认识论与哲学方法

A. Millar
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引用次数: 0

摘要

主流认识论的目的是根据信仰的条件对知识进行还原性分析。对感性认识、证言认识等知识,应借助于一般分析加以说明。本章概述了认识论方法的另一种方法,旨在提供特定种类知识的实质性说明,并根据这些说明阐明一般知识。有人提出这样一种主张,即那些探究事物的真理的人应当以知识为目标,而且应当以反思性知识为目标。认识论虽然关注的是知识的本质,但它应该对知识概念如何在我们的思维中表现出来敏感。富有成效的概念研究不必以提供对概念的分析为目的。
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Epistemology and Philosophical Method
Mainstream epistemology has aimed to provide reductive analyses of knowledge in terms of conditions on belief. Kinds of knowledge, for instance, perceptual knowledge and knowledge from testimony, are supposed to be explicated by drawing on the general analysis. This chapter outlines an alternative approach to epistemological method that aims to provide substantive accounts of knowledge of particular kinds and to illuminate knowledge in general in terms of those accounts. A case is made for the claim that those enquiring into the truth of some matter should aim at knowledge, and indeed reflective knowledge. It is argued that although epistemology is concerned with the nature of knowledge it should be sensitive to how the concept of knowledge figures in our thinking. Fruitful conceptual enquiry need not aim to provide analyses of concepts.
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