The formative years of Iran’s ‘jihadi field diplomacy’ in Azerbaijan

ABSTRACTThis study examines the formative years of Iran’s so-called ‘jihadi field diplomacy’ toward Azerbaijan during and after the First Nagorno-Karabakh War. To accomplish this, I adopt a novel version of neoclassical realism, which considers the socially constructed nature of variables. The application of constructivist neoclassical realism facilitates a deeper comprehension of the reasons and mechanisms behind Iran’s embrace of unconventional interventionist policies in Azerbaijan. I argue that Iran’s jihadi field diplomacy is characterized by two main features: the use of military tools to achieve foreign policy goals and a distinct leadership structure that operates independently of the government. Then I analyze three turning points that shaped Iran’s jihadi field diplomacy toward Azerbaijan. Firstly, after a failed diplomatic mediation between Yerevan and Baku in May 1992, Iran intensified its military and ideological efforts in Azerbaijan. Secondly, during the June 1993 coup, Iran supported pro-Russian coup leader Colonel Huseynov and sought to persuade him to collaborate with ex-Communist Aliyev against nationalist President Elchibey. Aliyev later perceived this initial cooperation as a serious ideological and military challenge. Lastly, the perceived threat and Iran’s Quds Force connections to the leaders of the subsequent military uprisings adversely affected bilateral relations between Iran and Azerbaijan.KEYWORDS: Karabakh Warcoupconstructivist neoclassical realismIranAzerbaijan Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 See ‘Mosāhebe-ye Efshā-shode-ye Zarif’, Iran International, 29 April 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h3tiTAUJTxo&ab_channel=IranInternational%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%86%D8%B4%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%84.2 ‘Zarif: Diplomāsi va Meydān dar Kenār-e Ham Qarār Dārand’, Irna, 1 May 2021, https://bit.ly/3wyUrOk.3 The conflict over Karabakh started in 1988 and turned into war in 1992.4 ‘Goftogu-ye Jeneral Haqiqatpur’, Mehran, 25 October 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5avxes7RWnI&ab_channel=mehran.review.5 For instance, see R.K. Ramazani, ‘Ideology and Pragmatism in Iran’s Foreign Policy’, The Middle East Journal, 58:4 (2004), pp. 1–7; S.E. Cornell, ‘Iran and the Caucasus: The Triumph of Pragmatism over Ideology’, Global Dialogue, 3:2/3 (2001), pp. 80–92; K. Barzegar, ‘Iran’s Foreign Policy Strategy after Saddam’, The Washington Quarterly, 33:1 (2010), pp. 173–189; R. Takeyh and N.K. Gvosdev, ‘Pragmatism in the Midst of Iranian Turmoil’, Washington Quarterly, 27:4 (2004), pp. 33–56; S. Hunter, ‘Iran’s Pragmatic Regional Policy’, Journal of International Affairs, 56:2 (2003), pp. 133–147.6 See A. Ehteshami, ‘The Foreign Policy of Iran’, in R.A. Hinnebusch and A. Ehteshami (eds) The Foreign Policies of Middle East States (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), pp. 287–303; B.A. Rieffer-Flanagan, ‘Islamic Realpolitik: Two-level Iranian Foreign Policy’, International Journal on World Peace, 26:4 (2009), pp. 7–8; J.D. Green, ‘Ideology and Pragmatism in Iranian Foreign Policy’, Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, 17:1 (1993), pp. 57–75; W. Posch, The Third World, Global Islam and Pragmatism: The Making of Iranian Foreign Policy (Berlin: SWP, 2013); B. Friedman, ‘The Principles and Practice of Iran’s Post-Revolutionary Foreign Policy’, The Yale Initiative for the Interdisciplinary Study of Antisemitism, 6 (2010), pp. 6–16. The following works offer valuable insights into the complex interplay between pragmatism and ideology in Iranian foreign policy: P. Osiewicz, Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran: Between Ideology and Pragmatism (Routledge, 2020); R. Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs (Oxford University Press, 2009); D. Menashri, ‘Iran’s Regional Policy: Between Radicalism and Pragmatism’, Journal of International Affairs, 60:2 (2007), pp. 153–167; W. Posch, ‘Ideology and Strategy in the Middle East: The Case of Iran’, Survival, 59:5 (2017), pp. 69–98.7 For example, see I. Salamey and Z. Othman, ‘Shia Revival and Welayat al-Faqih in the Making of Iranian Foreign Policy’, Politics, Religion & Ideology, 12:2 (2011), pp. 197–202; M. Mozaffari, ‘Iran’s Foreign Policy’, in I. Takashi (ed) The Sage Handbook of Asian Foreign Policy (London: Sage Publication, 2020).8 For instance, Taremi believes that the main drive behind Iran’s support for the Lebanese Hezbollah is ideological rather than pragmatist or geopolitical. K. Taremi, ‘At the Service of Hezbollah: The Iranian Ministry of Construction Jihad in Lebanon, 1988–2003’, Politics, Religion & Ideology, 16:2–3 (2015), pp. 248–251.9 M.B. Bishku, ‘The South Caucasus Republics and Israel’, Middle Eastern Studies, 45:2 (2009), p. 303; Rieffer-Flanagan, op. cit., pp. 20–21; W. Posch, The Third World, Global Islam and Pragmatism: The Making of Iranian Foreign Policy (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2013), p. 19; S. Akbarzadeh and J. Barry, ‘State Identity in Iranian Foreign Policy’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 43:4 (2016), p. 621.10 See S. Alam, ‘The Changing Paradigm of Iranian Foreign Policy under Khatami’, Strategic Analysis, 24:9 (2000), p. 1631; M. Moslem, Factional Politics in post-Khomeini Iran (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2002), pp. 141–151; M. Terhalle, ‘Revolutionary Power and Socialization: Explaining the Persistence of Revolutionary Zeal in Iran’s Foreign Policy’, Security Studies, 18:3 (2009), pp. 572–576.11 E.P. Rakel, ‘Iranian Foreign Policy since the Iranian Islamic Revolution: 1979–2006’, Perspectives on Global Development and Technology, 6:1–3 (2007), pp. 77, 164; Rieffer-Flanagan, op. cit., pp. 20–21; Salamey and Othman, op. cit., p. 198; K. Barzegar and A. Divsallar, ‘Political Rationality in Iranian Foreign Policy’, The Washington Quarterly, 40:1 (2017), p. 40.12 See M. Boroujerdi, ‘Javad Zarif Returns-to a Foreign Ministry Still Out in the Cold: Iran’s Top Diplomat Vies for Authority’, Foreign Affairs, 6 March 2019, https://bit.ly/3A7mDcP.13 For a detailed discussion of IRGC role in Iran’s politics see B. Sinkaya, The Revolutionary Guards in Iranian Politics: Elites and Shifting Relations (New York: Routledge, 2015).14 R.A. Hinnebusch, The International Politics of the Middle East (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2003), p. 7.15 D. Sylvan and S. Majeski. US Foreign Policy in Perspective: Clients, Enemies and Empire (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 240.16 See, T. Swietochowski, ‘Azerbaijan: The Hidden Faces of Islam’, World Policy Journal, 19:3 (2002), p. 74; A. Akdevelioğlu, ‘İran İslam Cumhuriyeti’nin Orta Asya ve Azerbaycan Politikaları’, Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi, 1:2 (2004), p. 149; T. Mkrtchyan, ‘Cultural Diplomacy and Religion’ in A. Jödicke (ed) Religion and Soft Power in the South Caucasus (London and New York: Routledge, 2018), pp. 170–186; N. Alizadeh, ‘Unutulmamış Savaş: İki Savaş Arasında İran’ın Karabağ Sorunu’, Barış Araştırmaları ve Çatışma Çözümleri Dergisi, 10:1 (2022), pp. 47–89.17 S. Bagirov, ‘Azerbaijan’s Strategic Choice in the Caspian Region’ in G.I. Chufrin (ed) The Security of the Caspian Sea Region (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 180–181; A. Aliyev, ‘Iranian Soft Power in Azerbaijan: Does Religion Matter?’ in A. Jödicke (ed) Religion and Soft Power in the South Caucasus (London and New York: Routledge, 2018), pp. 85–104; A. Goyushov, ‘Islamic Revival in Azerbaijan’, in Hillel Fradkin et al. (eds), Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Vol.7 (Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute, 2008), pp. 66–81.18 See ‘Azerbaijan, Iran and Rising Tensions in the Caucasus’, The Washington Post, 8 February 2023, https://shorturl.at/kyVY6.19 See J.T. Checkel, ‘The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory’, World Politics, 50:2 (1998), p. 325; G. Rose, ‘Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy’, World Politics, 51:1 (1998), p. 146; N. Ganjar, ‘Constructivism and International Relations Theories’, Global & Strategis, 2:1 (2008), pp. 85–98.20 Checkel, op. cit., p. 325.21 M. Finnemore and K. Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, International Organization, 52:4 (1998), p. 891; Checkel, op. cit., p. 327.22 See Ganjar, op. cit., pp. 85–98; P.J. Katzenstein, R.O. Keohane and S.D. Krasner, ‘International Organization and the Study of World Politics’, International Organization, 52:4 (1998), pp. 645–685.23 Rose, op. cit., p. 146; A. Wendt, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics’, International Organization, 46:2 (1992), pp. 391–425.24 N. Kitchen, ‘Systemic Pressures and Domestic Ideas: A Neoclassical Realist Model of Grand Strategy Formation’, Review of International Studies, 36:1 (2010), p. 119; J.W. Taliaferro, S.E. Lobell and N.M. Ripsman, Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 20.25 A. Wivel, ‘Explaining Why State X Made a Certain Move Last Tuesday: The Promise and Limitations of Realist Foreign Policy Analysis’, Journal of International Relations and Development, 8:4 (2005), p. 361.26 G. Gvalia, B. Lebanidze and D.S. Siroky, ‘Neoclassical Realism and Small States: Systemic Constraints and Domestic Filters in Georgia’s Foreign Policy’, East European Politics 35:1 (2019), p. 21.27 J.S. Barkin, ‘Constructivist and Neoclassical Realisms’, in J.S. Barkin (ed), The Social Construction of State Power (Bristol University Press, 2020), pp. 47–72. Also see M. Boyle, ‘Huadu: A Realist Constructivist Account of Taiwan’s Anomalous Status’, in J.S. Barkin (ed), The Social Construction of State Power (Bristol University Press, 2020), pp. 73–100; A. Iancu, ‘The Bridging Capacity of Realist Constructivism: The Normative Evolution of Human Security and the Responsibility to Protect’, in J.S. Barkin (ed), The Social Construction of State Power (Bristol University Press, 2020), pp. 171–192; G.C. Prieto, ‘Causation in Realist Constructivism: Interactionality, Emergence and the Need for Interpretation’, in J.S. Barkin (ed), The Social Construction of State Power (Bristol University Press, 2020), pp. 19–46; L. Sjoberg, ‘Permutations and Combinations in Theorizing Global Politics: Whither Realist Constructivism?’, in J.S. Barkin (ed), The Social Construction of State Power (Bristol University Press, 2020), pp. 193–216; E. Michaels, ‘Renewing Realist Constructivism: Does It Have Potential as a Theory of Foreign Policy?’, Teoria Polityki, 6 (2022), pp. 101–122.28 For example, see G. Meibauer, ‘Interests, Ideas, and the Study of State Behaviour in Neoclassical Realism’, Review of International Studies 46:1 (2020), pp. 20–36; J. Sterling-Folker, ‘Realism and the Constructivist Challenge: Rejecting, Reconstructing, or Rereading’, International Studies Review, 4:1 (2002), pp. 73–97.29 R.L. Doty, ‘Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Postpositivist Analysis of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines’, International Studies Quarterly, 37:3 (1993), pp. 297–320.30 Hinnebusch, op. cit., p. 7.31 M. Warnaar, Iranian Foreign Policy During Ahmadinejad: Ideology and Actions (New York: Springer, 2013), p. 23.32 K. Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge (London: Routledge, 1954), pp. 64–67.33 See W. Carlsnaes, Ideology and Foreign Policy: Problems of Comparative Conceptualization (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1987).34 D. Bell, The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard University Press, 1988), p. 400. For a more detailed discussion on the history of ideology see C. Adair-Toteff, ‘Mannheim, Shils, and Aron and the ‘End of Ideology’ Debate’, Politics, Religion & Ideology, 20:1 (2019), pp. 1–20.35 U. Franke and R. Weber, ‘At the Papini Hotel: On Pragmatism in the Study of International Relations’, European Journal of International Relations 18:4 (2012), p. 669.36 I.L. Claude JR, ‘The Tension between Principle and Pragmatism in International Relations’, Review of International Studies, 19:3 (1993), pp. 215–226.37 G. Sartori, ‘Politics, Ideology, and Belief Systems’, American Political Science Review, 63:2 (1969), pp. 399–403.38 Recently, a third group of scholars attempted to bridge the gap between these two groups by adopting neoclassical realism and constructivism as analytical approaches. For example see M. Mohammad Nia, ‘Understanding Iran’s Foreign Policy’, World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues, 15:2 (2011), pp. 106–138; T. Juneau, Squandered Opportunity: Neoclassical Realism and Iranian Foreign Policy (Stanford University Press, 2015). Warnaar, op. cit.; M. Mohammad Nia, ‘Understanding Iran’s Foreign Policy: An Application of Holistic Constructivism’, Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, 9:1 (2010), pp. 148–180; M. Mohammad Nia, ‘Discourse and Identity in Iran’s Foreign Policy’, Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs, 3:3 (2012), pp. 29–64; K. Barzegar and S. M. K. Dinan, ‘Iran’s Political Stance toward Yemen's Ansar Allah Movement: A Constructivist-Based Study’, Journal of Politics and Law, 9:9 (2016), pp. 77–83; E. Wastnidge, Diplomacy and Reform in Iran: Foreign Policy under Khatami (I.B. Tauris, 2016); C. Phillips, ‘Capability and Culpability: Iranian and Saudi Rivalry in the Syrian Conflict’, in S. Mabon and E. Wastnidge (eds), Saudi Arabia and Iran: The Struggle to Shape the Middle East (Manchester University Press, 2022), pp. 141–155; T. Hatami, A. Zargar and A. Amini, ‘Iran and Eurasian Economic Union’, Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs, 11:31 (2020), pp. 247–272.39 A.Valiyev, ‘Azerbaijan: Islam in a Post-Soviet Republic’, Middle East Review of International Affairs, 9:4 (2005), pp. 5–6; J. Wilhelmsen, ‘Islamism in Azerbaijan: How Potent?’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32:8 (2009), pp. 726–727; V. Ter-Matevosyan and N. Minasyan, ‘Praying Under Restrictions: Islam, Identity and Social Change in Azerbaijan’, Europe-Asia Studies, 69:5 (2017), pp. 819–837. Goyushov argues that Islamic movements are unlikely to have a significant impact on Azerbaijani society in the short term. See Goyushov, op. cit., p. 79.40 For instance, Cornell cites the presence of 25 million Azerbaijanis, which accounts for approximately 35 percent of the population in 2006. See S.E. Cornell, The Politicization of Islam in Azerbaijan (Uppsala University, 2006), pp. 42–43. In 2012, Ali Akbar Salehi, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated that 40 percent of Iranians speak Turkish. See ‘Chehel Milyon Tork dar Iran’, ALFA Media, 12 September 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ix2HRwPd1Ck.41 D. Nissman, ‘Iran and Soviet Islam: The Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan SSRs’, Central Asian Survey, 2:4 (1983), p. 58. Also see Swietochowski, op. cit., p. 73; Valiyev, op. cit., p. 1.42 R. Sattarov, ‘Urban, Rural or Something in between: The Development of “Alternative” Forms of Islam in Azerbaijan through the Case of Nardaran Village in Absheron’, in Christian Noack and Stephane A. Dudoignon (eds) Allah’s Kolkhozes (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2020), pp. 501–502; Goyushov, op. cit., pp. 70–71.43 Sattarov, op. cit., pp. 501–504.44 A. Vaserman and R. Ginat, ‘National, Territorial or Religious Conflict? The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 17:4 (1994), pp. 357–358.45 Vaserman and Ginat, op. cit., pp. 357–358. See also Valiyev, op. cit., p. 2; Goyushov, op. cit., p. 70; A. Goyushov, N. Caffee and R. Denis, ‘The Transformation of Azerbaijani Orientalists into Islamic Thinkers after 1991’, in A. Goyushov, N. Caffee and R. Denis, The Heritage of Soviet Oriental Studies (Routledge, 2011), p. 311.46 B. Shaffer, Borders and Brethren: Iran and the Challenge of Azerbaijani Identity (Cambridge, MA and London, UK: MIT Press, 2002), pp. 140–143; Alizadeh, ‘Rol Kuramı Açısından İran’ın I. Karabağ Savaşı’ndaki Dış Siyaseti’, Ermeni Araştırmaları, 69:1 (2021), pp. 110–111; Alizadeh, ‘Unutulmamış Savaş’, p. 116.47 C.S. Brown, ‘Wanting to Have Their Cake and Their Neighbor’s Too: Azerbaijani Attitudes towards Karabakh and Iranian Azerbaijan’, The Middle East Journal, 58:4 (2004), pp. 576–596.48 N. Alizadeh, Jonbesh-e Daneshjui-ye Azerbaijan (Tabriz: Tabriz University Press: 2005), pp. 39–40; Shaffer, op. cit., p. 199.49 ‘Ayatolluh Al-Uzma Musavi Ardabili va Safar be Shuravi’, Ettela’at, 4 December 2016, https://www.ettelaat.com/mobile/archives/11605?device=phone.50 Sattarov, op. cit., p. 501; B. Balcı, ‘Between Sunnism and Shiism: Islam in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan’, Central Asian Survey, 23:2 (2004), pp. 209–211.51 Vaserman and Ginat, op. cit., pp. 359–360.52 Akdevelioğlu, op. cit., pp. 146–147; Alizadeh, ‘Unutulmamış Savaş’.53 C. Mahmudlu and A. Shamkhal, ‘The Peace-making Process in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Why did Iran Fail in Its Mediation Effort?’, Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe, 26:1 (2018), pp. 33–49.54 For a more detailed disscussion about the probably role of Russia and Armenia see N. Alizadeh, ‘Rol Kuramı’, pp. 110–111; Alizadeh, ‘Unutulmamış Savaş’, pp. 56–57.55 Brown, op. cit., p. 576; Vaserman and Ginat, op. cit., pp. 357–360; Valiyev, op. cit., p. 5.56 Valiyev, op. cit., p. 7.57 M. Taheri, ‘Janāb Rais Jomhur Lotfan Tārikh-e be Qodrat Residan-e Pedar rā Bekhānid’, Irandiplomacy, 1 October 2021, https://bit.ly/3OD7y9p.58 ‘Surət Hüseynov: Prezident Qvardiyasının Əsgərlərini Pənah Hüseyn Güllələtdirib’, MeydanTV, 1 October 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=81vLs-tUBQI&ab_channel=MeydanTV.59 Taheri, op. cit.60 In late 1992, Elchibey faced challenges from Huseynov and Defence Minister Rahim Qaziyev. In February 1993, reports revealed Huseynov's forces deliberately withdrew from north Karabakh, leaving besieged soldiers behind. Elchibey dismissed Huseynov and Qaziyev resigned due to assumed involvement. Consequently, Huseynov moved his brigade to Ganja, causing a gap in the strategically vital Kalbajar Mountains. Taking advantage of this opening, the Karabakh Armenians swiftly captured the highlands in eastern Kalbajar, and with the assistance of troops from Armenia on the western front, they occupied the city on 3 April 1993. See, T. de Waal, Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War (New York and London: New York University Press, 2003), pp. 211–212.61 S. Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of an Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus (London and New York: Routledgecurzon, 2001), pp. 314–347.62 T. Goltz, ‘Letter from Eurasia: The Hidden Russian Hand’, Foreign Policy, 92 (1993), p. 110. Goltz, traveling to Ganja during the days of revolt reported that the Russian 104th Airborne Division had ceded all its weapons to Huseynov when Elchibey’s government asked Russian troops to leave Azerbaijan. See T. Goltz, Azerbaijan Diary. A Rogue Reporter’s Adventures in an Oil-Rich, War-torn, Post-Soviet Republic (New York and London: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), pp. 357–359.63 de Waal, op. cit., pp. 198–199.64 See Alizadeh, ‘Unutulmamış Savaş’; M. Djalili, ‘Iran and the Caucasus: Maintaining Some Pragmatism’, Connections, 1:3 (2002), p. 53.65 M. Mozaffari, op. cit., p. 923.66 de Waal, op. cit., p. 214.67 Cornell, ‘Iran and the Caucasus’, op. cit., p. 87.68 See ‘Rövşən Cavadovu Aldadıb Tələyə Salmaq, OMON-u Dağıtmaq’, OsmanqızıTV, 16 March 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BMrZgUwbBeg&ab_channel=OSMANQIZITV; ‘Rövşən Cavadovu Kim Öldürdü?’, ObyektivTV, 14 March 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LaATimFJsKo. Also see, Goltz, Azerbaijan Diary, pp. 356–392; de Waal, op. cit., pp. 213–214.69 Monte Melkonian and many of Armenians from Lebanon and Syria including Kevork Guzelian, Manvel Egiazarian, Kharo Kakhkegian, and Jirayr Sefilian who had been involved in prior conflicts in the Middle East—the most important of which was the 1975–1990 Lebanese Civil War—led different units in the FKW. See M.M. Gunter, ‘Transnational Sources of Support for Armenian Terrorism’, Journal of Conflict Studies, 5:4 (1985), pp. 33–34; J.E. Vorbach, ‘Monte Melkonian: Armenian Revolutionary Leader’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 6:2 (1994), pp. 180–185; O. Kuznetsov, The History of Transnational Armenian Terrorism in the Twentieth Century (Berlin: Verlag Dr. Koster, 2016), pp. 144–147.70 See ‘Басаев о Карабахе’, EK, 17 October 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vPcKg8d3tAM&ab_channel=%D0%95%D0%9A.71 M. Taarnby, ‘The Mujahedin in Nagorno-Karabakh: A Case Study in the Evolution of Global Jihad’, Elcano Newsletter, 45 (2008), pp. 1–13.72 J. Auerbach, ‘Azerbaijan Hires Afghan Mujahideen to Fight Armenia’, Boston Globe, 8 November 1993; Human Right Watch. Azerbaijan: Seven Years of Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh (Helsinki, 1994), p. 81; Also see ‘Rövşen Cavadovun Qardaşı Mahir Cavadovun SeherTV.m’, Boz-Qurd, 10 December 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zXQiJzQ7hhE&ab_channel=BOZ-QURD.73 ‘Revāyeti Jāleb az Hozur-e Āytollāh Hashemi Rafsanjani dar Mantaqe-ye Qarebāgh’, Donya-e-Eghtesad, 2 October 2020, https://bit.ly/3GfZWWH.74 ‘Qarebāgh Khāk-e Eslām!’ Iswnews, 23 July 2018, https://bit.ly/3EuyYtv; ‘Karabağ Savaşı’nın Afgan Mücahitleri’, GZT, 28 September 2020, https://www.gzt.com/mecra/karabag-savasinin-afgan-mucahitleri-3472194; Taarnby, op. cit.75 Rafsanjani’s memoirs reveal that Iran was considering the sale of thirty million USD worth of ammunition to Azerbaijan in 1993. See A.H. Rafsanjani, ‘Selābet-e Sāzandegi, Markaz-e Asnād-e Āyatollāh Hashemi Rafsanjani’, rafsanjani.ir, 26 August 1993, https://bit.ly/3sCvTCY.76 General Rahim Noiaqdam, one of the main field commanders of the QF in the Syrian Civil War, after humiliating Azerbaijani troops, claimed that he liberated the dam with eleven members of the IRGC’s paramilitary Basij Force and gave it back to Azerbaijan. See ‘Posht-e Parde-ye Ellat-e Asli-ye A’dam-e Vorud-e Iran be Monāqeshe-ye Qarebāgh’, Dana, 8 April 2016, https://bit.ly/3Mgh3tN.77 See his interview in ‘Araz’ın Dayaz Günü’, Farsdili, 7 April 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VBmFIwoULdY&ab_channel=FarsDili.78 See ‘İranın Azərbaycana Baxışı Köprü’, Gunaz TV, 7 October 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RHKHTxv0_Fg. Furthermore, Mahir Javadov claimed that during an operation in Fuzuli in 1994, Iran intervened to rescue the besieged OMON forces and Javadov brothers. see‘Rövşen Cavadovun Qardaşı’, op. cit; ‘Heydər Əliyev Mənim Qardaşımı Təkidlə Məhv Eləmək İstəyirdi-Mahir Cavadov’, ObyektivTV, 15 March 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YzKqBZ_KFDM&ab_channel=OBYEKTIVtv.79 ‘Hikmət Hacıyev: İranın Yardımlarını Unutmayacayıq!’, Maideaz, 11 October 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=noY9NstLSYc&ab_channel=MaideAz.80 ‘Revāyeti Jāleb’, op. cit.81 Both Rafsanjani and his son, Mahdi, revealed their distrust toward Aliyev. See ‘Pāsokh-e Mohsen Hashemi be Edde’ā-yi dar Mored-e Pishnahād-e Elhāq-e Jomhuri-ye Azarbayjan be Iran va Vākonosh-e Āyatollāh Hashemi Rafsanjani’, khabaronline, 9 October 2021, https://bit.ly/3PDGurl.82 Vaserman and Ginat, op. cit., pp. 359–360; Cornell, The Politicization of Islam, op. cit., pp. 42–43; E. Souleimanov, Understanding Ethnopolitical Conflict: Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia Wars Reconsidered (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 143–144; Alizadeh, ‘Rol Kuramı’, pp. 130–133; Mkrtchyan, op. cit., p. 174.83 ‘Asrār va Haqāyeq-e Nāqofte-ye Qarebāgh’, Arannews, 10 April 2016, https://bit.ly/3slkcjP.84 ‘Bargi az Khāterāt-e Rovshan Javadov’, qafqaz, 29 December 2015, https://bit.ly/3JXufli; ‘Aliyev Dorugh Miquyad ke Mikhāhad Qarebāgh rā Āzād Konad’, iranzamin, 24 January 2019, https://bit.ly/3LxFDVE.85 ‘Sardār Soleymāni Ejāze Dād Kāndidā-ye Majles Shavam’, Qudsonline, 5 April 2015, https://bit.ly/39ArU3g; ‘Goftogu-ye Jeneral Haqiqatpur’, op. cit.86 See, ‘Bakhsh-e Kutāhi az Āmuzesh-e Niruhā-ye Nezāmi-ye Jomhuri-ye Azarbāyjān tavassot-e Farmandehān-e Nezāmi-ye Iran’, Arannews, 1 October 2020, https://bit.ly/3vhfcxh; ‘Haqāyeq-e Jang-e Qarebāgh’, Khorshid-e Haqiqat, 2021, https://bit.ly/3M0ZCNa.87 M. Haqiqatpur, ‘Iran dar Jang-e Qarebāgh Yek Havāpeymā Por az Mohemmāt be Azarbayjan Dād’, Azariha, 5 April 2017, https://bit.ly/38DFt1B.88 ‘A’malliyāti ke Barāye Āzādsāziye Qarebāgh Anjām Shod Farmāndehi-ye Ān rā Bande bar O’hde Gereftam’, Qafqaz, 22 January 2018, https://bit.ly/3wBaiMu; ‘Aliyev Dorugh Miquyad’, op. cit.89 ‘A’malliyāti ke Barāye Āzādsāziye Qarebāgh Anjām Shod Farmāndehi-ye Ān rā Bande bar O’hde Gereftam’, Qafqaz, 22 January 2018, https://bit.ly/3wBaiMu; ‘Aliyev Dorugh Miquyad’, op. cit.90 According to Colonel Ali Rezai, Noaqdam was appointed as the first military advisor of Iran in Baku in 1994. See ‘İranın Azərbaycana Baxışı’, op. cit.91 See Shaffer, op. cit.; Alizadeh, ‘Unutulmamış Savaş’; Alizadeh, ‘Rol Kuramı’.92 ‘A’malliyāti’, op. cit.93 Rieffer-Flanagan, op. cit., pp. 21–25.94 Some of the QF generals claimed that the trained Azerbaijani soldiers participated in the FKW, but their claims are at odd with three facts: firstly, the timer on the videos reveals that the recorded military manoeuvre was held in October 1994; namely, about five months after the ceasefire. Secondly, as Haqiqatpur maintained in an interview, these videos show him and Aliyev in the military manoeuvre of ‘the first unit’ formed by the QF, which was held ‘just after completing training’. Therefore, the training of the first unit was completed months after the ceasefire. Thirdly, Colonel Ali Rezai maintains that QF’s training started after Aliyev’s visit to Iran, which took place about a month after the ceasefire on 29 June 1994. See ‘Komakhā-ye Nezāmi-ye Iran be Dovlat-e Baku’, Aparat, 2021, https://bit.ly/3xsK9RN; ‘Goftogu-ye Jeneral Haqiqatpur’, op. cit; ‘İranın Azərbaycana Baxışı Köprü’, Gunaz TV, 7 October 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RHKHTxv0_Fg.95 Haqiqatpur referred to 6,500 soldiers trained by the QF, but General H. Kabiri mentioned 8,000 soldiers. See ‘Iran Tanhā Hāmi-ye Azarbayjan dar Sakhtarin Sherāyet Bude-ast’, Irna, 6 December 2020, https://bit.ly/3wavloH.96 Franke and Weber, op. cit., p. 675.97 Taheri, op. cit.98 Bagirov, op. cit., pp. 180–181; S. Hunter, ‘Iran’s Pragmatic Regional Policy’, Journal of International Affairs 56:2 (2003), p. 134.99 Souleimanov, op. cit., pp. 143–144; Alizadeh, ‘Rol Kuramı’, pp. 130–133; Mkrtchyan, op. cit., p. 174.100 Arif Yunis mentioned that Aliyev disbanded thirty-three battalions loyal to the PFA, consisting of about ten thousand men in total, and vowed to create a new national army instead (Quoted in de Waal, op. cit., pp. 225–226).101 ‘Rāvi-ye Irani va Shāhed-e E’yni-ye Jang-e Qarebāgh’, Arannews, 9 January 2018, https://bit.ly/3ls1d3q. For more information about the Basij militia force see S. Golkar, ‘Organization of the Oppressed or Organization for Oppressing: Analysing the Role of the Basij Militia of Iran’, Politics, Religion & Ideology, 13:4 (2012), pp. 455–471.102 ‘İranın Azərbaycana Baxışı’, op. cit.103 H. Ahmadian, ‘Dignity, Wisdom and Expediency: How Ideational Factors Shape Iran’s Foreign Policy’, The International Spectator, 56:4 (2021), p. 40.104 For example, see Haqiqatpur’s interview ‘Goftogu-ye Jeneral Haqiqatpur’, op. cit.105 Ibid.106 Haqiqatpur, op. cit.107 See ‘Komakhā-ye Nezāmi-ye Iran’, op. cit.108 ‘Tasir-e Farmāndehān-e Sepāh bar Nezāmiyān-e Azarbayjan’, Mashreghnews, 5 September 2011, https://bit.ly/3Nn1H6K.109 ‘İran Azərbaycanın bir Batalyonuna Din Üzərində Qurulan Təlimlər Keçmək İstəyirdi- Rəsul Quliyevdən İlginc Açıqlamalar’, Teref, 30 December 2015, http://teref.az/musahibe/15177-ran-azerbaycanin-bir-batalyonuna-din-uzerinde-qurulan-telimler-kechmek-isteyirdi-resul-quliyevden-ilginc-achiqlamalar.html.110 See Z. Shakibi, ‘Pahlavīsm: The Ideologization of Monarchy in Iran’, Politics, Religion & Ideology, 14:1 (2013), pp. 120–121.111 See ‘Goftogu-ye Jeneral Haqiqatpur’, op. cit.; Haqiqatpur, op. cit.112 ‘Goftogu-ye Jeneral Haqiqatpur’, op. cit.113 ‘Yāddāsht va Sokhanān-e Ātashafruz-e Hoseyn Shariatmadāri va Mansur Haqiqatpur darbāre-ye Azarbayjan’, RFI, 3 April 2013, https://bit.ly/3G95qm8.114 ‘Nāme-ye Sargoshāde-ye Haqiqatpur be Nemāyande-ye Pārlemān-e Jomhuri-ye Āzarbayjan’, Arannews, 3 February 2012, https://bit.ly/3yNsgxJ; ‘Dar Haqiqat-e Haqiqatpur’, Azariha, 24 February 2014, https://bit.ly/3yLGlvE; ‘Komak-e 30 Milyon Dolāri-ye Taslihāti-ye Jomhuri-ye Eslāmi be Azarbayjan dar Jang-e Qarebāgh’, Paniranist, 5 April 2017, https://bit.ly/3a7UZ6b; ‘Sokhanrāni’ye Doktor Mansur Haqiqatpur’, Diyarekohan, 24 February 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DWOcHaJM8gs&ab_channel=diyarekohan.115 For a discussion about Aryanism in Iran see N. Alizadeh, ‘Ibrat, Hasrat, or Tahdid: Turkish Modernity in the Eyes of Iranian Nationalist Modernists in the Qajar-Pahlavi Interregnum’, Turkish Studies, 22:4 (2021), pp. 564–575.116 M. Howard, ‘Ideology and International Relations’, Review of International Studies, 15:1 (1989), pp. 6–7.117 Goyushov, op. cit., p. 71.118 For example see, ‘Estisāl-e Nemāyendegān-e Āzarbayjan dar barabr-e Nāmehā-ye Sargoshāde-ye Nemāyende-ye Ardabil’, Tabnak, 11 Feburary 2012, https://bit.ly/3jKKR4T; ‘Siyavuş Novruzov İranlı Deputata Kəskin Cavab Verdi’, Yeni Musavat, 11 February 2013, https://musavat.com/news/son-xeber/siyavush-novruzov-iranli-deputata-keskin-cavab-verdi_144047.html?d=1.119 ‘Siyavuş Novruzov: General Həqiqətpurla Bağlı Azərbaycanda Cinayət İşi Qaldırılıb’, APA, 17 December 2015, https://apa.az/az/xarici_siyaset/xeber_bashliq_-408836.120 ‘Üz-Üzə: Sülhəddin Əkbərlə Azərbaycan İran Münasibətləri Haqqında’, Marka Film Production, 11 October 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kFK3svwBI0Y&ab_channel=MarkaFilmProduction.121 Claude JR, op. cit.122 A. Adib-Moghaddam, The International Politics of the Persian Gulf: A Cultural Genealogy (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 32.123 Cornell, Small Nations, op. cit., p. 94.124 Ibid.; de Waal, op. cit., p. 251.125 Goltz, Azerbaijan Diary, p. 451.126 de Waal, op. cit., p. 252.127 Cornell, Small Nations, op. cit., p. 290.128 See ‘İranın Azərbaycana Baxışı’ op. cit.; ‘Angize’ye Sarhang Rezai az Peyvastan be Sepāh Che Bud va Chegune be Farmāndehi-ye Sepāh Rasid?’, Kalemehtv, 18 December 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WXjvBzjYKpk&ab_channel=kalemehtv.129 See, ‘Rövşen Cavadovun Qardaşı’, op. cit.; ‘Heydər Əliyev’, op. cit.130 ‘Goftogu-ye Jeneral Haqiqatpur’, op. cit.; Haqiqatpur, op. cit.131 ‘Heydər Əliyev’, op. cit.132 See ‘Rövşən Cavadovu Aldadıb’, op. cit.; ‘Rövşən Cavadovu Kim Öldürdü?’, op. cit.133 ‘Heydər Əliyev’, op. cit.134 Mahir claimed that Elchibey had asked Rovshan to attend in the airport and the OMON forces who gathered around Aliyev were not loyal to Javadovs. See ‘Heydər Əliyev’, op. cit.135 ‘Rövşən Cavadov: Sürət Hüseynov Xalq Hərəkatının Rəhbəridir!’, Sürət Hüseynov, 5 October 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wOe_71Msxo8&ab_channel=S%C3%BCr%C9%99tH%C3%BCseynov.136 ‘Heydər Əliyev’, op. cit.137 Ibid.138 See ‘Rövşen Cavadovun Qardaşı’, op. cit.; ‘Heydər Əliyev’, op. cit.; ‘Fugitives in Russia and Iran Implicated in Anti-Aliev Coup Plan’, Jamestown, 30 October 2001, https://jamestown.org/program/fugitives-in-russia-and-iran-implicated-in-anti-aliev-coup-plan/.139 Swietochowski, op. cit., p. 74; Sattarov, op. cit., p. 508.140 Wilhelmsen, op. cit., p. 727; G. Bashirov, ‘Islamic Discourses in Azerbaijan: The Securitization of ‘non-Traditional Religious Movements’, Central Asian Survey, 37:1 (2018), pp. 33–34.141 Valiyev, op. cit., pp. 1–7; Ter-Matevosyan and Minasyan, op. cit. p. 821.142 Valiyev, op. cit., p. 8.143 M. Kadivar, ‘Fatva-ye Teror va Bayaniye-ye Shademani az Ejra-ye An’, Kadivar, 21 July 2014, https://kadivar.com/13724/.144 For example, see Y. Tashjian, ‘“Hoseyniyyun” (Hüseyniyyun) Jonbeshi Por-Nofuz dar Azerbaijan va Mo’taqed be Iran-e Eslami’, Irandiplomacy, 5 November 2022, https://shorturl.at/gwzF9; L. Farhadi, ‘Goruh-e Hoseyniyyun (Hüseyniyyun) Che Kesani Hastand va Chera Iran Rahbaran-e An ra Bazdasht Kard?’, Rouydad24, 30 April 2023, https://shorturl.at/EGLWZ.145 For instance, see ‘Talash-e Aliyev bara-ye Bazgasht-e 41 O’zv-E Jonbesh-e “Hoseyniyyun”; Khaste-i ke Hich Vaqt be Natije Nemirasad’, Bashgah-e Khabarnegaran-e Javan, 9 Septamber 2022, https://shorturl.at/gkxIU.146 See M. Motamedi, ‘Analysis: Will Azerbaijan-Iran tensions lead to war?’, Aljazeera, 8 April 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/8/analysis-will-azerbaijan-iran-tensions-lead-to-war.Additional informationNotes on contributorsÖzgür KızılyurtÖzgür Kızılyurt holds a BA from Tabriz University, an MA from Tehran Allameh Tabatabai University, and a PhD from Ankara University. He currently serves as an Associate Professor of International Relations in the Department of Economics at İzmir Bakırçay University, Turkey. Kızılyurt is the author and editor of some books, including Student Movement in Azerbaijan (2005) and The Challenge of Identity in Azerbaijan (2006) in Persian, as well as Aryans, Zoroastrians, and Compradors: Iran and India in the Age of Colonial Globalisation (2021) in Turkish. His research articles have been published in journals such as Turkish Studies and Institutional Economics.