{"title":"属性的披露和定价","authors":"Alex Smolin","doi":"10.1111/1756-2171.12451","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A monopolist sells an object characterized by multiple attributes. A buyer can be one of many types, differing in their willingness to pay for each attribute. The seller can provide arbitrary attribute information in the form of a statistical experiment. To screen different types, the seller offers a menu of options that specify information prices, experiments, and object prices. I characterize revenue‐maximizing menus. All experiments belong to a class of linear disclosure rules. An optimal menu may be nondiscriminatory. The analysis highlights the importance of demand microstructure and the benefits of information control in trade settings.","PeriodicalId":51342,"journal":{"name":"Rand Journal of Economics","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8000,"publicationDate":"2023-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"4","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Disclosure and pricing of attributes\",\"authors\":\"Alex Smolin\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/1756-2171.12451\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract A monopolist sells an object characterized by multiple attributes. A buyer can be one of many types, differing in their willingness to pay for each attribute. The seller can provide arbitrary attribute information in the form of a statistical experiment. To screen different types, the seller offers a menu of options that specify information prices, experiments, and object prices. I characterize revenue‐maximizing menus. All experiments belong to a class of linear disclosure rules. An optimal menu may be nondiscriminatory. The analysis highlights the importance of demand microstructure and the benefits of information control in trade settings.\",\"PeriodicalId\":51342,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Rand Journal of Economics\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-10-18\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"4\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Rand Journal of Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12451\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Rand Journal of Economics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12451","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract A monopolist sells an object characterized by multiple attributes. A buyer can be one of many types, differing in their willingness to pay for each attribute. The seller can provide arbitrary attribute information in the form of a statistical experiment. To screen different types, the seller offers a menu of options that specify information prices, experiments, and object prices. I characterize revenue‐maximizing menus. All experiments belong to a class of linear disclosure rules. An optimal menu may be nondiscriminatory. The analysis highlights the importance of demand microstructure and the benefits of information control in trade settings.
期刊介绍：
The RAND Journal of Economics publishes theoretical and empirical research on industrial organization and closely related topics, including contracts, organizations, law and economics, and regulation. The RAND Journal of Economics, formerly the Bell Journal of Economics, is published quarterly by The RAND Corporation, in conjunction with Blackwell Publishing.
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