Pub Date : 2023-11-02DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2023.2285603
Emile Hokayem
Abstract Hamas’s 7 October 2023 attack and the subsequent war in Gaza has forced the Palestinian question back to the top of the Middle Eastern agenda after years of neglect. The crisis has also confirmed Hamas’s identity as an agent of resistance rather than governance and shattered Israel’s perceptions of its own power, the competence of its security services and political leadership, and the manageability of its immediate neighbourhood. Israeli forces may well destroy Hamas’s advanced military capabilities and decapitate its Gaza-based command, but they are unlikely to obliterate Hamas as a social, political and ideological actor, and a determined insurgency. In Arab forums, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict will probably inhibit normalisation with Israel and overshadow other conflicts. Iran does not have an immediate interest in expanding the war and has other options through partners for signalling support for Hamas. The war broadly benefits Tehran by affirming its forward-defence strategy, re-energising its axis of resistance and shaking its regional rivals.
{"title":"The Gaza War and the Region","authors":"Emile Hokayem","doi":"10.1080/00396338.2023.2285603","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2023.2285603","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Hamas’s 7 October 2023 attack and the subsequent war in Gaza has forced the Palestinian question back to the top of the Middle Eastern agenda after years of neglect. The crisis has also confirmed Hamas’s identity as an agent of resistance rather than governance and shattered Israel’s perceptions of its own power, the competence of its security services and political leadership, and the manageability of its immediate neighbourhood. Israeli forces may well destroy Hamas’s advanced military capabilities and decapitate its Gaza-based command, but they are unlikely to obliterate Hamas as a social, political and ideological actor, and a determined insurgency. In Arab forums, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict will probably inhibit normalisation with Israel and overshadow other conflicts. Iran does not have an immediate interest in expanding the war and has other options through partners for signalling support for Hamas. The war broadly benefits Tehran by affirming its forward-defence strategy, re-energising its axis of resistance and shaking its regional rivals.","PeriodicalId":51535,"journal":{"name":"Survival","volume":"24 1","pages":"57 - 66"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139290222","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-02DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2023.2285605
Charlie Laderman
Abstract There are parallels between the run-up to the United States’ entry into the Second World War in 1941 and the contemporary geopolitical environment. Authoritarian aggression has again produced war in Europe and threatens conflict in Asia. While new research on the path to war in December 1941 offers no neatly packaged lessons, it does present five enduring dilemmas. Firstly, it only takes one side to believe war is inevitable for it to materialise. Secondly, a combatant might regard a state’s characterisation of economic-defence aid to an adversary combatant as a measure short of war as a distinction without a difference. Thirdly, underlying but unrealised military primacy might encourage rather than deter war by making time a critical factor. Fourthly, domestic constraints can make it difficult for a government to make deterrence credible. Fifthly, and relatedly, a democratic leader cannot make durable policies that get too far ahead of public opinion.
{"title":"Time Is Short: Ukraine, Taiwan and the Echoes of 1941","authors":"Charlie Laderman","doi":"10.1080/00396338.2023.2285605","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2023.2285605","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract There are parallels between the run-up to the United States’ entry into the Second World War in 1941 and the contemporary geopolitical environment. Authoritarian aggression has again produced war in Europe and threatens conflict in Asia. While new research on the path to war in December 1941 offers no neatly packaged lessons, it does present five enduring dilemmas. Firstly, it only takes one side to believe war is inevitable for it to materialise. Secondly, a combatant might regard a state’s characterisation of economic-defence aid to an adversary combatant as a measure short of war as a distinction without a difference. Thirdly, underlying but unrealised military primacy might encourage rather than deter war by making time a critical factor. Fourthly, domestic constraints can make it difficult for a government to make deterrence credible. Fifthly, and relatedly, a democratic leader cannot make durable policies that get too far ahead of public opinion.","PeriodicalId":51535,"journal":{"name":"Survival","volume":"27 1","pages":"77 - 90"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139290834","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-02DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2023.2285611
David W. Ellwood
Abstract In Soft Power and the Future of US Foreign Policy, Hendrik W. Ohnesorge has collected interesting and worthwhile essays demonstrating that values, policies and personalities – as well as artists and performers, philanthropic foundations, universities, corporations and churches – are elements of American soft power. These cultural resources add to a nation’s global reputation and influence. Factors afflicting America’s reputation today include the declining quality of life for many sectors of American society, the country’s inept response to the COVID-19 pandemic, recent foreign-policy disasters, and the coercive use of soft power itself. None of the contributors scrutinise the gap between promise and performance in US public diplomacy, but it seems clear that hard power undergirds soft power, and that the ability to call upon a uniquely abundant variety of means to project power is still what distinguishes the United States from all its competitors.
摘要 在《软实力与美国外交政策的未来》一书中，亨德里克-W.-奥内索格（Hendrik W. Ohnesorge）收集了一些有趣而有价值的文章，证明价值观、政策和人物--以及艺术家和表演者、慈善基金会、大学、公司和教会--都是美国软实力的要素。这些文化资源提升了一个国家的全球声誉和影响力。当今影响美国声誉的因素包括美国社会许多阶层生活质量的下降、美国对COVID-19大流行病的应对不力、最近的外交政策灾难以及软实力本身的强制性使用。没有一位撰稿人仔细研究了美国公共外交中承诺与表现之间的差距，但似乎很明显，硬实力是软实力的基础，而利用独特的丰富手段来投射力量的能力仍然是美国区别于所有竞争对手的关键所在。
{"title":"The Ambivalence of Soft Power","authors":"David W. Ellwood","doi":"10.1080/00396338.2023.2285611","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2023.2285611","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In Soft Power and the Future of US Foreign Policy, Hendrik W. Ohnesorge has collected interesting and worthwhile essays demonstrating that values, policies and personalities – as well as artists and performers, philanthropic foundations, universities, corporations and churches – are elements of American soft power. These cultural resources add to a nation’s global reputation and influence. Factors afflicting America’s reputation today include the declining quality of life for many sectors of American society, the country’s inept response to the COVID-19 pandemic, recent foreign-policy disasters, and the coercive use of soft power itself. None of the contributors scrutinise the gap between promise and performance in US public diplomacy, but it seems clear that hard power undergirds soft power, and that the ability to call upon a uniquely abundant variety of means to project power is still what distinguishes the United States from all its competitors.","PeriodicalId":51535,"journal":{"name":"Survival","volume":"11 1","pages":"193 - 200"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139290858","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-02DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2023.2285610
Lynn Kuok
Abstract China is engaging in a broad and systematic effort to align its legal capabilities with its strategic goals in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, and could do so outside of Asia, in places as far afield as the Arctic and Antarctic, in order to reshape and, in some cases, fill gaps in international law. Yet, while China’s assertive ‘wolf-warrior diplomacy’ has received considerable attention, its legal diplomacy has largely gone under the radar. Despite their insistence on the importance of the rules-based international order, the United States and other Western powers have been less proactive and methodical in their use of international law as compared to China. In an age of great-power competition, countries are drawing on a diverse range of tools – military, diplomatic, economic, developmental and intelligence – to gain strategic advantage. Countries that fail to bolster their own legal capabilities and to integrate legal diplomacy into their national-security strategies may surrender the power of legitimacy to China, even if, particularly in the South China Sea, Chinese actions have indubitably contravened international law.
{"title":"China’s Legal Diplomacy","authors":"Lynn Kuok","doi":"10.1080/00396338.2023.2285610","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2023.2285610","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract China is engaging in a broad and systematic effort to align its legal capabilities with its strategic goals in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, and could do so outside of Asia, in places as far afield as the Arctic and Antarctic, in order to reshape and, in some cases, fill gaps in international law. Yet, while China’s assertive ‘wolf-warrior diplomacy’ has received considerable attention, its legal diplomacy has largely gone under the radar. Despite their insistence on the importance of the rules-based international order, the United States and other Western powers have been less proactive and methodical in their use of international law as compared to China. In an age of great-power competition, countries are drawing on a diverse range of tools – military, diplomatic, economic, developmental and intelligence – to gain strategic advantage. Countries that fail to bolster their own legal capabilities and to integrate legal diplomacy into their national-security strategies may surrender the power of legitimacy to China, even if, particularly in the South China Sea, Chinese actions have indubitably contravened international law.","PeriodicalId":51535,"journal":{"name":"Survival","volume":"5 1","pages":"159 - 178"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139290879","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-02DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2023.2285607
Lukas Milevski
Abstract Despite optimistic technological visions, future warfare is likely to consume and destroy military equipment and personnel at rates for which the West is ill prepared. Medium and larger militaries in particular may be primitivised during and by future warfare: they may become more socially, organisationally and technologically primitive versions of themselves. This is a process with historical and contemporary precedents, as experienced by Germany’s Wehrmacht during the Second World War and the Russian army in Ukraine today. The tactical and operational realities of sustained military campaigning against a major adversary may well primitivise Western militaries too, a challenge for which better technology is at once a partial answer and a vulnerability. Primitivisation has implications not only for defence-industrial and personnel policies, but also force design and ultimately employment.
{"title":"The Primitivisation of Major Warfare","authors":"Lukas Milevski","doi":"10.1080/00396338.2023.2285607","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2023.2285607","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Despite optimistic technological visions, future warfare is likely to consume and destroy military equipment and personnel at rates for which the West is ill prepared. Medium and larger militaries in particular may be primitivised during and by future warfare: they may become more socially, organisationally and technologically primitive versions of themselves. This is a process with historical and contemporary precedents, as experienced by Germany’s Wehrmacht during the Second World War and the Russian army in Ukraine today. The tactical and operational realities of sustained military campaigning against a major adversary may well primitivise Western militaries too, a challenge for which better technology is at once a partial answer and a vulnerability. Primitivisation has implications not only for defence-industrial and personnel policies, but also force design and ultimately employment.","PeriodicalId":51535,"journal":{"name":"Survival","volume":"29 1","pages":"119 - 136"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139290366","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-02DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2023.2285608
Abstract The global nuclear order – encompassing measures to prevent nuclear war, slow the proliferation of nuclear weapons and manage peaceful nuclear technology – today faces pressures that threaten its very viability. Global cooperation to limit arms racing has all but ceased. Frustration with the failure of the nuclear powers to make progress towards disarmament has called into question the durability of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The mixture of incentives and penalties to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons is losing its potency. A new grand bargain, equal in creativity and ambition to the one that birthed the NPT, is needed. The United States must signal willingness to make significant concessions to achieve a fresh consensus on global nuclear policy with two objectives. The first one is the prevention of a new arms race among the nuclear powers and the cessation of further proliferation. The second is a recommitment to sharing peaceful nuclear technology as part of a worldwide campaign to combat the climate crisis.
{"title":"Slouching Towards a Nuclear Gomorrah","authors":"","doi":"10.1080/00396338.2023.2285608","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2023.2285608","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The global nuclear order – encompassing measures to prevent nuclear war, slow the proliferation of nuclear weapons and manage peaceful nuclear technology – today faces pressures that threaten its very viability. Global cooperation to limit arms racing has all but ceased. Frustration with the failure of the nuclear powers to make progress towards disarmament has called into question the durability of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The mixture of incentives and penalties to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons is losing its potency. A new grand bargain, equal in creativity and ambition to the one that birthed the NPT, is needed. The United States must signal willingness to make significant concessions to achieve a fresh consensus on global nuclear policy with two objectives. The first one is the prevention of a new arms race among the nuclear powers and the cessation of further proliferation. The second is a recommitment to sharing peaceful nuclear technology as part of a worldwide campaign to combat the climate crisis.","PeriodicalId":51535,"journal":{"name":"Survival","volume":"1 1","pages":"137 - 158"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139290672","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-02DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2023.2285602
Chuck Freilich
Abstract Hamas’s unprecedentedly brutal and indiscriminate attack against Israel on 7 October 2023 has probably permanently derailed, or at least substantially delayed, prospects for a two-state solution. Israel is likely to conclude that its most fundamental demand for any peace agreement – ironclad security arrangements – cannot be achieved. Even if a centrist Israeli government emerges following the war, the most the Palestinians can probably hope for is heightened autonomy, not full independence. Israel may show greater willingness to consider civil disengagement – that is, the dismantling of settlements in those parts of the West Bank that it would not wish to retain in a final peace settlement, probably over 90% of them – but with the Israel Defense Forces fully deployed throughout the area. Saudi–Israeli normalisation has been postponed, but may be salvageable, especially if the Saudis take an active role in the peace process and in reinstating the Palestinian Authority in Gaza. Growing tensions could diminish the extraordinary US–Israeli strategic cooperation that arose immediately after the attack.
{"title":"Israel and the Palestinians: The Day After","authors":"Chuck Freilich","doi":"10.1080/00396338.2023.2285602","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2023.2285602","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Hamas’s unprecedentedly brutal and indiscriminate attack against Israel on 7 October 2023 has probably permanently derailed, or at least substantially delayed, prospects for a two-state solution. Israel is likely to conclude that its most fundamental demand for any peace agreement – ironclad security arrangements – cannot be achieved. Even if a centrist Israeli government emerges following the war, the most the Palestinians can probably hope for is heightened autonomy, not full independence. Israel may show greater willingness to consider civil disengagement – that is, the dismantling of settlements in those parts of the West Bank that it would not wish to retain in a final peace settlement, probably over 90% of them – but with the Israel Defense Forces fully deployed throughout the area. Saudi–Israeli normalisation has been postponed, but may be salvageable, especially if the Saudis take an active role in the peace process and in reinstating the Palestinian Authority in Gaza. Growing tensions could diminish the extraordinary US–Israeli strategic cooperation that arose immediately after the attack.","PeriodicalId":51535,"journal":{"name":"Survival","volume":"159 1","pages":"67 - 73"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139290977","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-02DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2023.2285606
Sara Bjerg Moller
Abstract Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, NATO embarked on an ambitious series of military reforms aimed at enhancing deterrence and defence of the Euro-Atlantic area. However, as the Alliance approaches its 75th anniversary, concerns are mounting regarding the ability of non-US allies to meet their expanded security obligations. The Alliance’s updated regional-defence plans, and planned transformations to the NATO force and command structures, could pose considerable challenges for the European and Canadian allies who, following decades of cuts to their armed forces, lack the personnel required for implementing these reforms.
{"title":"NATO at 75: The Perils of Empty Promises","authors":"Sara Bjerg Moller","doi":"10.1080/00396338.2023.2285606","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2023.2285606","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, NATO embarked on an ambitious series of military reforms aimed at enhancing deterrence and defence of the Euro-Atlantic area. However, as the Alliance approaches its 75th anniversary, concerns are mounting regarding the ability of non-US allies to meet their expanded security obligations. The Alliance’s updated regional-defence plans, and planned transformations to the NATO force and command structures, could pose considerable challenges for the European and Canadian allies who, following decades of cuts to their armed forces, lack the personnel required for implementing these reforms.","PeriodicalId":51535,"journal":{"name":"Survival","volume":"136 1","pages":"91 - 118"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139290308","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-02DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2023.2285598
Lawrence Freedman
Abstract Both the Russian Federation and the United States and its allies have avoided taking actions carrying the greatest risk of escalation to nuclear-weapons use. Left uncertain is whether specific contingencies might yet prompt nuclear use. But the Russo-Ukrainian war has now been going on long enough to ground the debate in what has been said and done during its course. Russian nuclear decision-making requires the most attention, and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s statements about it have been the most authoritative. He has defined Russia’s nuclear red line consistently and relatively restrictively, reserving the threat of nuclear use for an existential threat to the state. He has focused on deterring the West from fighting alongside Ukraine, disregarding those who wanted to punish the West for the support it was providing. So long as NATO continues to respect Putin’s red line, there is no reason to believe Putin would authorise nuclear use.
{"title":"The Russo-Ukrainian War and the Durability of Deterrence","authors":"Lawrence Freedman","doi":"10.1080/00396338.2023.2285598","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2023.2285598","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Both the Russian Federation and the United States and its allies have avoided taking actions carrying the greatest risk of escalation to nuclear-weapons use. Left uncertain is whether specific contingencies might yet prompt nuclear use. But the Russo-Ukrainian war has now been going on long enough to ground the debate in what has been said and done during its course. Russian nuclear decision-making requires the most attention, and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s statements about it have been the most authoritative. He has defined Russia’s nuclear red line consistently and relatively restrictively, reserving the threat of nuclear use for an existential threat to the state. He has focused on deterring the West from fighting alongside Ukraine, disregarding those who wanted to punish the West for the support it was providing. So long as NATO continues to respect Putin’s red line, there is no reason to believe Putin would authorise nuclear use.","PeriodicalId":51535,"journal":{"name":"Survival","volume":"9 1","pages":"7 - 36"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139291050","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-02DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2023.2285613
Hanns W. Maull
Homelands: A Personal History of Europe Timothy Garton Ash. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2023. $28.00. 384 pp. Democracy Erodes from the Top: Leaders, Citizens, and the Challenge of Populism in Europe Larry M. Bartels. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2023. £25.00/$29.95. 280 pp. Trading Power: West Germany’s Rise to Global Influence, 1963–1975 William Glenn Gray. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022. £34.99. 498 pp. Energy and Power: Germany in the Age of Oil, Atoms, and Climate Change Stephen G. Gross. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023. £35.99. 408 pp. Europe Alone: Small State Security Without the United States David Schultz, Aurelija Pūraitė and Vidmantė Giedraitytė, eds. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2022. £100.00/$130.00. 451 pp.
家园：A Personal History of Europe Timothy Garton Ash.康涅狄格州纽黑文：耶鲁大学出版社，2023 年。$28.00.384 pp.Democracy Erodes from the Top: Leaders, Citizens, and the Challenge of Populism in Europe Larry M. Bartels.新泽西州普林斯顿：普林斯顿大学出版社，2023 年。£25.00/$29.95.280 pp.Trading Power：Trading Power: West Germany's Rise to Global Influence, 1963-1975 William Glenn Gray.剑桥：剑桥大学出版社，2022 年。£34.99.498 pp.能源与权力：石油、原子和气候变化时代的德国》（Germany in the Age of Oil, Atoms, and Climate Change），斯蒂芬-G-格罗斯（Stephen G. Gross）著。牛津：牛津大学出版社，2023 年。£35.99.408 pp.单独的欧洲：没有美国的小国安全 David Schultz、Aurelija Pūraitė 和 Vidmantė Giedraitytė 编辑。Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2022.£100.00/$130.00.451 pp.
{"title":"Europe","authors":"Hanns W. Maull","doi":"10.1080/00396338.2023.2285613","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2023.2285613","url":null,"abstract":"Homelands: A Personal History of Europe Timothy Garton Ash. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2023. $28.00. 384 pp. Democracy Erodes from the Top: Leaders, Citizens, and the Challenge of Populism in Europe Larry M. Bartels. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2023. £25.00/$29.95. 280 pp. Trading Power: West Germany’s Rise to Global Influence, 1963–1975 William Glenn Gray. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022. £34.99. 498 pp. Energy and Power: Germany in the Age of Oil, Atoms, and Climate Change Stephen G. Gross. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023. £35.99. 408 pp. Europe Alone: Small State Security Without the United States David Schultz, Aurelija Pūraitė and Vidmantė Giedraitytė, eds. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2022. £100.00/$130.00. 451 pp.","PeriodicalId":51535,"journal":{"name":"Survival","volume":"5 1","pages":"201 - 207"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139291124","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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