Detect and Engage: A New American Way of War

AbstractThe threat that paces American force planning is not from Russia, but rather from China. This is leading to a new way of warfare. The authors call it ‘detect and engage’. The confluence of artificial intelligence, applied quantum mechanics and satellite networking permits dispersed and diverse units and platforms to operate as a unified joint force across sea, air, land and space. Cyber operations, practically indifferent to location, further enable the United States to reduce reliance on geographically concentrated and exposed forces. Advanced technology is just one step in operationalising new forms of warfare. Others include anticipating adversary responses; building robust inventories of extended-range weapons; knowing when and how to conduct close-in operations; integrating and empowering defence allies; and maintaining US forward presence. Harnessing leading-edge technology to improve global US military effectiveness reflects neither an isolationist nor an insular policy, but rather one of ongoing engagement.Key words: anti-access/area denial (A2/AD)artificial intelligence (AI)Chinacyberdetect and engagemultidomain operationsquantum technologiesRussiaspaceUnited States Notes1 See Stephen Biddle, ‘Back in the Trenches: Why New Technology Hasn’t Revolutionized Warfare in Ukraine’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 102, no. 5, September/October 2023; ‘The Future of War: A Special Report’, The Economist, 8 July 2023, https://www.economist.com/weeklyedition/2023-07-08?; and Franz-Stefan Gady and Michael Kofman, ‘Ukraine’s Strategy of Attrition’, Survival, vol. 65, no. 2, April–May 2023, pp. 7–22.2 See International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2023 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS), pp. 500–1.3 At the same time, intended vulnerabilities of the United States and its forces to cyber war may affect the viability of a strategy that assumes workable longdistance electronic communications.4 John Warden, a retired Air Force colonel and fighter pilot, has articulated the ways in which US airpower can achieve superiority and control and deliver large volumes of precision munitions at great distances, potentially gaining victory with diminished need for invading troops. See, for example, John A. Warden III, ‘Employing Air Power in the Twentyfirst Century’, in Richard H. Shultz, Jr, and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr (eds), The Future of Air Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1992).5 See Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade, ‘Shock & Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance’, National Defense University, Command and Control Research Program, October 1996, http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Ullman_Shock.pdf.6 Emphasising the importance of rapid decision-making is not new. Air Force officer and then consultant John Boyd coined the ‘OODA’ (observe–orient– decide–act) loop in the late twentieth century. It remains a good conception of superior command and control. See John R. Boyd, ed. Grant T. Hammond, A Discourse on Winning and Losing (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2018), pp. 217–44.7 See, for example, Congressional Research Service, ‘Joint All-Domain Command and Control ( JADC2)’, updated 21 January 2022, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/IF11493.pdf. For a measured critique of multidomain operations, see Franz-Stefan Gady, ‘Manoeuvre Versus Attrition in US Military Operations’, Survival, vol. 63, no. 4, August–September 2021, pp. 131–48.8 See, for example, US Department of Defense, ‘Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III Message to the Force’, 23 March 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3316641/secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-message-to-the-force/.9 For an assessment of the broad range of reforms still needed, see National Defense Science & Technology Strategy Review Task Force, ‘An Innovation Strategy for the Decisive Decade’, 17 July 2023, https://innovation.defense.gov/Portals/63/DIB_An%20Innovation%20Strategy%20for%20the%20Decisive%20Decade_230717_1.pdf.10 See David C. Gompert, ‘Spin-on: How the US Can Meet China’s Technological Challenge’, Survival, vol. 62, no. 3, June–July 2020, pp. 115–30.11 The idea of maximising ‘transaction’ advantage is an insight of Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, a leading pioneer of ‘networkcentric warfare’ at the turn of the twenty-first century. See Arthur K. Cebrowski and John H. Gartska, ‘Network-centric Warfare – Its Origin and Future’, Proceedings, vol. 124, no. 1, January 1998, pp. 28–35.12 Our assumption is that, for better or worse, no arms-control restrictions on intermediate-range missiles will be in place.13 See Barry R. Posen, ‘Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of US Hegemony’, International Security, vol. 28, no. 1, Summer 2003, pp. 5–46.Additional informationNotes on contributorsDavid C. GompertDavid C. Gompert is Distinguished Visiting Professor at the US Naval Academy, Advisor to Ultratech Capital Partners, Adjunct Fellow at RAND Corporation and former US Acting Director of National Intelligence.Martin LibickiMartin Libicki is the Maryellen and Richard L. Keyser Distinguished Visiting Professor of Cybersecurity at the US Naval Academy.