立法机构越大,政府就越大吗?来自巴西市议会改革的证据

Rodrigo Schneider, Henrique Veras
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引用次数: 0

摘要

更大的立法机构会导致更大的政府吗?我们利用巴西的一项改革,在回归不连续设计中根据人口阈值分配市政议会席位。我们发现,较大的议会在社会产品和立法成本上的公共支出明显较高。增加支出的部分资金来自地方税收收入的大幅增加,而对选民来说,另一种不那么突出的税收形式——服务税——也推动了支出的增长。作为对我们研究结果的潜在解释,我们表明,更多的理事会席位导致更大的政治多样性。JEL分类代码:D72, H72, R51
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Do Bigger Legislatures Lead to Bigger Government? Evidence from a Brazilian Municipal Council Reform
Do bigger legislatures lead to bigger government? We exploit a Brazilian reform that allocated the number of municipal council seats based on population thresholds in a regression discontinuity design. We find that larger councils have significantly higher public expenditures on social goods and legislative costs. Increased spending is partly financed by significantly higher local tax revenues and is driven by a less salient form of tax to voters – on services – than property taxes. As a potential explanation for our findings, we show that, more council seats led to greater political diversity. JEL Classification Codes: D72, H72, R51
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CiteScore
0.40
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审稿时长
24 weeks
期刊最新文献
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