{"title":"Suppositiones pro istis dubiis solvendis.奥卡姆的威廉《关于未来或然性的论证》中的未来或然性和预言","authors":"Riccardo Fedriga, Roberto Limonta","doi":"10.21747/21836884/med40a7","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In the Tractatus de praedestinatione et de praescientia Dei respectu futurorum contingentium, Wil-liam of Ockham uses the term suppositio – which in the Summa Logicae was the referential property allowing terms to stand in place of the res – as a translation of Aristotle’s ὑπόθεσις. In the Posterior Analytics, a hypothesis is the necessary premise to the scientific reasoning, assumed without demon-stration but later confirmed by the correctness of the conclusions. In the case of future contingents and prophecies, in the Tractatus, suppositiones are both indemonstrable, as they come from an act of belief, and necessary, since they found the possibility of a logical-demonstrative reasoning about objects that present themselves to the grasp of intellect only ficte. Ockham thus applies the method of propositional logic to a theological context, providing scientific status to the knowledge of future contingents. In this framework, the crucial distinction between present-tensed propositions secun-dum rem and secundum vocem is not a merely linguistic ad hoc solution to the problem of future contingents’ and prophecies’, knowability. Rather, the vocaliter nature of future contingents must be understood as a fictio or a suppositio needed to cut short the causal chain connecting the plane of resto that of cognitive acts, in coherence with Ockham’s theological and ontological parsimony.","PeriodicalId":497912,"journal":{"name":"Mediaevalia, textos e estudos","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Suppositiones pro istis dubiis solvendis. Futuri contingenti e profezie nel Tractatus de praedestinatione et de praescientia Dei respectu futurorum contingentium di Guglielmo di Ockham\",\"authors\":\"Riccardo Fedriga, Roberto Limonta\",\"doi\":\"10.21747/21836884/med40a7\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In the Tractatus de praedestinatione et de praescientia Dei respectu futurorum contingentium, Wil-liam of Ockham uses the term suppositio – which in the Summa Logicae was the referential property allowing terms to stand in place of the res – as a translation of Aristotle’s ὑπόθεσις. In the Posterior Analytics, a hypothesis is the necessary premise to the scientific reasoning, assumed without demon-stration but later confirmed by the correctness of the conclusions. In the case of future contingents and prophecies, in the Tractatus, suppositiones are both indemonstrable, as they come from an act of belief, and necessary, since they found the possibility of a logical-demonstrative reasoning about objects that present themselves to the grasp of intellect only ficte. Ockham thus applies the method of propositional logic to a theological context, providing scientific status to the knowledge of future contingents. In this framework, the crucial distinction between present-tensed propositions secun-dum rem and secundum vocem is not a merely linguistic ad hoc solution to the problem of future contingents’ and prophecies’, knowability. Rather, the vocaliter nature of future contingents must be understood as a fictio or a suppositio needed to cut short the causal chain connecting the plane of resto that of cognitive acts, in coherence with Ockham’s theological and ontological parsimony.\",\"PeriodicalId\":497912,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Mediaevalia, textos e estudos\",\"volume\":\"22 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Mediaevalia, textos e estudos\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.21747/21836884/med40a7\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Mediaevalia, textos e estudos","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.21747/21836884/med40a7","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
在《先验目的地论》中,奥卡姆的威廉姆使用了“假设”一词——在《逻辑总论》中,它是指允许术语代替事实的指称性属性——作为亚里士多德的“ο π ο εσις”的翻译。在后验分析中,假设是科学推理的必要前提,假设不需要证明,但随后会被结论的正确性所证实。至于未来的偶然事件和预言,在《论》中,假设既是不可证明的,因为它们来自于一种信仰的行为,又是必要的,因为它们发现了一种逻辑论证推理的可能性,这种逻辑论证推理是关于那些只有虚构的智力才能掌握的对象的。因此,奥卡姆将命题逻辑的方法应用于神学语境,为未来偶然事件的知识提供了科学地位。在这个框架中,现在时命题secun-dum rem和secundum vocem之间的关键区别不仅仅是对未来偶然事件和预言,可知性问题的语言解决方案。相反,未来偶然事件的发声者本质必须被理解为一种虚构或假设,它需要切断连接恢复和认知行为的因果链,与奥卡姆的神学和本体论的简约一致。
Suppositiones pro istis dubiis solvendis. Futuri contingenti e profezie nel Tractatus de praedestinatione et de praescientia Dei respectu futurorum contingentium di Guglielmo di Ockham
In the Tractatus de praedestinatione et de praescientia Dei respectu futurorum contingentium, Wil-liam of Ockham uses the term suppositio – which in the Summa Logicae was the referential property allowing terms to stand in place of the res – as a translation of Aristotle’s ὑπόθεσις. In the Posterior Analytics, a hypothesis is the necessary premise to the scientific reasoning, assumed without demon-stration but later confirmed by the correctness of the conclusions. In the case of future contingents and prophecies, in the Tractatus, suppositiones are both indemonstrable, as they come from an act of belief, and necessary, since they found the possibility of a logical-demonstrative reasoning about objects that present themselves to the grasp of intellect only ficte. Ockham thus applies the method of propositional logic to a theological context, providing scientific status to the knowledge of future contingents. In this framework, the crucial distinction between present-tensed propositions secun-dum rem and secundum vocem is not a merely linguistic ad hoc solution to the problem of future contingents’ and prophecies’, knowability. Rather, the vocaliter nature of future contingents must be understood as a fictio or a suppositio needed to cut short the causal chain connecting the plane of resto that of cognitive acts, in coherence with Ockham’s theological and ontological parsimony.