有效解决合伙纠纷

IF 2.8 3区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Rand Journal of Economics Pub Date : 2023-10-13 DOI:10.1111/1756-2171.12450
Daniel Fershtman, Béla Szabadi, Cédric Wasser
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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要本文研究合伙纠纷的有效解决,从合伙解散的文献来看,合伙解散不一定是有效的。我们描述了在单边和双边私人信息下哪些争议可以有效解决,并表明除非合作伙伴关系足够无效,否则有效解决是不可能的。我们建议简单的争议解决程序,尽可能实现有效的结果。最后,我们描述了当有效的解决方案是不可能的,私人信息是片面的时候的次优机制。
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Efficient resolution of partnership disputes
Abstract We study efficient resolution of partnership disputes in which, departing from the partnership dissolution literature, dissolution need not be efficient. We characterize which disputes can be resolved efficiently under both one‐ and two‐sided private information, and show that unless a partnership is sufficiently ineffective, efficient resolution is impossible. We propose simple dispute‐resolution procedures implementing the efficient outcome whenever possible. Finally, we characterize second‐best mechanisms when efficient resolution is impossible and private information is one sided.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.60
自引率
4.30%
发文量
28
期刊介绍: The RAND Journal of Economics publishes theoretical and empirical research on industrial organization and closely related topics, including contracts, organizations, law and economics, and regulation. The RAND Journal of Economics, formerly the Bell Journal of Economics, is published quarterly by The RAND Corporation, in conjunction with Blackwell Publishing.
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