党派认识论和错误的信任

IF 1.3 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Episteme-A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology Pub Date : 2023-10-02 DOI:10.1017/epi.2023.46
Boyd Millar
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们每个人都对同党者(那些属于我们认同的群体的人)的说法有更大的信心,这一事实在很大程度上解释了为什么这么多人相信他们遇到的大量错误信息。人们很自然地认为,这种被误导的党派信仰通常涉及某种形式的理性失败,哲学家和心理学家对据称涉及的理性失败的性质进行了各种辩护。我认为,对被误导的党派信仰的非理性的标准诊断没有一个是令人信服的,但我也认为,我们应该拒绝将这些信仰定性为理性的或与认知美德一致的企图。因此,我为相关认识错误的另一种诊断辩护。具体地说,我坚持认为,当个人评估证词时,他认为合作关系比他在实际情况下应该给予的权重更大,从而在有更好的替代方案时相信合作关系的证词时,通常会产生这种信念。
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Partisan Epistemology and Misplaced Trust
The fact that each of us has significantly greater confidence in the claims of co-partisans – those belonging to groups with which we identify – explains, in large part, why so many people believe a significant amount of the misinformation they encounter. It's natural to assume that such misinformed partisan beliefs typically involve a rational failure of some kind, and philosophers and psychologists have defended various accounts of the nature of the rational failure purportedly involved. I argue that none of the standard diagnoses of the irrationality of misinformed partisan beliefs is convincing, but I also argue that we ought to reject attempts to characterize these beliefs as rational or consistent with epistemic virtue. Accordingly, I defend an alternative diagnosis of the relevant epistemic error. Specifically, I maintain that such beliefs typically result when an individual evaluating testimony assigns more weight to co-partisanship than he ought to under the circumstances, and consequently believes the testimony of co-partisans when better alternatives are available.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.10
自引率
11.80%
发文量
48
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