,国内和外国公司都安排产量以使公司利润最大化。企业可以私下进行投资以降低边际成本。本文假设政府投资公共资本以激励私人投资。母国政府的公共投资使母国企业受益。公共资本投资项目需要一定的时间才能完成。也就是说,它将在未来完成。因此,承诺可信度很重要。具体来说,政治家有动机重新安排正在进行的公共资本投资项目,以达到他们的最佳政治利益。这是许多公共项目遇到拖延问题的主要原因。政治民粹主义是问题的核心。研究启示-本文强调承诺的可信度与公共项目的规模一样重要。尽管公共项目规模很大,但私营部门如果缺乏信誉,就不会对承诺作出反应。因此,政策制定者应该牢记,承诺的可信度是公共项目成功的必要条件。
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A Study on Government Commitment, Public Capital, and Trade
Purpose – Political populism can leave a negative impact upon social welfare with weakening commitment credibility. It is widely known that public policy plays a role in determining trade gains. The purpose of this paper is to examine how political populism affects the social welfare of an open economy. Design/Methodology/Approach – This paper extends the Brander-Spencer model in which home and foreign firms compete in oligopoly in a third country. In that model, social welfare is defined as the sum of home firm profits. Strategically, home and foreign firms schedule output to maximize firm profits. Firms can make investments privately to reduce the marginal cost. This paper supposes that a government invests in public capital to inspire private investments. The public investment of the home government benefits the home firms. Findings – The project of public capital investment takes time until completion. That is, it will be completed in the future. Thus, commitment credibility matters. Specifically, politicians have incentives to reschedule the on-going project of public capital investment in their best political interest. This is the main reason why many public projects encounter hold-up problems. Political populism lies at the center of the problems. Research Implications – This paper emphasizes that commitment credibility is important as along with the size of the public project. Although the size of a public project is large, the private sector does not respond to the commitment if it lacks credibility. Thus, policymakers should keep in mind that commitment credibility is a necessary condition for the success of a public project.
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