电路伪装集成硬件IP保护

Ron Cocchi, J. Baukus, Lap-Wai Chow, B. Wang
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引用次数: 120

摘要

电路伪装技术可以使用传统的CAD工具集成到标准的逻辑单元开发中。伪装的逻辑单元使用标准的前端和后端模型集成到一个典型的设计流程中。伪装的逻辑单元通过在GDS级别引入微妙的单元设计变化来混淆电路的功能。伪装逻辑单元的逻辑功能极难通过硅成像分析来确定,以防止网表提取、克隆和伪造。电路伪装作为客户设计流程的一部分,可以保护硬件IP免受逆向工程的侵害。伪装填充技术通过在设计中完全填充不影响主要设计功能的真实电路,进一步抑制特洛伊电路的插入。所有未使用的硅似乎都是功能性电路,因此攻击者无法找到插入木马电路的空间。电路伪装技术的集成与标准芯片设计流程和EDA工具兼容,使用这种技术的集成电路已经成功地应用于高攻击的商业和政府部门。受已颁发和正在申请的专利保护。
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Circuit camouflage integration for hardware IP protection
Circuit camouflage technologies can be integrated into standard logic cell developments using traditional CAD tools. Camouflaged logic cells are integrated into a typical design flow using standard front end and back end models. Camouflaged logic cells obfuscate a circuit's function by introducing subtle cell design changes at the GDS level. The logic function of a camouflaged logic cell is extremely difficult to determine through silicon imaging analysis preventing netlist extraction, clones and counterfeits. The application of circuit camouflage as part of a customer's design flow can protect hardware IP from reverse engineering. Camouflage fill techniques further inhibit Trojan circuit insertion by completely filling the design with realistic circuitry that does not affect the primary design function. All unused silicon appears to be functional circuitry, so an attacker cannot find space to insert a Trojan circuit. The integration of circuit camouflage techniques is compatible with standard chip design flows and EDA tools, and ICs using such techniques have been successfully employed in high-attack commercial and government segments. Protected under issued and pending patents.
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