不完善的中央银行沟通——信息与干扰

Pär Österholm, Spencer Dale, Athanasios Orphanides
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引用次数: 100

摘要

央行传达的很多信息要么嘈杂,要么不完善。本文考虑了在不完全知识和学习模型下中央银行沟通的潜在好处和局限性。结果表明,传递不完全信息的价值是模糊的。央行有可能分散公众的注意力;这意味着央行可能更愿意将其沟通政策的重点放在它最了解的信息上。的确,传达更多确定的信息可能会提高公众的理解,在某种程度上,它“排挤”了传递不完全信息的角色。
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Imperfect Central Bank Communication - Information versus Distraction
Much of the information communicated by central banks is noisy or imperfect. This paper considers the potential benefits and limitations of central bank communications in a model of imperfect knowledge and learning. It is shown that the value of communicating imperfect information is ambiguous. There is a risk that the central bank can distract the public; this means that the central bank may prefer to focus its communication policies on the information it knows most about. Indeed, conveying more certain information may improve the public's understanding to the extent that it "crowds out" a role for communicating imperfect information.
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