朦胧的欲望对象(哲学)

IF 0.9 3区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Informal Logic Pub Date : 2024-01-21 DOI:10.22329/il.v43i4.8311
Pau Olmos
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文从论证的修辞学视角出发,对西格尔(H. Siegel)的《用论据论证》(Argumenting with Arguments)一书作出回应。首先,我论述了西格尔的 "抽象命题意义上的论证 "概念,并试图说明它根本不是一个明显的对象,不应该毫无疑问地成为论证理论的重点。然后,我针对西格尔的一些误读,以及他在说服与理性论证之间的关系和我们应如何理解论证规范性的来源方面的一些合理的分歧,为 C. W. 廷代尔关于论证的修辞学观点辩护。
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Cet obscure object du désir (philosophique)
This paper is a response to H. Siegel’s “Arguing with Arguments” from a rhetorical perspective on argumentation. First I address Siegel’s concept of ‘argument in its abstract propositional sense’ and attempt to show that it is not at all an obvious object that should unquestionably be the privileged focus of argumentation theory. I then defend C. W. Tindale’s rhetorical perspective on argumentation against some of Siegel’s misreadings and also some of his legitimate disagreements regarding the relations between persuasion and rational justification and the way we should understand the source of argumentative normativity.
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来源期刊
Informal Logic
Informal Logic PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
1.50
自引率
0.00%
发文量
24
审稿时长
12 weeks
期刊介绍: Informal Logic publishes articles that advance the dialectic in reasoning and argumentation theory and practice. Primary criteria for the acceptance of articles with a theoretical focus or interest are: (1) the article advances the dialectic or constitutes an interesting comment on it: it presents a cogent argument, objection, interpretation or position that is an advance in relation to the background of issues and controversies on the topic; or it casts the issue addressed in a new and worthwhile light; and (2) the article makes explicit reference to the pertinent literature on its topic, and it discharges the burden of proof imposed by that scholarship. Primary criteria for acceptance of articles devoted to the teaching of informal logic, critical thinking or argumentation include: originality; utility; timeliness; and evidence of the effectiveness of the methods, materials, technologies, etc., proposed. The standard criteria for scholarly publication—topical fit with the subjects covered in the journal; adequacy of coverage to the issue addressed; clarity, organization and literateness of the prose; conceptual clarity and cogency of argumentation—apply ceteris paribus to the selection of all articles, notes and reviews.
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