反智主义一般认知问题的解答

IF 1.3 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Episteme-A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology Pub Date : 2023-09-15 DOI:10.1017/epi.2023.44
M. Hosein M. A. Khalaj
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引用次数: 0

摘要

一些作者认为,反智主义面临着解释知识的认知方面的一般认识论问题,并回答为什么知识作为一种倾向被认为是一种独特的知识。在本文中,我提出了一种解决这个问题的方法,其核心思想是,存在一种更广泛的知识意义,知识-那和知识-如何都属于这种意义。我提出了这个解决方案的两个版本。根据第一个版本,专有技术是一种独特的知识,因为有一个一般的可分析的知识类别,专有技术和专有知识都属于这个类别。这一总体分类被分析为三个组成部分:成功组成部分,外部主义反运气组成部分和内部主义反运气组成部分。根据该解决方案的第二个版本,诀窍是一种独特的知识,因为在理论领域(作为命题知识)和实践领域(作为诀窍)中都存在一种不可分析的类比知识概念。这两个版本的解决方案都是合理的,因为它们通过假设知识和非命题意向性之间存在内在关系,以一种反知识主义的方式区分了诀窍和诀窍。
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A Solution to the General Epistemic Problem for Anti-Intellectualism
Abstract Some authors maintain that anti-intellectualism faces a general epistemic problem of explaining the cognitive aspect of know-how, and answering the question of why know-how as a kind of disposition is to be considered a distinct kind of knowledge. In the present paper, I argue for a solution to this problem, the central idea of which is that there is a broader sense of knowledge to which both knowledge-that and knowledge-how belong. I present two versions of this solution. According to the first version, know-how is a distinct kind of knowledge since there is a general analyzable category of knowledge under which both know-how and know-that fall. This general category is analyzed into three components: a success component, an externalist anti-luck component, and an internalist anti-luck component. According to the second version of the solution, know-how is a distinct kind of knowledge since there is an unanalyzable analogical conception of knowledge that comes first in both the theoretical realm (as propositional knowledge) and the practical realm (as know-how). Both versions of the solution are plausible since they distinguish between know-how and knacks in an anti-intellectualist manner by positing that there is an internal relation between know-how and non-propositional intentionality.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.10
自引率
11.80%
发文量
48
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