Our goal is to analyze the distinction between factual statements and opinions from a philosophical—specifically an epistemological—perspective. Section 1 reviews the most common criteria for drawing the distinction, which while inadequate, as explained in Section 2, still plays an important cultural and political role. In Section 3, we argue that the difference between factual statements and opinions does not involve a single criterion. Instead, the conceptual structure of the terms ‘fact’ and ‘opinion’ is analogous to that of natural kinds—terms with multiple dimensions. We expect that improved theory will lead to improvements in pedagogy, decision-making, and public discourse. But these consequences are not our chief focus.
{"title":"Fact and Opinion","authors":"Debby Hutchins, David Kelley","doi":"10.22329/il.v43i3.7815","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v43i3.7815","url":null,"abstract":"Our goal is to analyze the distinction between factual statements and opinions from a philosophical—specifically an epistemological—perspective. Section 1 reviews the most common criteria for drawing the distinction, which while inadequate, as explained in Section 2, still plays an important cultural and political role. In Section 3, we argue that the difference between factual statements and opinions does not involve a single criterion. Instead, the conceptual structure of the terms ‘fact’ and ‘opinion’ is analogous to that of natural kinds—terms with multiple dimensions. We expect that improved theory will lead to improvements in pedagogy, decision-making, and public discourse. But these consequences are not our chief focus.","PeriodicalId":45902,"journal":{"name":"Informal Logic","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135733628","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The aim of this paper is to challenge the idea that Toulmin’s main focus in The Uses of Argument is to critique formal deductive logic. I first try to challenge the argument that, on the basis of what Toulmin says about analytic arguments, it is impossible to determine exactly what they are. I will then attempt to determine the basic contours of analytic arguments. Finally, I will conclude that the concept of an analytic argument involves epistemological assumptions to which formal logicians are in no way committed by the nature of their discipline.
{"title":"Do We Really Not Know What Toulmin’s Analytic Arguments Are?","authors":"Tomáš Kollárik","doi":"10.22329/il.v43i3.7263","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v43i3.7263","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this paper is to challenge the idea that Toulmin’s main focus in The Uses of Argument is to critique formal deductive logic. I first try to challenge the argument that, on the basis of what Toulmin says about analytic arguments, it is impossible to determine exactly what they are. I will then attempt to determine the basic contours of analytic arguments. Finally, I will conclude that the concept of an analytic argument involves epistemological assumptions to which formal logicians are in no way committed by the nature of their discipline.","PeriodicalId":45902,"journal":{"name":"Informal Logic","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135733620","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In making analogical arguments about actions, is more similarity between the source and target cases always better? No: all things considered, more similarity is not always better, even if the similarities are all relevant. The reason is that the context of the argument, including emotional considerations, modulates the selection of the source case to service the goals of the argument. If the goals of the argument include persuasion and even modifying someone’s emotional state, increasing the overall similarity between the source and target may be counterproductive.
{"title":"Case Study of Contextual and Emotional Modulation of Source-case Selection in Analogical Arguments","authors":"Marcello Guarini","doi":"10.22329/il.v43i3.7802","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v43i3.7802","url":null,"abstract":"In making analogical arguments about actions, is more similarity between the source and target cases always better? No: all things considered, more similarity is not always better, even if the similarities are all relevant. The reason is that the context of the argument, including emotional considerations, modulates the selection of the source case to service the goals of the argument. If the goals of the argument include persuasion and even modifying someone’s emotional state, increasing the overall similarity between the source and target may be counterproductive.","PeriodicalId":45902,"journal":{"name":"Informal Logic","volume":"153 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135733825","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper provides methodological tools and considers the reasons why it is difficult to address the controversial question, “Are fallacies frequent?” After preliminary remarks on the need to clarify the meaning of both ‘fallacy’ and ‘frequency,’ this paper shows that the emphasis on whether fallacies occur frequently is recent and bound to contemporary definitions that make it a necessary condition. Then, it discusses three different, debated empirical approaches that are intended to support the claim that fallacies are frequent. All of them raise doubts or objections or are even controversial from a methodological point of view. Ultimately, more empirical research is needed to answer this question.
{"title":"Are Fallacies Frequent ?","authors":"Michel Dufour","doi":"10.22329/il.v43i3.7124","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v43i3.7124","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides methodological tools and considers the reasons why it is difficult to address the controversial question, “Are fallacies frequent?” After preliminary remarks on the need to clarify the meaning of both ‘fallacy’ and ‘frequency,’ this paper shows that the emphasis on whether fallacies occur frequently is recent and bound to contemporary definitions that make it a necessary condition. Then, it discusses three different, debated empirical approaches that are intended to support the claim that fallacies are frequent. All of them raise doubts or objections or are even controversial from a methodological point of view. Ultimately, more empirical research is needed to answer this question.","PeriodicalId":45902,"journal":{"name":"Informal Logic","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135734898","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper explores the relationship between intellectual virtues and critical thinking, both as such and as educational ends worth pursuing. The first half of the paper examines the intersection of intellectual virtue and critical thinking. The second half addresses a recent argument to the effect that educating for intellectual virtues (in contrast to educating for critical thinking) is insufficiently action-guiding and therefore lacks a suitable pedagogy.
{"title":"Educating for Good Thinking: Virtues, Skills, or Both?","authors":"J. Baehr","doi":"10.22329/il.v43i2.8008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v43i2.8008","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores the relationship between intellectual virtues and critical thinking, both as such and as educational ends worth pursuing. The first half of the paper examines the intersection of intellectual virtue and critical thinking. The second half addresses a recent argument to the effect that educating for intellectual virtues (in contrast to educating for critical thinking) is insufficiently action-guiding and therefore lacks a suitable pedagogy.","PeriodicalId":45902,"journal":{"name":"Informal Logic","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49594296","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This work is a revision of the False Dilemma Fallacy (FDF). The formalized model (FM)of this fallacy has as its centerpiece a valid disjunctive syllogism, but the disjunctive premise is presumed to be false, thus making the argument unsound. Our revised model (FM2.0) focuses on the formal structure by comparing the given vs. the real argument, which is unsound because of its invalidity. This approach we believe is more pedagogically useful and a better explanation of the fallacious nature of the FDF. It extends the identity of “formal fallacy” to the FDF. The abstract is formatted in two columns. The English abstract goes on this side.
{"title":"Something Called the ‘False Dilemma Fallacy’ (FDF): A Return to Formalization Just This Time","authors":"Rory J. Conces, Matthias J. Walters","doi":"10.22329/il.v43i2.7171","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v43i2.7171","url":null,"abstract":"This work is a revision of the False Dilemma Fallacy (FDF). The formalized model (FM)of this fallacy has as its centerpiece a valid disjunctive syllogism, but the disjunctive premise is presumed to be false, thus making the argument unsound. Our revised model (FM2.0) focuses on the formal structure by comparing the given vs. the real argument, which is unsound because of its invalidity. This approach we believe is more pedagogically useful and a better explanation of the fallacious nature of the FDF. It extends the identity of “formal fallacy” to the FDF. The abstract is formatted in two columns. The English abstract goes on this side.","PeriodicalId":45902,"journal":{"name":"Informal Logic","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43681594","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ISSNe, Facultad DE Arquitectura, Y. Urbanismo, U. D. Chile, Junio
{"title":"In Memoriam","authors":"ISSNe, Facultad DE Arquitectura, Y. Urbanismo, U. D. Chile, Junio","doi":"10.22329/il.v43i2.8057","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v43i2.8057","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45902,"journal":{"name":"Informal Logic","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41494227","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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