让世界银行远离发展道路:世界银行负面质押条款的项目融资例外案例

K. Barth
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摘要

在过去几十年动荡的财政年里,世界银行以最后贷款人的身份,向债务缠身的主权国家发放了无担保贷款。世界银行没有对国家资产采取留置权,而是通过措辞宽泛的“负面质押条款”来保护自己的利益。该条款确保任何公共资产的留置权作为外债的担保,导致第三方债权人享有优先权,以平等和合理的方式担保借款国应付的所有金额。简而言之,如果授予这种留置权,世界银行将分享支付给第三方债权人的金额,从而防止债权人享有优先债权人地位,并破坏任何后来授予的留置权的价值。在世界银行贷款协议中加入“消极质押条款”有助于降低世界银行提供无担保贷款的风险,因为它确保了发展中国家不会将其资产的优先权给予后来的债权人。理论上,这种质押既保护了作为债权人的世界银行,也保护了作为债务人的主权国家。然而,“负面质押条款”在一个国家与其他债权人接触的能力上设置的障碍是如此强大,以至于该条款最终阻止了国家为项目融资吸引商业投资。根据目前的草案,“负面承诺条款”阻止商业贷款机构投资那些可能进一步发展和丰富一个国家(从而增强一个国家偿还债务的能力)的项目。这不仅对有关的发展中国家来说是不幸的,而且也挑战了世界银行这个旨在促进发展的多边机构的存在理由。本文建议对否定质押条款进行改革,通过澄清文本语言和违约后果的方式,缩小该条款的范围。本文还认为,通过在“消极承诺条款”中加入项目融资例外,以吸引投资者参与有助于扩大国家基础设施的项目,世界银行将更好地实现其促进发展的总体目标。
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Getting the World Bank Out of Development's Way: The Case for a Project Finance Exception to the World Bank Negative Pledge Clause
During tumultuous fiscal years of the past few decades, the World Bank, acting in its capacity as lender of last resort, granted unsecured loans to debt-ridden sovereigns. Instead of taking a lien over the state's assets, the World Bank protected its interests via a broadly-worded Negative Pledge Clause. This clause ensures that any lien created on any public assets as security for external debt which results in a priority for a third-party creditor equally and ratably secures all amounts payable by the borrowing state. In short, should such a lien be granted, the World Bank shares in the amounts paid out to the third party creditor, thus preventing the creditor from enjoying senior creditor status and undermining the value of any later-granted lien. Including the Negative Pledge Clause in the World Bank loan agreements helps mitigate the World Bank's risk of providing unsecured loans by ensuring that a developing nation will not give a later creditor priority over its assets. In theory, such a pledge protects both the World Bank, as a creditor, and the sovereign nation, as debtor. However, the barrier that the Negative Pledge Clause constructs around a state's ability to engage with other creditors is so formidable that the clause ends up preventing the state from attracting commercial investment for project financings. As currently drafted, the Negative Pledge Clause dissuades commercial lenders from investing in exactly the kinds of projects that might further development and enrich a nation (thus strengthening the nation's ability to pay back its debts). This is not only unfortunate for the developing countries involved, but also challenge the raison d'etre of the World Bank, a multilateral institution designed to promote development. This article proposes reforming the Negative Pledge Clause by clarifying the language of the text and the consequences of a breach in the way which narrows the breadth of the clause. This article also argues that the World Bank would better achieve its overall purpose of promoting development by including a project finance exception to the Negative Pledge Clause to attract investors to projects that help expand national infrastructure.
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