产权制度下议价行为的实验结果

Rachel T. A. Croson, J. Johnston
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引用次数: 37

摘要

在一个为期两期的筛选博弈中,通过实验探讨了替代性产权制度对获取物品和通过双方同意的交换获得物品之间选择的影响。结果总体上与均衡预测一致,表明产权制度对观察到的行为有重大影响。牛津大学出版社2000版权所有。
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Experimental Results on Bargaining Under Alternative Property Rights Regimes
The effect of alternative property rights regimes on the choice between taking an object and acquiring it via a consensual exchange is experimentally explored in a two-period screening game. Results are generally consistent with equilibrium predictions, suggesting that property rights regimes have a significant impact on observed behavior. Copyright 2000 by Oxford University Press.
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