并购的所有权、机构和代理完成

IF 5.7 2区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS Global Strategy Journal Pub Date : 2023-09-13 DOI:10.1002/gsj.1494
Thomas Lindner, Jakob Müllner, Harald Puhr
{"title":"并购的所有权、机构和代理完成","authors":"Thomas Lindner, Jakob Müllner, Harald Puhr","doi":"10.1002/gsj.1494","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Research Summary In this paper, we study how variations in debt and equity ownership and the institutions that govern interactions between different types of principals and agents affect the completion likelihood of acquisitions. Using a sample of 55,722 acquisitions, our study finds that risk‐averse debtholders reduce the completion likelihood of acquisitions. When acquisitions cross borders, the acquiring capital providers become exposed to institutional environments that have evolved to prioritize different ideologies or principals because of the structure and customers of local capital markets. As a result, institutional duality in home and target countries reduces the completion likelihood of acquisitions. Our study integrates varieties of capitalism arguments and firm‐level agency conflicts and highlights the theoretical importance of capital markets and their concentration. Managerial Summary An acquisition is a highly consequential negotiation process between managers and capital providers of a firm. Based on their evaluation of a potential deal, managers propose acquisitions to capital providers who either accept it or pressure managers into withdrawing from the announced deal. This study considers firms' capital structure and cross‐national differences in the governing institutions to explain the resistance of capital providers against announced acquisitions. In particular, it points to the fear of capital providers losing control of their firms as a driver of their resistance against cross‐border acquisitions. However, when a favorable capital‐market structure in the target's home country alleviates the fears of capital providers, their resistance weakens.","PeriodicalId":47563,"journal":{"name":"Global Strategy Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.7000,"publicationDate":"2023-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Ownership, institutions, and the agency of M&A completion\",\"authors\":\"Thomas Lindner, Jakob Müllner, Harald Puhr\",\"doi\":\"10.1002/gsj.1494\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract Research Summary In this paper, we study how variations in debt and equity ownership and the institutions that govern interactions between different types of principals and agents affect the completion likelihood of acquisitions. Using a sample of 55,722 acquisitions, our study finds that risk‐averse debtholders reduce the completion likelihood of acquisitions. When acquisitions cross borders, the acquiring capital providers become exposed to institutional environments that have evolved to prioritize different ideologies or principals because of the structure and customers of local capital markets. As a result, institutional duality in home and target countries reduces the completion likelihood of acquisitions. Our study integrates varieties of capitalism arguments and firm‐level agency conflicts and highlights the theoretical importance of capital markets and their concentration. Managerial Summary An acquisition is a highly consequential negotiation process between managers and capital providers of a firm. Based on their evaluation of a potential deal, managers propose acquisitions to capital providers who either accept it or pressure managers into withdrawing from the announced deal. This study considers firms' capital structure and cross‐national differences in the governing institutions to explain the resistance of capital providers against announced acquisitions. In particular, it points to the fear of capital providers losing control of their firms as a driver of their resistance against cross‐border acquisitions. However, when a favorable capital‐market structure in the target's home country alleviates the fears of capital providers, their resistance weakens.\",\"PeriodicalId\":47563,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Global Strategy Journal\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":5.7000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-09-13\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Global Strategy Journal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1002/gsj.1494\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"管理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Global Strategy Journal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1002/gsj.1494","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要本文研究了不同类型的委托人和代理人之间的债务所有权和股权所有权的变化以及管理其相互作用的制度如何影响收购完成的可能性。通过对55,722宗收购的样本分析,我们的研究发现,风险厌恶型债权人降低了收购完成的可能性。当收购跨越国界时,收购资本提供者就会暴露在制度环境中,这些制度环境已经演变为优先考虑不同的意识形态或委托人,因为当地资本市场的结构和客户。因此,母国和目标国的制度二元性降低了收购完成的可能性。我们的研究整合了各种资本主义争论和企业层面的代理冲突,并强调了资本市场及其集中度的理论重要性。收购是公司管理者和资本提供者之间的一个非常重要的谈判过程。根据对潜在交易的评估,基金经理向资本提供者提出收购建议,资本提供者要么接受收购,要么向基金经理施压,要求他们退出已宣布的交易。本研究考虑了公司的资本结构和治理机构的跨国差异,以解释资本提供者对已宣布收购的抵制。特别是,它指出了对资本提供者失去对其公司控制权的恐惧,这是他们抵制跨境收购的一个驱动因素。然而,当目标国有利的资本市场结构缓解了资本提供者的担忧时,他们的阻力就会减弱。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
Ownership, institutions, and the agency of M&A completion
Abstract Research Summary In this paper, we study how variations in debt and equity ownership and the institutions that govern interactions between different types of principals and agents affect the completion likelihood of acquisitions. Using a sample of 55,722 acquisitions, our study finds that risk‐averse debtholders reduce the completion likelihood of acquisitions. When acquisitions cross borders, the acquiring capital providers become exposed to institutional environments that have evolved to prioritize different ideologies or principals because of the structure and customers of local capital markets. As a result, institutional duality in home and target countries reduces the completion likelihood of acquisitions. Our study integrates varieties of capitalism arguments and firm‐level agency conflicts and highlights the theoretical importance of capital markets and their concentration. Managerial Summary An acquisition is a highly consequential negotiation process between managers and capital providers of a firm. Based on their evaluation of a potential deal, managers propose acquisitions to capital providers who either accept it or pressure managers into withdrawing from the announced deal. This study considers firms' capital structure and cross‐national differences in the governing institutions to explain the resistance of capital providers against announced acquisitions. In particular, it points to the fear of capital providers losing control of their firms as a driver of their resistance against cross‐border acquisitions. However, when a favorable capital‐market structure in the target's home country alleviates the fears of capital providers, their resistance weakens.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
14.20
自引率
11.80%
发文量
46
期刊介绍: The Global Strategy Journal is a premier platform dedicated to publishing highly influential managerially-oriented global strategy research worldwide. Covering themes such as international and global strategy, assembling the global enterprise, and strategic management, GSJ plays a vital role in advancing our understanding of global business dynamics.
期刊最新文献
Issue Information - TOC A perspective on three trade-offs of blockchain technology for the global strategy of the MNC Foreign institutional investors and equity share decisions in cross‐border mergers and acquisitions Do financial crises moderate the influence of stakeholder rights protection on M&A activity: The influence of institutional logics and power? Issue Information - TOC
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1