The Best of Both Worlds or the Worst of Both Worlds? Multilateral Development Banks, Immunities and Accountability to Rights-Holders

Multilateral development banks (MDBs) are accorded immunities and privileges as agents of their member states as justified by functionalist arguments. They are also operationally hybrid: they are actors in their own right in addition to being functional agents. Navigating the functionalist imagery and relying on the argument that they are delegated purely economic pursuits (i.e. financing economic development), MDBs are able to eschew accountability to rights-holders that are affected by their decisions and operations. Although administrative law approaches have succeeded in increasing transparency, instilling self-regulatory frameworks and providing for independent review, the absence of external oversight of such review mechanisms and the broad immunities to suit enjoyed by MDBs have impeded true accountability to rights-holders. This article argues that, in so far as they engage in private sector financing operations, MDBs and their constituent arms share the form, function and relationships of an economic corporation to a large extent. Consequently, their immunities should be limited to render them bound—like ordinary corporations- by the domestic norms with respect to rule of law and human rights of the home and host countries in which they operate in order to make them accountable to rights-holders and to provide recourse for wrongdoings.