日本的排外主义

J. Ramseyer, E. Rasmusen
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引用次数: 0

摘要

非正式的社会制裁,如排斥,是大多数社区控制行为偏差的主要手段,而正式的法律制裁是一种更昂贵的备用机制,但在大学实验室之外,对排斥的研究几乎不存在。我们构建了一个正式的模型,并考察了日本乡村排斥的法律案例。真正触犯社会福利的村民是不会提起这些诉讼的。更确切地说,很多排斥都是机会主义的——敲诈财产、掩盖整个社区的渎职行为或骚扰竞争对手。通常情况下,目的不是使用政府的强制权力,而是让法院公开证明被驱逐的对象并非真正有罪。
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Ostracism in Japan
Informal social sanctions such as ostracism are most communities’ primary means of controlling deviance, with formal legal sanctions a costlier backup mechanism, but outside university laboratories, studies of ostracism barely exist. We construct a formal model and examine legal cases brought by targets of Japanese village ostracism. Villagers truly offending against social welfare do not bring these suits. Rather, much ostracism is opportunistic — to extort property, hide communitywide malfeasance, or harass rivals. Typically, the objective is not to employ government’s coercive power, but to have the court publicly certify that the target of ostracism is not really culpable.
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