Exploring Local Political Opportunity Structures: Protest and Social Control in Russia’s Provinces

Abstract Why does the scale and intensity of protest vary so widely across Russian cities? This article answers this question by disaggregating political opportunity structures to consider the interaction between formal and informal political factors through a paired comparison of two similar Russian cities during the turbulent 1990s. Drawing on archival documents, interviews, and an analysis of local media, I argue that the observed variation depends on elite strategies for social control and local governmental institutions. Specifically, when a city’s institutions and political elite strategy match, either with undemocratic institutions and a closed political elite strategy, or with democratic institutions and an open political elite strategy, protests are likely to be small and insignificant. In contrast, when the institutional architecture and political elite strategies mismatch, protests are more likely to be large and intense because there is an opening for protest, but not institutionalized paths for participation.