人类是唯一理性的动物吗?

IF 1.1 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Pub Date : 2023-09-20 DOI:10.1093/pq/pqad090
Giacomo Melis, Susana Monsó
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引用次数: 0

摘要

虽然越来越多的经验证据表明人类和非人类的心理之间存在连续性,但许多哲学家仍然认为只有人类才能理性地行动和形成信仰。在本文中,我们对这种说法提出了质疑。我们首先澄清合理性的概念。然后,我们关注信仰的合理性,并认为,在相关意义上,人类不是唯一理性的动物。为此,我们首先要区分对信念形成和修正中的认知原因的非反思性和反思性反应。我们认为,非反射性的反应显然是许多动物都能做到的。然后我们认为,反思性反应的一个关键表现是对破坏对手的反应能力。最后,我们提出了一些经验证据,表明一些动物物种有能力处理这些失败者,这意味着即使按照最严格的标准,人类也不是唯一理性的动物。
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Are Humans the Only Rational Animals?
Abstract While growing empirical evidence suggests a continuity between human and non-human psychology, many philosophers still think that only humans can act and form beliefs rationally. In this paper, we challenge this claim. We first clarify the notion of rationality. We then focus on the rationality of beliefs and argue that, in the relevant sense, humans are not the only rational animals. We do so by first distinguishing between unreflective and reflective responsiveness to epistemic reasons in belief formation and revision. We argue that unreflective responsiveness is clearly within the reach of many animals. We then defend that a key demonstration of reflective responsiveness would be the ability to respond to undermining defeaters. We end by presenting some empirical evidence that suggests that some animal species are capable of processing these defeaters, which would entail that even by the strictest standards, humans are not the only rational animals.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.70
自引率
0.00%
发文量
73
期刊介绍: The Philosophical Quarterly is one of the most highly regarded and established academic journals in philosophy. In an age of increasing specialism, it remains committed to publishing high-quality articles from leading international scholars across the range of philosophical study. Accessibility of its content for all philosophers - including students - is an editorial priority. The Philosophical Quarterly regularly publishes articles, discussions and reviews, and runs an annual Essay Prize. Its distinguished international contributors engage with both the established and the new, for example, through reflection on cognitive psychology, decision theory, quantum mechanics.
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