Narratives of Disenchantment and Secularization: Critiquing Max Weber's Idea of Modernity ed. by Robert A Yelle and Lorenz Trein (review)

Reviewed by: Narratives of Disenchantment and Secularization: Critiquing Max Weber's Idea of Modernity ed. by Robert A Yelle and Lorenz Trein Larry Ray Robert A Yelle and Lorenz Trein, eds., Narratives of Disenchantment and Secularization: Critiquing Max Weber's Idea of Modernity (London: Bloomsbury, 2022), vii + 262 pp. (pbk). ISBN 9781350327757. £26.09. This is a collection of eight chapters plus the editors' introduction that arise from a conference in 2017 at Munich's Ludwig Maximilian University on the nature of secular modernity. The contributions address a range of questions about the meaning of Weber's 'disenchantment of the world', the problem of modernity, what alternative accounts of modernization have emerged, whether there was a breach with an 'enchanted' world, whether disenchantment is itself a myth, and the place of religion in the modern world. These are critical questions for understanding Weber's analysis and our conceptions of modernity. The papers are erudite, written by internationally acknowledged specialists and succinctly argued. It is good to see an edited collection that is thematic, where all the contributions address a core set of questions, although this also means that there is some repetition among the chapters. Further, the discussions here of secularism and disenchantment, although they tend to be Christo-centric, generally acknowledge the indeterminacy of the process for Weber, envisaging a linear trend over thousands of years from the Hebrew Bible through the Reformation to secular modernity (2). The brevity of the chapters, even though they manage to cover a good amount of ground, mean that tantalizing questions are often raised but not answered. This review enters into discussion on some of the key issues raised. The question of temporal rupture arises in a number of contributions. Trein (72) asks what is the significance of the past if 'one's present is thoroughly disenchanted' and proceeds to ask whether this implies a temporal rupture between enchantment and modernity? This leads into a fascinating genealogical discussion of the question of temporality as both a self-description of modernity and mode of theorizing it, though the chapter ends somewhat provocatively on the question, 'So what is modernity?'. Temporality is central to the concept of rationalization and [End Page 238] brings into play issues of diachronic and synchronic analysis. It might be true to say, as Jason Josephson-Storm does, that the Protestants did not doubt the existence of a spirit world and that witches were burned in New England, indicating that enchantment remained very much a part of the Reformation. Hans Kippenberg similarly points out that disenchantment must be distinguished from rationalization, and that the latter for Weber did not at all preclude the formation of modern esotericism (30). But rationalization was proposed as a process of long durée that could take unforeseen turns, which was presaged as a central theme of the Protestant Ethic essays. The pursuit of evidence of salvation transposed into a spirit of capitalism that would ultimately have horrified the Puritans. Within this process 'enchanted' beliefs may survive but their status changes. Josephson-Storm (47) points out that despite the 'grand secularization process' fortune-telling today is widespread, along with astrology. We might add to these homeopathy and other magical therapeutics. However, as Josephson-Storm and others also note, esoteric practices are pursued instrumentally, and we might further ask to what extent do the users of these services really buy into the cosmologies that underpin them? Their consumption choices are private and magical beliefs do not generally enter the spheres of public deliberation. Josephson-Storm further says that specialists and non-specialists alike have difficulty getting a handle on Weber's conception of disenchantment partly because they have fixed on 'Science as a Vocation' to the exclusion of other discussions (37). Moreover, he suggests, there is a presumption that Weber saw an opposition between rationality and magic, whereas the latter can be instrumental-rational since spells are for pragmatic purposes. Again, this does not address the question of the rationality of the belief systems that underpin magical practices and how much public legitimacy they might have compared to their status in pre-modern Europe. Indeed, as Michael Saler points out, Entzauberung is not so much disenchantment as...