负外部效应下的技术采用

IF 0.3 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS B E Journal of Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2023-09-21 DOI:10.1515/bejte-2022-0089

Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau

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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要本文表明，在负面的生产外部效应(如浪费、污染)存在的情况下，市场驱动的技术采用是社会低效的。在新古典主义的框架内考虑了两种不同的市场结构:完全竞争和垄断。在这两种情况下，都存在一系列成本结构，在这些成本结构下，企业更倾向于采用次等技术。一些政策工具被考虑在他们的福利提高属性方面。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Technology Adoption under Negative External Effects

Abstract This paper shows that, in the presence of negative production external effects (e.g., waste, pollution), market-driven technology adoption is socially inefficient. Two distinct market structures are considered within the neoclassical framework: perfect competition and monopoly. In both cases, there is a range of cost structures under which firms prefer the adoption of inferior technologies. A number of policy instruments are considered in terms of their welfare enhancing properties.

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来源期刊

B E Journal of Theoretical Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

0.80

自引率

25.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： We welcome submissions in all areas of economic theory, both applied theory and \"pure\" theory. Contributions can be either innovations in economic theory or rigorous new applications of existing theory. Pure theory papers include, but are by no means limited to, those in behavioral economics and decision theory, game theory, general equilibrium theory, and the theory of economic mechanisms. Applications could encompass, but are by no means limited to, contract theory, public finance, financial economics, industrial organization, law and economics, and labor economics.