{"title":"为美学的认识原则辩护","authors":"Andrea Sauchelli","doi":"10.1017/epi.2023.50","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Making an adequate aesthetic judgment about an object or an aesthetic property requires first-hand experience of that object or property. Many have suggested that this principle is a valid epistemic norm in the epistemology of the aesthetic. However, some recent philosophers have argued that certain works of conceptual art and other counterexamples disprove the principle in question, even suitably modified. In this paper, I argue that these philosophers are mistaken and that, when properly qualified, the acquaintance principle (in some of its versions) is not threatened by their examples and arguments.","PeriodicalId":46716,"journal":{"name":"Episteme-A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology","volume":"75 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3000,"publicationDate":"2023-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"In Defence of the Acquaintance Principle in Aesthetics\",\"authors\":\"Andrea Sauchelli\",\"doi\":\"10.1017/epi.2023.50\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract Making an adequate aesthetic judgment about an object or an aesthetic property requires first-hand experience of that object or property. Many have suggested that this principle is a valid epistemic norm in the epistemology of the aesthetic. However, some recent philosophers have argued that certain works of conceptual art and other counterexamples disprove the principle in question, even suitably modified. In this paper, I argue that these philosophers are mistaken and that, when properly qualified, the acquaintance principle (in some of its versions) is not threatened by their examples and arguments.\",\"PeriodicalId\":46716,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Episteme-A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology\",\"volume\":\"75 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-10-11\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Episteme-A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2023.50\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Episteme-A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2023.50","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
In Defence of the Acquaintance Principle in Aesthetics
Abstract Making an adequate aesthetic judgment about an object or an aesthetic property requires first-hand experience of that object or property. Many have suggested that this principle is a valid epistemic norm in the epistemology of the aesthetic. However, some recent philosophers have argued that certain works of conceptual art and other counterexamples disprove the principle in question, even suitably modified. In this paper, I argue that these philosophers are mistaken and that, when properly qualified, the acquaintance principle (in some of its versions) is not threatened by their examples and arguments.