转向首价规则后投标策略的调整

Miguel Alcobendas, Robert Zeithammer
{"title":"转向首价规则后投标策略的调整","authors":"Miguel Alcobendas, Robert Zeithammer","doi":"10.1145/3490486.3538236","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We document the response of bidders to a change in auction pricing rules by a platform selling online advertising impressions. The platform switched from a second-price auction to a first-price auction in 2019. We analyze the transition and ask three questions: Did the bids by the same bidder bidding to show the same creative in the same location on the same webpage fall? If yes, did the bids fall enough? And if the bids fell enough, how long did the transition take? To answer our questions, we study 11 long-running creatives with sufficient volume of bids for a month before the switch and three months after the switch. We find that bids on these long-running creatives indeed declined after the switch, but this decline was not sufficient. To detect insufficient shading, we propose a simple nonparametric estimator of the lower bound on advertiser valuations in first-price sealed-bid auctions. Unlike standard econometric approaches to first-price auctions, our bound estimator does not assume equilibrium and it can accommodate affiliated private values. The identifying assumption is that each bidder prefers his actual bid to an even lower bid given the hyper-local competition the bidder is facing at the moment. This assumption implies a lower bound on a rationalizable valuation of the bidder in a first-price auction. Comparing the post-switch valuation lower bounds to the pre-switch valuation magnitudes allows us to detect insufficient adjustment whenever the former exceeds the latter. And we indeed find that the bid shading was insufficient for a vast majority of bidders and creatives included in our study: observed bids on the median creative imply that the bidder bid as if the switch from second-price to first-price rules increased his valuation of an impression at least 30 percent. We also find evidence of an incomplete and slow downward adjustment in bid magnitude over the period of months, whereby bids remain insufficiently shaded for about half of the creatives even three months after the switch. The full paper is available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4036006","PeriodicalId":209859,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"4","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Adjustment of Bidding Strategies After a Switch to First-Price Rules\",\"authors\":\"Miguel Alcobendas, Robert Zeithammer\",\"doi\":\"10.1145/3490486.3538236\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We document the response of bidders to a change in auction pricing rules by a platform selling online advertising impressions. The platform switched from a second-price auction to a first-price auction in 2019. We analyze the transition and ask three questions: Did the bids by the same bidder bidding to show the same creative in the same location on the same webpage fall? If yes, did the bids fall enough? And if the bids fell enough, how long did the transition take? To answer our questions, we study 11 long-running creatives with sufficient volume of bids for a month before the switch and three months after the switch. We find that bids on these long-running creatives indeed declined after the switch, but this decline was not sufficient. To detect insufficient shading, we propose a simple nonparametric estimator of the lower bound on advertiser valuations in first-price sealed-bid auctions. Unlike standard econometric approaches to first-price auctions, our bound estimator does not assume equilibrium and it can accommodate affiliated private values. The identifying assumption is that each bidder prefers his actual bid to an even lower bid given the hyper-local competition the bidder is facing at the moment. This assumption implies a lower bound on a rationalizable valuation of the bidder in a first-price auction. Comparing the post-switch valuation lower bounds to the pre-switch valuation magnitudes allows us to detect insufficient adjustment whenever the former exceeds the latter. And we indeed find that the bid shading was insufficient for a vast majority of bidders and creatives included in our study: observed bids on the median creative imply that the bidder bid as if the switch from second-price to first-price rules increased his valuation of an impression at least 30 percent. We also find evidence of an incomplete and slow downward adjustment in bid magnitude over the period of months, whereby bids remain insufficiently shaded for about half of the creatives even three months after the switch. The full paper is available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4036006\",\"PeriodicalId\":209859,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-07-12\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"4\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1145/3490486.3538236\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3490486.3538236","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4

摘要

我们记录了竞标者对拍卖定价规则变化的反应,通过销售在线广告印象的平台。2019年,该平台从第二价格拍卖转为第一价格拍卖。我们分析了这种转变,并提出了三个问题:同一投标人在同一网页的同一位置展示相同创意的出价是否下降?如果是,出价是否足够低?如果出价足够低,过渡需要多长时间?为了回答我们的问题,我们研究了11个长期存在的创意,这些创意在转换前一个月和转换后三个月都有足够的投标量。我们发现,这些长期存在的创意的出价确实在转换后下降了,但这种下降还不够。为了检测不充分的阴影,我们提出了一个简单的非参数估计的下界的广告商估值在第一价格密封投标拍卖。与第一价格拍卖的标准计量经济学方法不同,我们的界估计器不假设均衡,它可以容纳附属的私人价值。确定的假设是,每个竞标者更喜欢他的实际出价甚至更低的出价,鉴于竞标者目前面临的超本地化竞争。这一假设暗示了首价拍卖中竞标者合理估价的下限。将转换后的估值下限与转换前的估值幅度进行比较,使我们能够在前者超过后者时检测到调整不足。我们确实发现,对于我们研究中的绝大多数竞标者和创意人员来说,投标阴影是不够的:观察到的中位数创意的投标表明,竞标者的投标似乎从第二价格规则转换为第一价格规则使他对印象的估值至少增加了30%。我们还发现,在几个月的时间里,投标幅度出现了不完全和缓慢的向下调整,即使在转换后的三个月里,大约一半的创意人员的投标仍然没有得到充分的保护。全文可在https://ssrn.com/abstract=4036006上找到
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
Adjustment of Bidding Strategies After a Switch to First-Price Rules
We document the response of bidders to a change in auction pricing rules by a platform selling online advertising impressions. The platform switched from a second-price auction to a first-price auction in 2019. We analyze the transition and ask three questions: Did the bids by the same bidder bidding to show the same creative in the same location on the same webpage fall? If yes, did the bids fall enough? And if the bids fell enough, how long did the transition take? To answer our questions, we study 11 long-running creatives with sufficient volume of bids for a month before the switch and three months after the switch. We find that bids on these long-running creatives indeed declined after the switch, but this decline was not sufficient. To detect insufficient shading, we propose a simple nonparametric estimator of the lower bound on advertiser valuations in first-price sealed-bid auctions. Unlike standard econometric approaches to first-price auctions, our bound estimator does not assume equilibrium and it can accommodate affiliated private values. The identifying assumption is that each bidder prefers his actual bid to an even lower bid given the hyper-local competition the bidder is facing at the moment. This assumption implies a lower bound on a rationalizable valuation of the bidder in a first-price auction. Comparing the post-switch valuation lower bounds to the pre-switch valuation magnitudes allows us to detect insufficient adjustment whenever the former exceeds the latter. And we indeed find that the bid shading was insufficient for a vast majority of bidders and creatives included in our study: observed bids on the median creative imply that the bidder bid as if the switch from second-price to first-price rules increased his valuation of an impression at least 30 percent. We also find evidence of an incomplete and slow downward adjustment in bid magnitude over the period of months, whereby bids remain insufficiently shaded for about half of the creatives even three months after the switch. The full paper is available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4036006
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
On Two-sided Matching in Infinite Markets Herd Design Efficient Capacity Provisioning for Firms with Multiple Locations: The Case of the Public Cloud Tight Incentive Analysis on Sybil Attacks to Market Equilibrium of Resource Exchange over General Networks General Graphs are Easier than Bipartite Graphs: Tight Bounds for Secretary Matching
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1