Pub Date : 2023-10-18DOI: 10.30965/24518921-00803011
Daniil Romanov, Ilya Fominykh, Ivan Ankudinov
Abstract Political scientists have long known that modern electoral autocracies can use quasi-democratic institutions to neutralize the danger posed by the opposition. Participation in elections by completely controlled spoiler parties proved to be an effective tool for maintaining authoritarian stability. However, researchers know few cases of how aging authoritarian regimes create systemic semi-independent opposition in order to increase turnout and split the votes of the systemic opposition. Based on a database of candidates from single-member districts ( SMD ) in the 2021 regional parliamentary elections in Russia with more than 2,200 unique observations, we show how the participation of candidates from the newly created New People, Green Alternative, and the Russian Party of Freedom and Justice affected the electoral results of United Russia and two parties of the ‘old’ systemic opposition.
{"title":"Substituting the Opposition under Electoral Authoritarianism: The Case of the Russian Regional Parliamentary Elections in 2021","authors":"Daniil Romanov, Ilya Fominykh, Ivan Ankudinov","doi":"10.30965/24518921-00803011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00803011","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Political scientists have long known that modern electoral autocracies can use quasi-democratic institutions to neutralize the danger posed by the opposition. Participation in elections by completely controlled spoiler parties proved to be an effective tool for maintaining authoritarian stability. However, researchers know few cases of how aging authoritarian regimes create systemic semi-independent opposition in order to increase turnout and split the votes of the systemic opposition. Based on a database of candidates from single-member districts ( SMD ) in the 2021 regional parliamentary elections in Russia with more than 2,200 unique observations, we show how the participation of candidates from the newly created New People, Green Alternative, and the Russian Party of Freedom and Justice affected the electoral results of United Russia and two parties of the ‘old’ systemic opposition.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135942884","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-18DOI: 10.30965/24518921-00803008
Allison D. Evans
Abstract Why does the scale and intensity of protest vary so widely across Russian cities? This article answers this question by disaggregating political opportunity structures to consider the interaction between formal and informal political factors through a paired comparison of two similar Russian cities during the turbulent 1990s. Drawing on archival documents, interviews, and an analysis of local media, I argue that the observed variation depends on elite strategies for social control and local governmental institutions. Specifically, when a city’s institutions and political elite strategy match, either with undemocratic institutions and a closed political elite strategy, or with democratic institutions and an open political elite strategy, protests are likely to be small and insignificant. In contrast, when the institutional architecture and political elite strategies mismatch, protests are more likely to be large and intense because there is an opening for protest, but not institutionalized paths for participation.
{"title":"Exploring Local Political Opportunity Structures: Protest and Social Control in Russia’s Provinces","authors":"Allison D. Evans","doi":"10.30965/24518921-00803008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00803008","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Why does the scale and intensity of protest vary so widely across Russian cities? This article answers this question by disaggregating political opportunity structures to consider the interaction between formal and informal political factors through a paired comparison of two similar Russian cities during the turbulent 1990s. Drawing on archival documents, interviews, and an analysis of local media, I argue that the observed variation depends on elite strategies for social control and local governmental institutions. Specifically, when a city’s institutions and political elite strategy match, either with undemocratic institutions and a closed political elite strategy, or with democratic institutions and an open political elite strategy, protests are likely to be small and insignificant. In contrast, when the institutional architecture and political elite strategies mismatch, protests are more likely to be large and intense because there is an opening for protest, but not institutionalized paths for participation.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135942879","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-18DOI: 10.30965/24518921-00803010
Ekaterina Kosevich
Abstract The strengthening of cooperation between Russia and Venezuela has become one of the characteristics of the system of international relations at the beginning of the 21st century. The previously “unfamiliar” states showed a rapid rapprochement in less than two decades, rewriting the established paradigm that only Cuba could be considered as the Kremlin’s strategic partner in Latin America. Russia’s “special operation” in Ukraine, which began on February 24, 2022, unexpectedly led to rapid positive changes in US-Venezuelan relations, once again reminding the world that these countries have historically been important trade and economic partners, which will not change quickly. This raised the Kremlin’s concerns about the impending “loss” of Venezuela. The article provides an analysis of the current state of Russia-Venezuela relations, highlighting the factors that were behind every achievement of Russia in Venezuela, with the coming to power of a left-wing government that defined itself as socialist, anti-capitalist, anti-neoliberal and anti-hegemonic. Highlighting the main areas of the ongoing interaction between Caracas and Washington, the author casts doubt on the prevailing opinion in the literature that Russia has been able to form a full-fledged and long-term strategic partnership with Venezuela.
{"title":"Russia-Venezuela Relations (and US Interests): A Fully-Fledged and Long-Term Strategic Partnership?","authors":"Ekaterina Kosevich","doi":"10.30965/24518921-00803010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00803010","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The strengthening of cooperation between Russia and Venezuela has become one of the characteristics of the system of international relations at the beginning of the 21st century. The previously “unfamiliar” states showed a rapid rapprochement in less than two decades, rewriting the established paradigm that only Cuba could be considered as the Kremlin’s strategic partner in Latin America. Russia’s “special operation” in Ukraine, which began on February 24, 2022, unexpectedly led to rapid positive changes in US-Venezuelan relations, once again reminding the world that these countries have historically been important trade and economic partners, which will not change quickly. This raised the Kremlin’s concerns about the impending “loss” of Venezuela. The article provides an analysis of the current state of Russia-Venezuela relations, highlighting the factors that were behind every achievement of Russia in Venezuela, with the coming to power of a left-wing government that defined itself as socialist, anti-capitalist, anti-neoliberal and anti-hegemonic. Highlighting the main areas of the ongoing interaction between Caracas and Washington, the author casts doubt on the prevailing opinion in the literature that Russia has been able to form a full-fledged and long-term strategic partnership with Venezuela.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":"83 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135942878","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-18DOI: 10.30965/24518921-00803009
Lev Sokolshchik, Yulia Sokolshchik
Abstract The following article addresses the question of why, despite a handful of certain overlapping interests, the U.S and Russia ultimately failed to reach a compromise during their negotiations at the start of the Ukrainian crisis. We aim to reveal the effects of competing national security narratives from both the United States and Russia, and its role in the deterioration of these relations. Though the current crisis in U.S. – Russia relations has been sometime in the making, it became particularly evident in the context of Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine. Based on paradigmatic narrative interpretations, a qualitative text analysis, and a comparative analysis, we examine the two main aspects of the counties’ competing narratives: “national security storytelling” and state “threat perception”. We argue that due to their antagonistic identities, competing worldviews, and equally posing threat perceptions, these narratives have damaged the possibility to overcome contradictions between the United States and Russia. In the long term, these competing narratives may create the preconditions for a systemic confrontation between the countries in world politics.
{"title":"Why U.S. – Russia Relations Failed: An Analysis of Competing National Security Narratives","authors":"Lev Sokolshchik, Yulia Sokolshchik","doi":"10.30965/24518921-00803009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00803009","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The following article addresses the question of why, despite a handful of certain overlapping interests, the U.S and Russia ultimately failed to reach a compromise during their negotiations at the start of the Ukrainian crisis. We aim to reveal the effects of competing national security narratives from both the United States and Russia, and its role in the deterioration of these relations. Though the current crisis in U.S. – Russia relations has been sometime in the making, it became particularly evident in the context of Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine. Based on paradigmatic narrative interpretations, a qualitative text analysis, and a comparative analysis, we examine the two main aspects of the counties’ competing narratives: “national security storytelling” and state “threat perception”. We argue that due to their antagonistic identities, competing worldviews, and equally posing threat perceptions, these narratives have damaged the possibility to overcome contradictions between the United States and Russia. In the long term, these competing narratives may create the preconditions for a systemic confrontation between the countries in world politics.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135942875","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-18DOI: 10.30965/24518921-00803007
Stephen E. Hanson, Jeffrey S Kopstein
Abstract Just over a quarter-century ago, the authors published a widely read essay comparing Weimar Germany and Post-Soviet Russia in historical perspective. After Russia’s unprovoked assault on Ukraine, comparisons of Vladimir Putin’s regime with Nazi Germany are once again tragically relevant. Reexamining our arguments from 1997 shows the continuing relevance of the variables we emphasized in that essay: the burdensome legacies of the past imperial regime, intense international pressure to marketize post-Soviet Russia’s statist economy, and Russia’s weak party system. Three main issues in our earlier article, in retrospect, required greater development: pinpointing the time span needed to assess regime change, distinguishing mobilizational and patrimonial forms of ‘anti-liberal statism,’ and exploring more fully the foreign policy options for would-be defenders of the liberal global order facing powerful revanchist challenges. We conclude that this sort of ‘replication’ of earlier research should be encouraged more often among political scientists adopting the comparative-historical approach.
{"title":"The Weimar/Russia Comparison Revisited","authors":"Stephen E. Hanson, Jeffrey S Kopstein","doi":"10.30965/24518921-00803007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00803007","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Just over a quarter-century ago, the authors published a widely read essay comparing Weimar Germany and Post-Soviet Russia in historical perspective. After Russia’s unprovoked assault on Ukraine, comparisons of Vladimir Putin’s regime with Nazi Germany are once again tragically relevant. Reexamining our arguments from 1997 shows the continuing relevance of the variables we emphasized in that essay: the burdensome legacies of the past imperial regime, intense international pressure to marketize post-Soviet Russia’s statist economy, and Russia’s weak party system. Three main issues in our earlier article, in retrospect, required greater development: pinpointing the time span needed to assess regime change, distinguishing mobilizational and patrimonial forms of ‘anti-liberal statism,’ and exploring more fully the foreign policy options for would-be defenders of the liberal global order facing powerful revanchist challenges. We conclude that this sort of ‘replication’ of earlier research should be encouraged more often among political scientists adopting the comparative-historical approach.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135942877","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-15DOI: 10.30965/24518921-00803004
Nikolay Ternov, Dmitry Mikhailov
The paper proposes a new interpretation of the evolution of legitimacy in Russia based on two pillars: the sociological tradition of legitimacy research, and David Easton’s typology. In this regard, the political process in Russia can be perceived as a conflicting coexistence of various legitimacies. The very conflicting variations begin to prevail in the public consciousness at certain stages of modern Russia existence, not forcing out each other completely. The trends that prevailed in the definition of Russian statehood allow us to distinguish three stages in the legitimacy evolution, which conditionally correspond to each decade of the existence of modern Russia: the “ideological” stage (90s-00s) and the “structural” one (00s-2012). We define the contemporary period as “personal” that emerged after 2012. The current political crisis in Russia is interpreted as a conflict of “structural” and “personal” legitimacy, that is unfolding against the backdrop of attempts by the authorities to compensate for the lack of trust, with technologies of “quick” self-legitimacy.
{"title":"Legitimacies Conflict: The Evolution of Perceived Legitimacy in Modern Russia","authors":"Nikolay Ternov, Dmitry Mikhailov","doi":"10.30965/24518921-00803004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00803004","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000The paper proposes a new interpretation of the evolution of legitimacy in Russia based on two pillars: the sociological tradition of legitimacy research, and David Easton’s typology. In this regard, the political process in Russia can be perceived as a conflicting coexistence of various legitimacies. The very conflicting variations begin to prevail in the public consciousness at certain stages of modern Russia existence, not forcing out each other completely.\u0000The trends that prevailed in the definition of Russian statehood allow us to distinguish three stages in the legitimacy evolution, which conditionally correspond to each decade of the existence of modern Russia: the “ideological” stage (90s-00s) and the “structural” one (00s-2012). We define the contemporary period as “personal” that emerged after 2012. The current political crisis in Russia is interpreted as a conflict of “structural” and “personal” legitimacy, that is unfolding against the backdrop of attempts by the authorities to compensate for the lack of trust, with technologies of “quick” self-legitimacy.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47538329","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-15DOI: 10.30965/24518921-00803005
Robert C. Otto
This paper examines the evidence that the Federal Security Service (FSB) was behind the 1999 apartment bombings to bring Vladimir Putin to power. Although this version of events may prove true, this article posits that evidence for this assertion is lacking and that current arguments for this version have considerable flaws. In addition, although the official version, despite its weaknesses may also well prove true, the paper posits an as yet an unexplored version to explain the bombings as an “inside job.” The paper looks at the atmosphere prevailing in Moscow that Fall and Berezovskii’s purported role in bringing Vladimir Putin to power which is often overstated. Nonetheless, Putin’s failure to conduct a proper investigation of the bombings makes him complicit in them.
{"title":"The 1999 Moscow Bombings Reconsidered","authors":"Robert C. Otto","doi":"10.30965/24518921-00803005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00803005","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000This paper examines the evidence that the Federal Security Service (FSB) was behind the 1999 apartment bombings to bring Vladimir Putin to power. Although this version of events may prove true, this article posits that evidence for this assertion is lacking and that current arguments for this version have considerable flaws. In addition, although the official version, despite its weaknesses may also well prove true, the paper posits an as yet an unexplored version to explain the bombings as an “inside job.” The paper looks at the atmosphere prevailing in Moscow that Fall and Berezovskii’s purported role in bringing Vladimir Putin to power which is often overstated. Nonetheless, Putin’s failure to conduct a proper investigation of the bombings makes him complicit in them.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46043015","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-15DOI: 10.30965/24518921-00803002
O. Masyutina, Ekaterina Paustyan, G. Yakovlev
Russian regions exhibit significant variation in their waste management efforts, despite the urgency of the problem and the importance of waste management for all regional governments. To examine this variation, we apply the concept of authoritarian environmentalism, which suggests that authoritarian governments have distinctive capabilities for tackling certain environmental challenges. Analysis of a regional panel data set for the period 2012-2019 shows that our measure of the degree of authoritarianism – the share of votes for the ruling party United Russia in parliamentary elections – has a strong positive effect on the share of recycled waste in the Russian regions. This result indicates that more authoritarian regions tend to recycle more household waste than less authoritarian regions. However, it could also be the case that more authoritarian governments are simply more likely to manipulate their environmental statistics to show better environmental performance.
{"title":"Environmental Politics in Authoritarian Regimes: Waste Management in Russian Regions","authors":"O. Masyutina, Ekaterina Paustyan, G. Yakovlev","doi":"10.30965/24518921-00803002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00803002","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Russian regions exhibit significant variation in their waste management efforts, despite the urgency of the problem and the importance of waste management for all regional governments. To examine this variation, we apply the concept of authoritarian environmentalism, which suggests that authoritarian governments have distinctive capabilities for tackling certain environmental challenges. Analysis of a regional panel data set for the period 2012-2019 shows that our measure of the degree of authoritarianism – the share of votes for the ruling party United Russia in parliamentary elections – has a strong positive effect on the share of recycled waste in the Russian regions. This result indicates that more authoritarian regions tend to recycle more household waste than less authoritarian regions. However, it could also be the case that more authoritarian governments are simply more likely to manipulate their environmental statistics to show better environmental performance.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45657658","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-15DOI: 10.30965/24518921-00803006
R. Zaporozhchenko
Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine demonstrated the Kremlin’s imperial ambitions. The invasion was not only a shocking event, but also a process of geopolitical transformation. Russia, which has a long history of imperialism, in the 21st century is trying to break the established global world order and propose an alternative one. But the tools it uses are tools of violence, domination, blackmail, and intimidation. This is particularly important to explore in the context of the Russian leadership’s construction of imperial sovereignty, a form of political power used to expand and consolidate the empire’s influence in a particular geopolitical space: the post-Soviet space. This article aims to show the nature of Russian imperial sovereignty as well as the mechanisms of its dissemination, which are modus operandi – dynamic structures of reproduction of the system of power relations.
{"title":"“Shadow of the Empire”: Rethinking Russian Imperial Sovereignty in the Context of the War against Ukraine, 2022","authors":"R. Zaporozhchenko","doi":"10.30965/24518921-00803006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00803006","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine demonstrated the Kremlin’s imperial ambitions. The invasion was not only a shocking event, but also a process of geopolitical transformation. Russia, which has a long history of imperialism, in the 21st century is trying to break the established global world order and propose an alternative one. But the tools it uses are tools of violence, domination, blackmail, and intimidation. This is particularly important to explore in the context of the Russian leadership’s construction of imperial sovereignty, a form of political power used to expand and consolidate the empire’s influence in a particular geopolitical space: the post-Soviet space. This article aims to show the nature of Russian imperial sovereignty as well as the mechanisms of its dissemination, which are modus operandi – dynamic structures of reproduction of the system of power relations.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45242276","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-15DOI: 10.30965/24518921-00803003
Adam Sykes
Russian President Vladimir Putin has demonstrated a keen interest in questions of history and political theory over his more than two decades at or near the apex of Russian power. These questions became particularly salient in Russia’s political discourse after Putin returned to power in 2012 and inaugurated the so-called “conservative turn.” This paper examines how Putin characterized liberalism between his return to power in 2012 and the start of the “special military operation” in Ukraine on 24 February 2022. It contends that, over this decade, Putin consistently positioned himself as a moderate critic of Western liberalism as opposed to an uncompromising ideologue, even after the 2014 Ukraine crisis. To highlight this tendency, this paper simultaneously examines two prominent Russian state television personalities – Dmitrii Kiselev and Vladimir Solov’ev – who have used strident rhetoric in describing Western liberalism, notably after the 2014 crisis in Ukraine.
{"title":"Livid about Liberalism: Putin, State Controlled Television and Kremlin Portrayals of Liberalism","authors":"Adam Sykes","doi":"10.30965/24518921-00803003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00803003","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Russian President Vladimir Putin has demonstrated a keen interest in questions of history and political theory over his more than two decades at or near the apex of Russian power. These questions became particularly salient in Russia’s political discourse after Putin returned to power in 2012 and inaugurated the so-called “conservative turn.” This paper examines how Putin characterized liberalism between his return to power in 2012 and the start of the “special military operation” in Ukraine on 24 February 2022. It contends that, over this decade, Putin consistently positioned himself as a moderate critic of Western liberalism as opposed to an uncompromising ideologue, even after the 2014 Ukraine crisis. To highlight this tendency, this paper simultaneously examines two prominent Russian state television personalities – Dmitrii Kiselev and Vladimir Solov’ev – who have used strident rhetoric in describing Western liberalism, notably after the 2014 crisis in Ukraine.","PeriodicalId":37176,"journal":{"name":"Russian Politics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2023-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46071918","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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